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Abstract 
 
Over the last years the combat against climate change has become a top priority for the 
European Union. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first and 
biggest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances, while it 
is considered by the European Commission as the cornerstone of Europe’s “green” policies 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industry in a cost-effective way. 
The present thesis focuses on two specific features of the EU ETS: auctioning and trading of 
emission allowances. It is thus a study of both the primary and secondary markets created by 
the EU ETS. The more specific scope of the thesis was on one hand to collect information, 
analyze and assess the auctions held in the different phases of EU ETS from 2005 onwards 
as a means of allowance allocation in the primary market and on the other hand to review the 
various emission allowances products traded in the European carbon exchanges and the 
monitoring rules governing the carbon market. 
In particular, the auctions held during the first two phases of EU ETS and the early auctions 
of phase III emission allowances during 2012 are presented in detail and they are assessed in 
terms of the extend of the implementation of the process, auctioning design, and auction 
results. Additionally, in order to draw conclusions regarding the statistical relationships 
between the primary market and the secondary market of emission allowances this thesis 
uses the following statistical tools: correlation, covariance, mean equality test, and variance 
equality test. The selected variables are divided in pairs and each pair is examined separately, 
so as to investigate the dependences between the variables. 
Focus was also placed on the auctioning system due to be implemented with the next 
months, in the context of the third trading period starting in 2013 and the adjustments yet to 
be done by the European Commission are also presented. 
A detailed analysis of all GHG emissions trading products as offered in both primary and 
secondary markets is further provided. This analysis is divided into two parts. In the first 
part, all features of the different emission products, including price and volume statistics and 
contract types are examined , with special reference to European exchange platforms in 
place. In the second  part, the relationships between the different products and between the 
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different contracts of the same product are examined by using the aforementioned statistical 
tools. It is especially investigated the degree of interdependence between the four main 
products traded in the European carbon exchanges (EUAs, CERs, ERUs, and EUAAs) and 
the price interrelationship of the different contracts (spot, futures) offered for each product.  
Regulation and market oversight remains a critical parameter in ensuring proper market 
functioning and preventing market abuse.  An in depth investigation of the European 
Commission monitoring rules either already in place or in a proposal status to prohibit 
market abuse, including the recent REMIT regulation for monitoring the wholesale energy 
markets and its potential interdependences with EU ETS, is also included in the last part of 
this thesis. 
The work has lead to some basic conclusions: 
 The primary emission allowances market seems to be in interdependence with the 
secondary carbon market. There are clear indications that the level of the 
secondary market price determines the clearing price and thus a well-functioning 
secondary market has a positive effect on the primary market. 
 Both the primary and the secondary markets have obtained the characteristics of 
any other commodity market across the globe. The evolution of prices according 
to the market participants’ expectations, the increasing transacted volumes, the 
open access to all interested parties, the different contract types, and the growing 
volume and value are strong indications that the carbon market as a whole and 
especially the European secondary market  have obtained the features of the 
markets for other types of commodities. 
 The smooth transition from phase II to phase III of the EU ETS is considered of 
paramount importance by the Commission. The Commission tries to obtain this 
orderly transition in two ways: Primarily through the establishment of a reliable 
scheme that ensures efficient auctioning as from 2013 and thereinafter through the 
implementation of early auctions. The Commission estimates that the former 
facilitates the transition for the primary market, while the latter corresponds to the 
secondary market participants’ needs.  
 In an expanding carbon market the Commission tries to obtain a constantly 
evolving legal framework in order to ensure the integrity of the market and secure 
fair and efficient trading conditions. 
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1. Introductory Chapter 
During the last two decades of the 20
th
 century governments and international 
organizations around the world started to recognize the need to limit the global warming 
phenomenon and became active in the combat against climate change. 
Therefore, in 1988 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) created the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The role of the new-established organization was “to assess on a comprehensive, 
objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced 
climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation” (IPCC 
web page, 2012, A, p.1). 
Furthermore, in 1992 countries joined the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The scope of this international treaty was “the stabilization 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC web page, 
2012). The treaty categorizes the countries in Annex I (developed and economies in 
transition), Annex II (developed) and non-Annex I (developing). 
The Convention adopted at the “Rio Earth Summit” in 1992 and entered into force in 
1994. Today 195 countries have ratified it and are called Parties to the Convention. 
However, the most decisive step forward was done in 1997 during the 3
rd
 Conference of 
the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, when the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto 
protocol was of paramount importance since it set quantitative and binding targets for 
GHG emission reductions.  
The protocol was drafted in 1997, signed in 1998, but it entered into force in 16 February 
2005. That happened because it required ratification from more than 55 countries 
representing more than 55% of GHG emissions. As a consequence it entered into force 
after ratification from the Russian Federation. Today 193 countries have ratified the 
protocol and it covers 6 GHGs: CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs, SF6. 
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To the industrialized and developed countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
minus Belarus (Annex I of the UNFCCC) has been set the target to reduce their emissions 
by 5.2% below 1990 levels over the period 2008-2012. In particular: 
 -8% for EU 
 -7% for USA 
 -6% for Japan, Canada, Poland and Hungary 
 -5% for Croatia 
 0 for New Zealand, Russian Federation and Ukraine 
 +1% for Norway 
 +8% for Australia 
 +10% for Iceland 
 No reduction for EIT (economies in transition) countries. 
It has to be noticed that the 15 States who were EU members in 1997 when the Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted, took advantage of a scheme under the protocol known as a 
“bubble”. This scheme gives the countries the opportunity to redistribute among 
themselves the target of 8%. In plain words countries can have different individual 
targets, but which combined make an overall target for that group of countries (UNFCCC 
web page, 2012, B). 
The reader can find all the relevant information in Table 1.1. The table is a summary of 
the Annex B countries, their emissions limitations, the base years they used for their GHG 
reductions and their total national emissions. 
Table
 
1.1: Annex B countries and their targets under the Kyoto protocol (UNFCCC web 
page, 2012, C) 
Party Quantified 
emissions 
reductions 
(percentages of 
the base year 
or the period 
level) 
Base year for 
CO2, CH4 and 
N2O 
Base year for F-
gases 
Total national 
emissions 
(tonnesCO2 
equivalent) 
Australia 108 1990 1990 547,699,841 
Austria 87 1990 1990 79,049,657 
Belarus**
 
92 - 1995 - 
Belgium 92.5 1990 1995 145,728,763 
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Party Quantified 
emissions 
reductions 
(percentages of 
the base year 
or the period 
level) 
Base year for 
CO2, CH4 and 
N2O 
Base year for F-
gases 
Total national 
emissions 
(tonnesCO2 
equivalent) 
Bulgaria*
 
92 1988 1995 132,618,658 
Canada 94 1990 1990 593,998,462 
Croatia
 
95 1990 1990 31,321,790 
Czech Republic*
 
92 1990 1995 194,248,218 
Denmark 79 1990 1995 69,978,070 
Estonia*
 
92 1990 1995 42,622,312 
European Union 92 1990 1990 or 1995 4,265,517,719 
Finland 100 1990 1995 71,003,509 
France 100 1990 1990 563,925,328 
Germany 79 1990 1995 1,232,429,543 
Greece 125 1990 1995 106,987,169 
Hungary*
 
94 1985-1987 1995 115,397,149 
Iceland 110 1990 1990 3,367,972 
Ireland 113 1990 1995 55,607,836 
Italy 93.5 1990 1990 516,850,887 
Japan 94 1990 1995 1,261,331,418 
Latvia*
 
92 1990 1995 25,909,159 
Liechtenstein 92 1990 1990 229,483 
Lithuania*
 
92 1990 1995 49,414,386 
Luxemburg 72 1990 1995 13,167,499 
Monaco 92 1990 1995 107,658 
Netherlands 94 1990 1995 213,034,498 
New Zealand 100 1990 1990 61,912,947 
Norway 101 1990 1990 49,619,168 
Poland*
 
94 1988 1995 563,442,774 
Portugal 127 1990 1995 60,147,642 
Romania*
 
92 1989 1989 278,225,022 
Russian Federation*
 
100 1990 1995 3,323,419,064 
Slovakia*
 
92 1990 1990 72,050,764 
Slovenia*
 
92 1986 1995 20,354,042 
Spain 115 1990 1995 289,773,205 
Sweden 104 1990 1995 72,151,646 
Switzerland 92 1990 1990 52,790,957 
Ukraine*
 
100 1990 1990 920,836,933 
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
87.5 1990 1995 779,904,144 
Notes:  
* EIT countries (Economies In Transition) 
** The amendment to the Kyoto Protocol with an emission reduction target for 
Belarus adopted by decision 10/CMP.2 has not entered into force yet. 
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Nevertheless, the essential breakthrough was the implementation of the market-based 
mechanisms (also known as flexible mechanisms or flexibility mechanisms or Kyoto 
mechanisms) through the Kyoto Protocol. The committed parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
have an obligation to reduce their GHG emissions and meet their individual targets via 
national measures. Alternatively the protocol provided for the possibility to use three market-
based mechanisms, thereby introducing what is known as the carbon market
4 
(UNFCCC web 
page, 2012, D). 
The market-based mechanisms are: 
a) Emission Trading (transactions of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs),  
b) Clean Development Mechanism (transactions of Certified Emission Reduction 
Units (CERs)) 
c) Joint Implementation (transactions of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)) 
In this introductory Chapter only the concepts of the three market based mechanism are 
discussed. A detailed presentation regarding the products linked to them can be found in 
Chapter 4.  
 Emission Trading and AAUs 
As presented above under the Kyoto Protocol the Annex B countries have targets regarding 
their emissions of CO2. Over the commitment period (2008-2012) these levels of allowed 
emissions (assigned amounts) are divided into Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), where one 
AAU is an asset representing one tone of CO2 equivalent. 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows countries that have a surplus of AAUs to sell the 
excess capacity to countries that are not meeting their targets. In this way AAUs can be 
traded as a commodity (UNFCCC web page, 2012, E). 
There are also some other forms of units that can be traded under the emission trading 
scheme and each equals one tone of CO2. These units are: a) A removal unit (RMU) on the 
basis of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)activities such as reforestation, 
b) an emission reduction unit (ERU) generated by a joint implementation project, and c) 
a certified emission reduction (CER) generated from a clean development mechanism project 
activity.  
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The emission trading schemes may be established as climate policy instruments at the 
national level and the regional level. Under such schemes, governments set emissions 
obligations to be reached by the participating entities. The EU ETS is such a scheme and is 
the largest in operation.  
It has to be noticed that within the EU ETS the tradable asset is the European Union 
Allowance (EUA), which equals one AAU. Nevertheless the AAUs are not a direct 
substitute for EUAs, since they are not allowed for compliance in the EU ETS (Ramming, 
2008, p. 2). 
The transactions of units are tracked and recorded through registry systems under the 
protocol, while an International Transaction Log (ITL) ensures secure transfer of emission 
reduction units between countries. 
 Clean Development Mechanism and CERs 
The CDM is defined by article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and allows Annex B parties to 
invest in an emission-reduction project in developing countries. The investor is rewarded 
with Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), each equivalent to one tone of CO2, which are 
issued by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board.  
The CERs are tradable and provide some flexibility in how the parties under the protocol 
meet their emission reduction targets. The CERs can also be used for compliance under the 
EU ETS.  CERs are traded in both the primary and the secondary market. 
At the same time there are benefits for the developing countries as CDM projects contribute 
in sustainable development. As a prerequisite a CDM project must provide emission 
reductions that are additional to what would otherwise have occurred. A project, in order to 
be categorized as a CDM project, must be evaluated and qualify through a process that 
involves the seven steps presented in Table 1.2. It has to be pointed out that each CDM 
project is evaluated by a private third party certifier under the rules of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Designated Operational Entity). 
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Table 1.2: Steps for an investor to follow for the registration of a CDM project and the 
issuance of CERs (UNFCCC web page, 2012, F) 
a) Project design. The project participant prepares a project design document (PDD). 
b) National approval. The project participant secures letter of approval from Party. In 
particular Designated National Authority (DNA) of the host submits a letter indicating the 
host has ratified Kyoto and that participation is voluntary, while that project contributes to 
sustainable development. 
c) Validation. The project design document is validated by accredited Designated 
Operational Entity (DOE), private third-party certifier. 
d) Registration. Valid project submitted by DOE to CDM Executive Board with request 
for registration. 
e) Monitoring. The project participant is responsible for monitoring actual emissions 
according to approved methodology. 
f) Verification & certification. The DOE verifies that emission reductions took place, in 
the amount claimed, according to approved monitoring plan. 
g) CER issuance. The DOE submits verification report with request for issuance to CDM 
Executive Board. 
 Joint Implementation and ERUs 
The rationale behind JI is the same as in the case of CDM. JI is defined under article 6 of 
Kyoto protocol and through this mechanism an Annex B party can reduce its emissions by 
investing in projects in one other Annex B party exclusively. The investor is rewarded with 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), each equivalent to one tone of CO2 (UNFCCC web page, 
2012, G).  
Under the JI mechanism the investing parties have another flexible and cost-efficient way to 
fulfilling a part of their Kyoto commitments, while the host country benefits from foreign 
investment and technology transfer. 
Again, as a prerequisite a JI project must provide emission reductions that are additional to 
what would otherwise had occurred. The host country has to approve the project and 
participants have to be authorized to participate by a Party involved in the project. 
Annex B parties are obliged to comply the criteria presented in Table 1.3 in order to use the 
JI mechanisms. 
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Table 1.3: Criteria to be met by the Annex B parties in order to use the JI mechanism 
a) They must be parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
b) The allowed emission levels must be calculated in a number 
equivalent to CO2 emissions. 
c) A regional system must have been set (e.g. national registry) in order 
to calculate the emissions and eliminations of greenhouse gases. 
d) They must have set a group of competent authorities to check the 
transfer of ERUs and to submit this data to the secretariat. 
e) All the information must be collected and provided to the secretariat 
every year. 
f) The relevant information is submitted under certain rules defined in 
the Kyoto Protocol 
 
It has to be noticed that eligible as JI projects are the projects starting as from the year 2000 
and meet the relevant requirements. However ERUs may only be issued for a crediting 
period starting after the beginning of 2008. 
Under the JI mechanism there is also another distinction regarding the procedures the party 
must follow, related to the above mentioned requirements. 
i) Track 1 procedure. In the case that a host party meets all the above eligibility criteria 
may verify emission reductions or enhancements of removals from a JI project and may issue 
the appropriate quantity of ERUs. This procedure is commonly referred to as the Track 1 
procedure. 
ii) Track 2 procedure. If a party meets some of the requirements can steel host a JI project, 
but this can be done only through the verification procedure under the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC). Under this track 2 procedure, the party has to comply with 
the requirements and especially with the paragraphs a), b) and d) of the eligibility 
requirements. Only then it is possible for this party to transfer ERUs. 
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1.1 Europe is taking action  
After the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol the combat against climate change has become a 
top priority for the European Union. The Commission acknowledges that fighting climate 
change carries a cost, but estimates that if Europe does not take action it will be far more 
expensive in the long run. This position is in full consonance with the conclusions deriving 
from the famous Stern Review. 
According to scientific evidence global warming is needed to be limited to at least 2ºC above 
the pre-industrial temperature. EU estimates that to stay within this ceiling the world has to 
halt the rising trend in global greenhouse gas emissions before 2020, at least halve global 
emissions by the middle of this century and continue this reducing trend thereafter. The 20-
20-20 target is one of the EU’s indicative responses to the previous facts, since it set specific 
goals to be met by the EU until 2020 and compared with 1990 levels. In particular it sets the 
targets of efficiency improvement in energy sector by 20%, the GHG emissions reduction by 
20%, and 20% share in energy mix for Renewable Sources. 
The strategy followed by the EU to rein climate change is an aggregation of different 
initiatives that have either already been implemented or been proposed to member states and 
the European Parliament. Those policies include: 
1) The improvement of energy efficiency of a wide array of equipment and 
household appliances. 
2) The increased use of renewable energy sources. 
3) Supporting the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. 
4) Developing a comprehensive EU adaptation strategy that strengthens Europe's 
resilience to climate change. 
5) The European Climate Change Programme (launched in 2000), which has led to 
the adoption of a wide range of new policies and measures, including the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). 
 
1.2 The present thesis 
This thesis focuses on two specific features of the EU ETS: auctioning and trading of 
emission allowances. Nevertheless, one must have in mind that these features are only two of 
the various functions taking place under the general context of the EU ETS. Moreover the 
[17] 
 
EU ETS has some special characteristics that make it a really unique scheme. Consequently, 
a brief description of the system is given bellow in order the outline of the dissertation to be 
clear. 
The European Commission considers EU ETS to be the cornerstone of Europe’s “green” 
policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industry in a cost-effective way. The 
EU ETS, which entered into force in 2005, was the first large-scale emissions trading scheme 
in the world and currently covers some 11,000 installations in 30 countries (DG Clima of the 
European Commission web page, 2012, A). 
Particularly it has to be pointed out that the EU ETS is a “cap and trade” program. 
Essentially, each allowance represents the right to emit one tone of CO2 - or an amount of 
another greenhouse gas giving the same contribution to global warming as one tone of CO2.  
A “cap” is defined as the aggregate of emission allowances issued for a given year to 
installations in each Member State and as a result the total level of emissions under the 
scheme is determined by the sum of all the caps in the EU (ILEX ENERGY Consulting, 
2005, p. 4). In this way there is set a ceiling on the amount of greenhouse gasses that can be 
emitted by the installations in the scheme. 
By the 30
th
 of April of every year, each installation participating in the scheme must 
surrender a number of allowances at least equal to its emissions for the year. If the source 
does not turn in sufficient allowances, it must pay a heavy penalty. Over time, the emissions 
caps will decline and fewer allowances will be issued, forcing CO2 emissions to decline as 
well to the enacted levels of the cap.  
Before the start of the first and the second trading periods, each Member State had to decide 
how many allowances to allocate in total for a trading period and how many each installation 
covered by the Emissions Trading System would receive. The quantity of emission 
allowances that Member States distributed for free to the installations in those periods were 
set out by the National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Although, there will be no NAP for the 
third trading period, as the allocation will be determined directly at EU level
2 
(DG Clima of 
the European Commission web page, 2012, B).  
Nevertheless, the EU intention is to auction as many allowances as possible rather than 
giving them for free. The term “trade” implies the possibility that have the participants in the 
market to exchange emission allowances. In this way the European Commission estimates 
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that the compliance cost is minimized and emission sources have greater flexibility. There 
are studies indicating that Emissions trading does not inevitably impose net costs on 
industry. Despite initially opposing the EU ETS, all participating industrial sectors in Europe 
have in aggregate profited from its operation to date – perhaps excessively. Whether or not a 
sector profits, loses or is neutral depends upon design choices, particularly around allocation 
(Crubb et al., 2011, p. 7).   
The market sets the price for the allowances and thus transactions are taking place. For 
example if an installation has the opportunity to reduce one ton of emissions at a cost lower 
than the price of an allowance, the EU ETS gives it the profit incentive to reduce emissions 
and sell allowances. Additionally, firms are motivated to develop and deploy new, lower-
cost means to reduce emissions (Leggett et al., 2012, p. 10) 
Another particularity of the scheme is the Trading Period. The Commission tried to 
neutralize the annual irregularities in CO2-emission levels. For a sequence of several years 
installations knew, a priori from the NAP, how many allowances they were going to get at 
the beginning of each year N to cover year N. Each such sequence of years is called a 
Trading Period. The first Trading Period had covered all EU ETS emissions since 1
st
 of 
January 2005 and expired in the 31
st
 of December 2007. Since the 1
st
 of January 2008, the 
second Trading Period is under way and will last until the 31
st
 of December 2012. The 3rd 
trading period is going to become effective from the 1
st
 of January 2013 and will last until 
the 31
st
 of December 2020. 
During the first two Trading Periods Member States had to submit their National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) for approval from the European Commission. The NAPs determined (under 
the term that they approved by the EC) the caps, the number of allowances distributed for 
free, the volume to be stored for new-comers in the New Entrants Reserve (NER) and the 
amount of credits to be auctioned. 
 From the beginning of Phase III the NAPs no longer exist. The cap will decrease 
continuously from 2013 onwards by 1.74% each year in order the number of emission 
allowances to be 21% below the 2005 level. Allocation will be based on EU - wide 
harmonized allocation rules and auctions are going to be held in European Level. Only 
Germany, UK and Poland will continue to carry out auctions separately.  
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From 2013 at least 50% of credits will have to be sold at auctions and the aim is to reach full 
auctioning by 2027. Exceptions can be made for specific energy intensive industries where it 
is judged that having to buy all allowances would damage their international 
competitiveness. 
The above brief presentation provides for a better understanding regarding the frame in 
which auctioning and trading operate. However, scope of this thesis is the evaluation of 
auctioning and trading under the EU ETS. In particular it tries to draw conclusions by 
examining, displaying, and assessing the auctions held in the different phases of EU ETS, the 
various emission allowances products traded in the European carbon exchanges, and the 
monitoring rules governing the carbon market. 
The main body of this study is separated in four Chapters (Chapters 2 to 5). Chapter 2 covers 
the auctions held during the first two phases of the EU ETS, Chapter 3 provides a description 
of the auctioning system from 2013 onwards and discusses the early auctions of phase III 
emission allowances during 2012, Chapter 4 displays the various emission allowances 
products traded in the European exchanges, while Chapter 5 perform an investigation 
regarding the monitoring rules in place to prohibit market abuse. The conclusions of the 
present thesis can be found in Chapter 6. 
In particular, the second Chapter tries to provide an overview of the auctions carried out 
during the first and the second trading period of the EU ETS and assesses their 
implementation and their results. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation offers the 
first empirical analysis of the design and the results of the implemented emission allowances 
auctions from certain Member States during phase II of the EU ETS. 
It also contains a detailed presentation of the main auction methods in order to conclude 
which is the best possible solution, if any. Finally, it displays the arguments of those in favor 
of auctioning and the supporters of the grandfathering solutions. 
The third Chapter aims at providing a survey of the auctioning system to be implemented 
as from the third trading period starting in 2013. The subject of this Chapter is extremely 
dynamic since the third trading period has not started yet, while the European Commission 
has to make some final adjustments by January 2013. Consequently this Chapter quotes 
information regarding the rules to be governing the auctions during phase III, while it cites 
the leftovers that the European Commission has to deal with.  
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Additionally, it includes a detailed overview of the so called “early auctions” and the 
auctions under the NER 300 initiative. It has to be mentioned that this study offers the first 
empirical analysis of the early auctions of phase III emission allowances held in 2012. 
Scope of the subsequent Chapter is to provide a thorough review of all GHG emissions 
trading products as offered in both primary and secondary markets and is divided into two 
parts. The first part of the Chapter deals with the three products linked to the Kyoto Protocol; 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs) and Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) as offered in the primary market.  The second part of this Chapter 
focus on the secondary market of all GHG emission related products as realized through the 
European exchange platforms. 
Under this scope all the special features of all the different emission products including price 
and volume statistics and contract types with special reference to European exchange 
platforms in place are presented. To the best of my knowledge this is the first time that a 
study is gathering such an amount of the various trading analytics of the different emission 
credit products transacted both in the primary and in the secondary market.  
The fifth Chapter, finally, is performing an in depth investigation of the monitoring rules in 
place to prohibit market abuse including the recent REMIT regulation for monitoring the 
wholesale energy markets and the potential interdependences with EU ETS. In this context 
the Chapter provides a detailed presentation of all the legal “tools” in place constituting the 
market oversight framework.  
All these legal “tools” and their provisions are examined carefully, while the reader can find 
a detailed presentation regarding the specific role of each “tool”. As far as I know this 
Chapter offers the first assessment regarding the implications of REMIT in the carbon 
markets, while it is the first time that the entire legal framework governing the European 
carbon markets is put together under the same study. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
In Chapters 1, 2, and 3 the price behavior of different products and the price behavior of 
different contracts of the same product are examined. In order to draw conclusions regarding 
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the statistical relationships between the different variables this thesis uses the following 
tools: correlation, covariance, mean equality test, and variance equality test. 
Correlation indicates the degree of linear dependence between the variables. The correlation 
between the variables can take values between -1 and +1. When the correlation is +1 there is 
perfect positive linear relationship between the variables, while the value of -1 is indicating a 
perfect negative linear relationship. All the other values indicate the degree of linear 
dependence between the variables and as the correlation approaches zero there is less of a 
relationship.  
In plane words the correlation indicates the relationship between two variables. For example 
a correlation close to +1 (-1) indicates that the two variables are related and are moving to 
the same (opposite) direction.  
Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that the statistical dependence is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the presence of a causal relationship. Thus, the correlation is only an indication 
regarding the relationship of two variables. 
Covariance of two random variables is a measure of how much these two variables are 
changing together. A positive covariance is an indication that the two variables are showing 
a similar behavior. In the case that the covariance is a negative number the variables tend to 
show opposite behavior.  
For example, if the two variables tend to achieve their greater values (or the smaller values) 
together then the covariance is a positive number. If the greater values of the one variable 
mainly correspond to the smaller values of the other then the covariance is a negative 
number.  
Once again, it is pointed out that the covariance is an indication regarding the behavior of the 
two random variables. Furthermore the magnitude of the covariance is not that easy to 
interpret and under this thesis it is not taken into account. 
The mean equality tests presented in this thesis have been performed in the EViews 
econometric and forecasting program. This test is a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the 
variability between the sample means (between groups) should be the same as the variability 
within any subgroup (within group).  The tests assume that the subsamples are independent.  
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Essentially, the test evaluates the null hypothesis that the means in all subgroups are equal 
against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different mean. However in order to 
perform the test we first have to normalize our series because they are referred to different 
products (in order to normalize a series we divide the difference of series to mean by the 
standard deviation). After the performance of the test we take a table with the test results (see 
Table 1.4).  
Table 1.4: Results of mean equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 48 2.09E-15 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 48.00000 2.09E-15 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 48) 4.36E-30 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 48) 4.36E-30 1.0000 
     
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
If the  four different methods (t-test, Satterthwaite-Welch t-test, Anova F-test, and Welch F-
test) have a probability greater than 0.05 then we do not reject the null hypothesis and thus 
there is a probability (in Table 1.4 the probability is 95% in all the methods) that the means 
are equal, which is an indication of co-movement of the two variables.  
The variance equality tests presented in this thesis have also been performed in the EViews 
econometric and forecasting program. The test evaluates the null hypothesis that the variance 
in all subgroups are equal against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different 
variance. In order to perform this test we do not have to normalize our series. After the 
performance of the test we take a table with the test results (see Table 1.5).  
Table 1.5: Results of variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (24, 24) 1.071461 0.8671 
Siegel-Tukey  0.106723 0.9150 
Bartlett 1 0.027997 0.8671 
Levene (1, 48) 0.023302 0.8793 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 48) 0.002697 0.9588 
     
     
If the five different methods (F-test, Siegel-Tukey, Barlett, Levene, and Brown-Forsythe) 
have a probability greater than 0.05 (as in the Table 1.5) then we do not reject the null 
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hypothesis and thus there is a probability (in this case at least 81.71% according to F-test and 
Barlett methods) that the variances are equal, which is an indication of co-movement of the 
two series.  
Finally, it has to be pointed out that in all the cases that are used statistical tools within this 
thesis the number of observation is relatively small. Thus, the statisticall tools cannot be 
considered sufficient in order to demonstrate the causal relationships. Nevertheless, these 
tools provide valuable indications regarding the underlying relationships. 
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Chapter 2: Allowances at auction 
 
2.1 Introduction and literature review 
When the Directive 2003/87/EC (the Directive that established the scheme for GHG 
emission allowance trading within the Community) was still under negotiation one of the hot 
topics was whether Member States should sell (auction) emission credits or distribute them 
for free (grandfathering). The economists recommended to the European Commission to 
allow Member States auction as many allowances as possible, while the firms wanted the 
majority of credits for free (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 137). The final result seems to be in the 
favor of the installations. Specifically for the 1
st
 trading period decided that Member States 
could auction up to 5% of allowances and up to 10% for the 2
nd
 trading period.  
The second section of the Chapter (Section 2.2) reviews studies available in the literature 
that focus on the “auctions versus free allocation” in order to bring forward the merits of the 
former in comparison to the latter. The pros and cons of free allocation of emission 
allowances versus allocation at a cost though market based (auctions) mechanisms have been 
discussed in detail in several publications dealing with emission allowance allocation.  
Hepburn et al (2006) and Cramton and Cerr (2002) provide a detailed presentation on the 
six main arguments concerning EU allowances auctions:  
a) Are auctions an extra burden for final consumers?  
b) Why auctions and not a tax?   
c) Do the European firms have a competitive disadvantage under the auction choice? 
d) How auctions fight perverse dynamic incentives? 
e) Are the transaction costs affordable? 
f) Is there a legality issue regarding auctions? 
The present thesis discusses the arguments of those in favor of auctioning and the supporters 
of the grandfathering solutions. It ends up in the conclusion that auctioning of allowances 
prevails over free allocation. 
The third section (Section 2.3) provides a brief overview of auction theory and discusses the 
main elements of standard static (or sealed-bid) and dynamic auction formats that have been 
also used in the auctioning of emission allowances. Hofmann (2006), Cramton and Cerr 
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(2002) and Hepburn et al (2006) describe in details the two basic formats, while  they 
discuss some other key elements such as the participation, the periodicity of auctions, the 
spot or forward dilemma and the set of a minimum price. 
The two basic auction schemes are presented within the present thesis, while the other key 
elements are discussed in detail. From the investigation it is concluded that the auction 
method is a key element for the success of the scheme and the sealed-bid auction format it is 
considered to be the most appropriate for the auctions under the EU ETS. 
The next section (Section 2.4) builds on existing reviews on the auctioning methods and 
results employed by the only three member states (Ireland, Hungary, Lithuania) that used 
auctioning as a method of emission allowance allocation complementary to free allocation. 
In Denmark, although initially some willingness to proceed with the auctioning system was 
recorded, auctions were not carried out. Fazekas (2008) focused on the auctions carried out 
during Phase I.  
Within the present thesis it is provided information regarding the auctions held during the 
first trading period, it is assessed the implementation of the new trading scheme, and it is 
evaluated the performance of the auction. The main conclusion is that the lack of previous 
experience had as a result some auctions to be far from successive. 
The fifth section (Section 2.5) builds on the format and method adopted in section 3 to 
present the details of the auctions carried out by five member states during phase II.  The 
analysis within this thesis is not based on any existing review article, because as far as I have 
searched no such exists.  
This thesis has used raw data obtained directly from the member states carrying out the 
auctions and to the best of my knowledge it offers the first empirical analysis of the design 
and results of the implemented emission allowances auctions from certain Member States 
during phase II of the EU ETS.  The results are presented in tables, separately for each 
country, since tabulating helps in making comparisons and drawing quantitative conclusions. 
Information was hard and complex to find for each Member State individually. The initial 
goal of this thesis was to gather data regarding all the Member States that held auctions 
during phase II. However, it was only possible to collect the auctioning results of five 
Member States: United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Lithuania. Thus, the 
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assessment of auctions during the first trading period is based on these specific auctioning 
results.  
The basic conclusion deriving from this section is that the secondary market has a large 
influence on the auctions. Also, it is concluded that the market participants have adapted to 
the EU ETS environment, while the primary market itself seems to operate smoothly. 
 
2.2 Why auctioning – The pros and cons of auctioning emission credits 
The six main arguments concerning EU allowances auctions are mentioned in the 
introduction of the Chapter. This section provides a detailed presentation of all these 
arguments in order to find the best suitable answer to the question “auctioning or 
grandfathering?”. 
 
2.2.1 A burden for the consumers? 
A widespread economic perception is that auctioning puts additional cost to production 
which is passing through to downstream consumers and companies. By putting a price on 
CO2 emitted the production cost is rising and as a result the companies pass a proportion of 
this marginal cost increase through to consumers. Yet under the condition that firms 
maximize profits, even with grandfathering the downstream prices are rising because of the 
opportunity costs of allowances (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 140). So it is clear that both 
systems create distortions in the market. 
Nevertheless according to Hepburn et al (2006) auctioning has the potential to correct 
distributional impacts. The paper acknowledges that there is an impact in prices in changing 
from free allocation of allowances to auctioning. However, it is argued that any anomaly can 
be corrected because auctioning raises revenue that may be reallocated. 
In the case of EU the Member States can use this revenue to reduce tax distortions and thus 
reduce costs throughout the economy. For instance the country deficit can be mitigated, 
providing benefits to current borrowers and future generations. Also all taxpayers would 
benefit by a reduction on consumption taxes and poor and middle classes would relief if 
there was a cut in payroll taxes. In contrast, free allocation does not yield efficiency benefits 
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and the total costs are considered to be higher, since the wealth is redistributed to those who 
directly receive permits. If the government grants permits to coal companies, electric 
utilities, and their ilk, it will yield no benefits for workers in those industries, local 
economies or consumer prices (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 9-10). 
According to Ballard et al. (1985) each additional 1.00$ of government revenue accruing 
from distortionary taxation has an aggregate cost for the society of 1.30$. Consequently is 
clear that the efficiency gains would be significant if the government revenue could mitigate 
distortions, by auctioning rather than free allocating. 
Concluding auctions can give better results for equity than free allocation. Auctions provide 
more flexibility than grandfathering in compensation. Additionally, poorer people tend to be 
workers and consumers more than they are shareholders, so they are unlikely to benefit from 
grandfathering. 
 
2.2.2 Why not a tax? 
Another proposal was that it would be better if an eco-tax was implemented rather than 
auctioning of emission credits. The main arguments were that in this way the negative 
environmental externalities would internalized by the firms and the revenue from the tax 
could contribute in the reduction of other distortionary taxes in the economy. 
In theory the idea of eco-taxation might be attractive but in practice there are big political 
economy challenges (Helm, 2005, p.5). Allocation of economic rents is strongly influence 
the policy decision and any attempt to transfer those rents created by environmental 
constraints to the public purse has as a result the immediate reaction from powerful 
interested groups. 
Additionally, any attempt to put a price to carbon (including trading schemes) has 
undesirable consequences. For example a carbon tax or a trading scheme has as a result the 
rise of energy prices and consequently is an additional burden for the consumers. But as it is 
discussed in subchapter 2.1 since those policies create revenue can reduce costs. The 
advantage of the auction is that it creates revenue and at the same time does not face such a 
strong opposition. 
 
[28] 
 
2.2.3 Do the European firms have a competitive disadvantage under the 
auction choice? 
One of the strong arguments in favor of the free allocation (and therefore against auctioning) 
is that grandfathering mitigates the adverse impact that the scheme has on the 
competitiveness of European installations in a globalized environment. 
Regarding the downstream industries they are facing higher electricity prices either under 
auctioning or grandfathering (see subsection 2.2.1). Also the competitiveness argument is 
non-applicable for the electricity sector, since it is not facing competition from abroad. 
Hepburn et al (2006) recognize that there is a competitiveness issue mainly in the sectors 
which a) are most exposed to foreign competition and b) their cost rises significantly due to 
the requirements for compliance with the emissions trading system. Within these categories 
fall industries such as cement, steel, non-ferrous metals, and certain chemical products. In 
the above cases the cost at the margin is not affected but there is an impact on the gross 
revenues of firms, since in short term grandfathering helps companies maintain a good 
balance sheet. In the long term free allocation provides a subsidy to fund the protection of 
market share by under-pricing, and auctioning reduces that capacity. So it is clear that 
grandfathering protects firms’ balance sheets, but the choice between free allocation and 
auctioning does not fundamentally change competitiveness in the longer term (Hepburn et 
al., 2006, p. 141). 
 
2.2.4 About perverse dynamic incentives  
According to Hepburn et al (2006) grandfathering creates perverse dynamic incentives. In 
many Member States the free allocation of allowances is generous for existing installations 
and at the same time is quite restrictive for new-comers in the market. As a consequence 
there are no incentives for plant modernization and replacement (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 
142-143). 
Cramton and Kerr (2002) also point out that auctioning, unlike grandfathering, promote 
innovation. In specific it is discussed that innovation reduces scarcity rents by lowering 
permit prices, while the firms have always an incentive to innovate when economic 
instruments are used. In an auctioning system the lower prices benefit innovative firms since 
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they do not receive scarcity rents. In contrast, when the permits are given for free there is no 
gain to industry from the reduced prices as it owns the scarcity rents. Consequently, firms’ 
incentives to innovate are greater under the auctioning solution (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 
11). 
Additionally when the distribution of future credits is calculated based on present emission 
levels (as it happens in EU ETS), companies have an incentive to emit more now in order to 
get a greater number of allowances in the future. 
Among the economists and the academics it is clear that those perverse incentives can be 
eliminated in two ways. The first is the creation of specific allocation mechanisms such as 
benchmarking and once-and-for-all free allocation. The second option is auctioning since 
those problems do not accrue when the companies have to buy their emission credits. 
 
2.2.5 The cost of negotiation - Transaction costs 
Another disadvantage of free allocation of emission credits became clear during the 
negotiation of phase I National Allocation Plans and it is evinced by both Hepburn et al 
(2006) and Cramton and Kerr (2002). In order to obtain the maximum benefits possible 
governments and firms spent considerable amounts of time and energy when the 
conversation was still underway. This undesirable “waste” of resources represents huge 
transactional costs (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 15). In addition as more complicated 
grandfathering schemes are introduced in order to fight other unwanted distortions the 
possibility for the transactional costs to grow bigger is even greater (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 
143). 
Since auctions do not involve negotiation and lobbying activities the transactional cost of 
these discussions is reduced considerably. Nevertheless auctioning involves its own 
administrative and transactional costs. Thus, the design of the options defines whether the 
overall implementation efficiency of the EU ETS is increased or not. 
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2.2.6 The legality issue 
The final point of conflict between those in favor of auctioning and the supporters of the 
grandfathering solutions had to do with the legality of those two options. The former insist 
that free allocation is a form of staid aid. The latter’s argument is that firms have the “right to 
pollute”, while auctioning would adversely affect decisions that were made in reliance upon 
previous regulatory structures remaining in place (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 141-142).
 
Primarily, the “right to pollute” argument is rather easy to be dispensed. Essentially there 
was never a “right to emit” but only the freedom to do so until regulation provided 
otherwise. So the regulatory bodies have the power to change the rules of the “game”, 
especially when the activities under regulation are harming others. 
This simple assumption can also provide answers regarding the argument that investors 
deserve compensation for investments made prior to EU ETS. If governments’ decisions are 
in favor of the public interest then there can be put restrictions in the use of an asset without 
any legal obligation for compensation. 
Even if governments wish to compensate investors to attract private-sector investments, this 
can be considered as State aid and any compensation is prohibited under State aid rules. On 
the other hand requiring installations to buy emission allowances is consistent with the 
polluter pays principle. 
Concluding, the legal considerations suggest that auctions are favored over free allocations. 
 
2.2.7 Conclusion on the “auction vs. free allocation” issue 
Table 2.1 aims to provide a summary of the comparatively extensive discussion on the 
emission allowance allocation method. From the arguments presented above, auctioning of 
allowances prevails over grandfathering.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of issues (Hepburn et al, 2006, p.144) 
Issue Favors 
Static efficiency Auctions 
Distribution of rents Auctions in theory, free allocation in practice 
Competitiveness Depends upon use of auction revenues 
Legal considerations Auctions 
Dynamic incentives Auctions 
Transaction costs Uncertain, favors auctions in medium term 
 
The only argument in favor of free allocation is this of the lost competitiveness and probably 
this is the reason why under the EU ETS installations susceptible to carbon leakage are 
treated favorably and only electricity sector will have to buy all the credits (see Chapter 3).  
 
2.3 Auction Methods and other design elements 
Auction theory provides the appropriate tools in order to design an efficient and well 
established scheme for auctioning a supply of identical items such as emission allowances. In 
simple words, a seller (a Member State for example) is offering a fixed supply of identical 
items and the buyers (or bidders) express their willingness to buy various quantities at 
various price levels by submitting bids at auction (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 5). 
Provided that strong restrictions on participation are not imposed, auctioning of emission 
credits within the EU ETS is pretty much the same with the sale of government securities 
(Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 144). In both occasions there is a great number of potential buyers 
in the primary market as well as a secondary market where the same goods are also traded. 
Taking into account that the securities market is considered to be a competitive and well-
functioning market it can be drawn the conclusion that European Commission and Member 
States have the opportunity to fabricate a well established and sophisticated market 
environment. The existence of a secondary market is making the market more competitive 
but at the same time affects the bidders’ behavior as they do not depend only on –Member 
States held - auctions to buy emission credits.  
Despite those similarities with some existing markets the EU ETS has some unique features 
that make it a really special scheme. Its major singleness is that the vast majority of 
allowances are distributed for free (that is especially the case during the Phases I and II) and 
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thus only a small minority of credits is auctioned. The minor volumes set at auction raise the 
question whether auctioning of allowances is cost-effective. Specifically, those costs are 
fixed in a big degree and they are not affected by the volume size. 
Under these circumstances the auction method is considered to be a key element for the 
success of the scheme. The present thesis discusses the most common options for conducting 
auctions and Table 2.2 provides a summary of the types and subtypes of auctions. This 
section first displays the more “popular” static (or sealed-bid) type and its two basic 
subtypes. The static auction format has been chosen by all the Member States that performed 
auctions during the first two trading period of EU ETS and has been also chosen by the 
Commission for the auctions to be held in phase III. Then are explained the advantages of 
the ascending-bid type and there are presented its two basic subtypes. 
Table 2.2: Overview of auction types 
Static or sealed-bid auction Dynamic or ascending auctions 
Uniform price 
auction 
Pay-your-bid 
auction 
Auction with an 
ascending clock 
Auction with 
demand schedules 
 
In addition they are discussed some other important design elements such us the periodicity 
of auctioning, the participation requirements, the spot or forward dilemma, the set of a 
minimum price and finally the auction competition and coordination among Member States. 
 
2.3.1 Static or sealed-bid auctions 
A sealed-bid comprises only one round and each potential buyer submits confidential bids, 
called demand schedules, which specify the number of credits the bidder is willing to buy at 
different prices (Hofmann, 2006, p. 6). The sum of these demand schedules molds the 
aggregate demand curve. The clearing price (P*) is where the amount of available credits 
equals the aggregate demand. All bids at or above P* are accepted. 
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate demand Curve (Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p. 6) 
 
The main advantage of this method is that the whole procedure is easy and simple to 
implement. On the other hand the main drawback is that the potential buyers do not have the 
chance to reconsider and change their strategy during the procedure. 
Additionally, the price on the secondary market influences the potential bidders because they 
expect to achieve a lower price by participating in the auction. In this way it is expected that 
the bidding prices will always be lower than the secondary market price. 
Regarding the price paid by the winners there are used two main methods: a) Uniform price 
auction where all the winners pay the clearing price and b) Pay-your-bid auction where all 
the winners pay the price they actually bid. 
 
a) Uniform price auction  
This way of pricing is the most common approach used for auctions with homogenous 
divisible goods such as emission credits. In uniform price auction each winner pays the 
clearing price and thereof all winners pay the same price. 
The benefits of this option are quite a lot. The most significant vantage is that small bidders 
in the market take advantage of the price reduction by the large bidders. So, theoretically, 
under uniform price auction more small bidders participate in the process. 
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Figure 2.2: Uniform price auction (Hofmann, 2006, p. 7) 
 
Also, because of its simplicity, this method is efficient as it rewards the potential buyers that 
make the higher bids. The former is the case under the condition that no individual can 
influence the market price. 
Finally, this way of auctioning allows more sophisticated forms of auctions. In particular it 
can be used in two-sided markets, where both buyers and sellers submit bids. Therefore it 
offers the opportunity for auctions with the participation of more than one Member States as 
every supplier could offer different volumes at different prices. 
In contrast, the disadvantage of this method is that if a market player has the power to 
manipulate the market will make the scheme inefficient. For instance, this participant could 
bid below its true marginal value, trying to use its influence to lower the price (Hofmann, 
2006, p. 8). 
b) Pay-your-bid auction 
The pay-your-bid auction is different than uniform price auction because the potential buyers 
in the market have to choose a quite unlike strategy. Since the winners pay the unit price that 
they actually bid every participant try to forecast the clearing price and then bid slightly 
higher. By looking in Figure 3 it seems that this method could result in higher revenues for 
the auctioneer but this is not always the case. Under this process potential buyers tend to bid 
lower prices than in a uniform-price auction and hence there may not be much difference in 
the total revenue (DTI, 2005b). 
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Figure 2.3: Pay-your-bid auction (Hofmann, 2006, p. 9) 
 
The higher revenues for the seller in a pay-your-bid auction compared with uniform price 
case are essentially the only point that the former prevail. If we consider that an auction is 
efficient when the higher bidder is awarded then the pay-your-bid model is rather inefficient 
because it recompense the buyer that predicted the clearing price. 
Also, under this method small players are exposed to strategic risk as they do not usually 
have the resources and the information needed to estimate the clearing price. Big players 
have more founds and are better informed and as a result they can easier predict the clearing 
price. Nevertheless, when a liquid and efficient secondary market exists the forecast of the 
clearing price will no longer be a privilege of large bidders since all bidders will base their 
bid on the price in the secondary market.  
 
2.3.2 Dynamic or ascending auctions 
The concept of dynamic options is different than this of static options. Within this scheme 
competition determines both allocation and price. In specific there more than one round of 
bidding and buyers has the option to improve their bid. This process secure that all bidders in 
the procedure have good information and those eager to pay the most take the credits. So the 
obvious advantage of this method is that price is determined through a reliable procedure. 
The above method is really useful in the cases where the information is held by few 
individuals in the market. By this process information is distributed to everyone in the 
market and enables all the participants to review their estimates. 
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Ascending auctioning can be implemented in two basic ways: a) with demand schedules or 
b) with an ascending clock. Demand schedules option can be viewed as a sealed-bid auction 
with multiple rounds. Each potential buyer submit a new demand schedule in every round 
and the procedure is repeated until no potential buyer is willing to improve its bid (Cramton 
and Kerr, 2002, p.7). Nevertheless, in the context of auctioning a divisible good, like 
emission allowances, an ascending clock auction is widely viewed as the best design because 
it is simple for both the potential buyers and sellers and it is most effective at promoting 
price discovery (DTI, 2005b). 
Ascending clock auction is a more convenient option. Again the potential buyers have to 
submit a new offer in each round of the process. The main difference of this procedure is that 
bidder indicate the volume of credits its willing to buy in a given price level. As long as 
demand for allowances is greater than the supply the price is raised. The submission of bids 
continues until demand equals supply and bidders are getting the volume bided at that price 
level. 
According to the former Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of the United Kingdom 
this type of auction is superior to the others because it amplifies market volume and liquidity 
(DTI, 2005b). 
Despite its benefits this method can also be inefficient in the case that big players in could 
bid below their true marginal value, creating distortions in the market. Also this procedure is 
more expensive to implement than the static methods. However, dynamic auctions generally 
create higher revenue (Hofmann, 2006, p. 11). 
 
2.3.3 Participation 
The selected auction method has to encourage entry and promote competition. Accordingly 
the auction type to be implemented must secure the widest possible participation by bidders 
from all sectors. Otherwise the revenues and the efficient allocation of allowances are in 
danger (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 146). 
Issues such as liquidity and bankruptcy of the participants must be screened in order to avoid 
distortions by fraudulent participation (Hofmann, 2006, p.13). Also, in order to prevent 
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manipulation of the auction price, limits could be set on the size of any individual bidder’s 
share of the allowances allocated in an auction (Hepburn et al., 2006, p. 146-147). 
 
2.3.4 Periodicity of auctions 
A key element that has to be clarified by Member States or the European Commission is the 
auctions frequency. In order to determine the periodicity of conducting auctions the 
following factors have to be taken into account: a) the administrative and transaction costs 
for conducting an auction, b) other options for distribution and c) the lifetime of an 
allowance and the length of the compliance period (Hofmann, 2006, p. 12). 
Also the specific purpose of the auction has to be determined. When the objective is to raise 
revenue it is suitable a scheme with frequent auctions. If the goal is to send a price signal at 
the beginning of a trading period is appropriate a large auction at the beginning of this 
trading period.  
In addition large infrequent auctions would deescalate administrative and transaction costs 
and might promote competitive bidding. However, this method may result in reduced 
participation by small firms since it requires large initial investments (Hepburn et al., 2006, 
p. 147 ). 
On the other hand, small and repeated auctions are in favor of smaller bidders. Also this kind 
of process is unlike to affect the liquidity in the secondary market and create distortions.  
 
2.3.5 The “spot or forward?” dilemma 
Another important feature that has to be taken under consideration is whether the sellers 
auction spot or forward allowances. Spot allowances are sold for immediate delivery 
(normally two business days after the auction), while forward allowances are for delivery in 
future years. As a general rule early auctions are facilitating development of an active 
derivatives market, thus improving risk allocation (Hofmann, 2006, p.12).  
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2.3.6 Minimum price 
The establishment of a minimum price can be viewed as a way for the seller to minimize the 
risk of too low prices. The threat of low prices occurs when some participants in the market 
have the power to manipulate the price. 
Nevertheless, as it can be seen in Figure 2.3, by setting a minimum price there is a risk for 
the auctioneer not to sell all the credits available in the auction. Additionally the great 
number of participants into the EU ETS reduces the likelihood for manipulation. 
Figure 2.3: Auctioning without and with a minimum price (Hepburn et al, 2006, p. 145) 
 
 
2.3.7 Coordination and competition between Member States 
The final question to be answered is whether the auctions in one Member State might affect 
the others. At first glance member States could hold auctions independently. However this 
tactic means that each Member State has to be an active participant in the market, judging 
when it is the right time to auction, at what price and what volume of credits. Essentially this 
strategy implies that each Member State shall monitor the auction decisions of other Member 
States and try to compete them. 
Under this scheme there is the possibility some Member States (especially the small ones) 
not to be able to sell all their allowances or raise the expected revenue. Also the active 
participation in the market might lead in conflict of interest. 
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A way to overcome these obstacles is the formation of pooling auctions where many 
Member States selling allowances at the same time and under specific rules. The above 
argument seems to be true since the European Commission decided for Phase III to create a 
common platform to auction emission allowances on behalf of the Member States. 
 
2.4 Auction results during Phase I of EU ETS 
When the EU ETS became functional in 2005 there was much uncertainty regarding the new 
scheme European Commission, Member States and market participants knew that the first 
trading period was like a rehearsal for the successful implementation of the new project. 
Naturally this uncertainty is reflected in the auctions carried out during this period. Only four 
Member States among the total of twenty-five decided to auction emission credits: Hungary, 
Ireland, Lithuania and Denmark. The first three countries concluded that static uniform price 
auctions were the best solution and they decided to open the procedure for all the participants 
in the market. Denmark primarily announced that they going to hold auctions but after 
consideration they decided that the best solution was the direct sale via a market agent. 
The quantities set aside for auction on behalf of each Member State in the National 
Allocation Plans (NAP) and the volume of credits actually put for sale can be viewed in 
Table 2.3. By observing Table 2.3 it can be seen that the latter quantity is larger. This is 
because the countries auctioned additional allowances that came from New Entrant Reserves 
(NER) and closed installations.  
Table 2.3: Allowances set aside for auction and allowances actually auctioned 
(Fazekas, 2008, p.7) 
EUAs Allowances 
set aside for 
auctioning 
Allowances actually auctioned 
 
 
% allowances 
auctioned/total 
allowances 
2005 2006 2007 Total 
Hungary  1,420,000 0 1,197,000 1,177,500 2,374500 4.18% 
Ireland 502,201 0 1,213,000 0 1,213,000 1.81% 
Lithuania 552,000 0 0 552,000 552,000 1.5% 
Denmark  5,025,000 0 2,762,000 2,262,000 5,025,000 5% 
 
[40] 
 
Another conclusion is that countries made a bad decision regarding the time of the auctions. 
From Figure 2.4 it is clear that the highest prices are observed from the middle of 2005 and 
until the middle of 2006 
Figure 2.4: EUA prices (A Response to Climate Change web page, 2012) 
 
Table 2.4 provides information regarding the details of the auctions carried out by each of 
the three Member States. The table reveals that only Ireland had relative success achieving 
prices of 26.32 €/tone of CO2 and 6.87€/tone of CO2. Hungary in December of 2006 sold 
their allowances for 7.42 €/tone of CO2 but in March 2007 the clearing price felt to 
0.88€/tone of CO2. Finally the Lithuanian auction were far from successful since they sold 
their allowances for only 0.06 €/tone of CO2. The details regarding the auctions carried out 
by the three Member States plus Denmark are presented below. 
Table 2.4: Auctions held during Phase I (Fazekas, 2008, p. 12) 
 Ireland Hungary Lithuania 
Number of 
auctions 
2 2 1 
Date of 
auctions 
January 27, 2006 and 
December, 2006 
December 11, 2006 and 
March 27, 2007 
September 10, 2007 
 
Total for 
auction 
(allowances) 
 
set aside 502,201 
250,000 in January 2006, 
963,000 in December 2006 
set aside 791,523 and sold 
2,4374,000. 
1,197,000 in December 2006 
and 1,177,500 in March 
2007 
 
552,000 
% of total 
allocation 
0.75%      2.5% 1.5% 
% of auctioning    1.81% 7.5% 1.5% 
lot size 500 in January 2006 
1000 in December 2006 
500 1000 
deposit 3000 in January 2006 
15000 in December 2006 
100% collateral 100% collateral 
auction design static static static 
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 Ireland Hungary Lithuania 
minimum bid 
(EUA) 
500 in January 2006 
1000 in December 2006 
1000 1000 
minimum bid 
increment 
n.a. 1 eurocent 1 eurocent 
 
 
 
 
minimum price 
 
 
 
 
n.a. 
Dec.06: set at the Point Carbon 
2007 EUA closing price index 
of the day before the auction 
minus 90 cents 
March 07: 85% of the closing 
Dec.07 forward price for the 
day before the particular 
auction round rounded off to 2 
decimals. 
 
 
 
85% of the market 
price 
participants registry account owners 
listed on CTL 
registry account owners 
listed on CTL 
registry account 
owners listed on CTL 
auction type uniform price auction uniform-price auction uniform-price auction 
reserve price undisclosed undisclosed undisclosed 
settlement time 5 days in Jan, 
2 days in Dec 
1 day 1 day 
pre-
qualification 
on-line, website not needed not needed 
clearing price 
(€/EUA) 
26.32 in January 2006 
6.87 in December 2006 
7.42 in December 2006, 
0.88 in March 2007 
0.06 
Secondary 
market price 
(€/EUA) from 
Vertis Ltd 
 
26.32 in January 2006 
n.a. in December 2006 
 
7.10 in December 2006 
0.98 in March 2007 
 
0.06  
 
 
2.4.1 The Irish case 
Ireland was the first to auction emission credits since they carried out their first auction in 
January 2006. The country had initially set aside 502,201 allowances (0.75% of total 
allowances) in the NAP but they finally sold an aggregate of 1,213,000 credits (1.81% of 
total allowances). The surplus came from closed facilities and the NER.  
The country tried to make the auctions as simple as possible and as a result they chosen the 
static uniform price auction while the procedure was open to all bidders with a valid account 
in the EU ETS registry system.  
The Irish officials tried to reduce the risk of auctioning during a “low” in market prices and 
they decided to spread the risk by running two auctions. This strategy rewarded Ireland in the 
first auction as they achieved a clearing price of 26.32 €/tone of CO2, while the price 
decreased at 6.87 €/tone of CO2 in the second auction. 
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It has to be pointed out that Ireland implemented the pre-qualification process in order to 
reduce the risk of price manipulation. Under this process an initial amount is collected from 
the participants in the auction to discourage bogus biding. This amount of money is deducted 
from the amount owed by auction winners and refunded to auction losers. Any winners not 
honoring their bids would forfeit their deposits (Fazekas, 2008, p. 9). In the first auction this 
deposit was 3.000 € and in the second 15.000 €. 
 
2.4.2 The Hungarian case 
Hungary was the second Member State that carried out an auction in the context of the EU 
ETS, but the country did not have the same results as Ireland had a few months earlier. 
Hungarian government set aside 790,000 allowances (2.5% of total allowances) but they 
managed to auction a total of 2,374,500 allowances (4.18% of total allowances). Once again 
the additional credits came from closures and the NER. 
As Ireland did a few months earlier Hungary chosen the static uniform price auction and 
once again the process was open to all bidders with a valid account in the EU ETS registry 
system. Another similarity is that Hungary also decided to carry out two auctions. 
However the similarities between Hungary and Ireland stop here. The EUAs spot price was 
falling sharply in the secondary markets over the last months (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4) 
as a result of the overallocation of free allowances. Consequently Hungary succeed a 
clearing price of 7.42 €/tone of CO2 in the first auction (December 2006), while the clearing 
price felt at 0.88 €/tone of CO2 in the second auction that carried out in March 2007. 
The innovation about Hungary’s strategy was that they implemented a minimum price. For 
the first auction the minimum price set at was set at the Point Carbon 2007 EUA closing 
price index of the day before the auction minus 90 cents. The minimum price at the second 
option was 85% of the closing Dec.07 forward price for the day before the particular auction 
round rounded off to 2 decimals (Fazekas, 2008, p. 10). 
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2.4.3 The Lithuanian case 
Lithuania was the last country that conducted an auction and the less lucky. The Lithuanian 
government set aside 552,000 allowances in the NAP and it was the only Member State of 
the three that did not add any more allowances from NER or closures.  
When Lithuanian carried out their auction the EUA spot price had almost collapsed at 0.06 € 
(see Table 2.4) and as a result the clearing price shaped at the level of the secondary market 
price. The country raised a bid more than 33,000 € and they barely covered the administrative 
costs. 
Once again the method of static uniform price auction was chosen and the process was open 
to all bidders with a valid account in the EU ETS registry system. As in the Hungarian case 
Lithuania set a minimum price. The minimum price arranged at 85% of the market price 
(Fazekas, 2008, p. 11). 
 
2.4.4 The Danish case 
Denmark, finally, was a really unique case. The country initially set aside 5,025,000 
allowances for sale (5% of total allowances) but later they decided not to perform an auction. 
The Danish government judged that it was in the countries interest to sale the available 
allowances via an agent.  
The country sold their emission credits through the brokered market starting from mid-2006 
when the secondary market spot price was 2.20 €. As a result of this strategy no safe 
conclusions can be drawn. However it has to be noted that this tactic provide security against 
price volatility, since changing prices between the announcement and the auction are not 
constitute a problem deposits (Fazekas, 2008, p. 9). 
 
2.4.5 Assessment of Phase I auctions 
The first conclusion that came out by looking the strategy implemented by the three Member 
States held auctions plus Denmark is that they chose a learning by doing tactic as there was 
no previous experience in similar processes. 
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Nevertheless the three countries carried out auctions, without having a direct order by the 
European Commission, decided to use the static uniform price model which later chosen by 
the Commission to perform auction in Phase III of EU ETS. Thus, someone could argue that 
all three Member States chose the right model, off course with different modifications in the 
details. 
Regarding the model itself seems to be easy to implement, with simple design and 
transparent, while it facilitates and promotes the participation of many potential buyers in the 
procedure. 
An additional conclusion is that the countries may not rewarded in all the cases for their 
choice to hold auctions but they gained valuable experience that could use during Phase II 
processes. 
Figure 2.5: Net allowance position by country over 2005-2007, in volume (indicated by 
numbers in Mt) and as a percentage (indicated by colors) of national allocation 
(Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008, p. 9) 
 
Also, a comparison between clearing prices achieved in the procedure and the secondary 
market prices at those dates was the first indication regarding the market behavior and price 
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process that are taking place during the auctions. Even in those early stages was clear that 
clearing prices were following the secondary market price. 
Finally it has to be mentioned that overallocation of allowances during the first Trading 
Period was the reason why the prices of Phase I credits faced such a dramatical decrease and 
as a consequence some auctions were far from successive. Figure 5 provides information to 
strengthen the above argument.  
 
2.5 Auction results during Phase II of EU ETS 
The first Trading Period of EU ETS was something like a learning process for both the 
European Commission and the Member States. The former had the chance to judge the 
whole project in practice while the latter had gained valuable experience regarding the 
auctions and the behavior of the participants in the market. 
As discussed in section 2.4, during Phase I only four Member states decided to perform 
auctions and only three actually sold allowances in the primary market via auctions. 
However, in Phase II several Member States became active market players.  
The main distinction between Member states that decided to perform auctions during Phase 
II has to do with the source of the credits for sale. Some Member States clarified in their 
NAPs that they would set aside allowances for auction while others decided to sell only the 
allowances from closures or unclaimed NER allowances (Fazekas, 2008, p. 9). 
In the first category belong Germany (8.8% of total allocation), United Kingdom (7% of total 
allocation), Netherlands (4.0% of total allocation), Lithuania (2.7% of total allocation), Austria 
(1.2% of total allocation), Hungary (4.7% of total allocation), Ireland (4.3% of total allocation) 
and Belgium (0.29% of total allocation).  
In the second category are included Greece (up to 10% of total allocation), Poland (up to 10% of 
total allocation), Denmark (up to 2% of total allocation), Italy (5.7% of total allocation was 
planned to be sold at a fixed price) and Spain (auctioning of allowances that have not been used 
by the 30th of June of 2012). 
Information is hard and complex to find for each Member State individually. Nevertheless 
this thesis tries to draw conclusions regarding the auctions performed during the second 
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trading period by collecting the auctioning results of five Member States: United Kingdom, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Lithuania.  
The cases of UK and Germany are of the most interest since both countries held the largest 
number of auctions, each time selling also a large volume of allowances. This work focuses 
to a grand extend on the German and British auctions,  since both countries have a long 
tradition in the exchange market environment and are expected to be used as leading 
examples for the implementation of the forthcoming Phase III auctions.  
In addition the examples of Greece, Netherlands and Lithuania can provide valuable 
feedback regarding the implementation of an auction by a small country in a fully 
competitive environment. 
 
2.5.1 The German case 
Germany is the most active Member State regarding the performance of emission credits 
auctions and the only one of the five examined below that perform futures auctions. The 
country started performing auctions in January 2010 and is offering approximately 41 
million emission allowances annually for auctioning. The total amount of auctioned 
allowances is around nine percent of the national emissions trading budget. In 2008 and 2009 
the same amount was sold freely at carbon exchanges on a day-to-day basis. 
Following a tendering procedure by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), the auctions are held weekly at the spot and 
futures markets of the European Energy Exchange EEX in Leipzig. According to the German 
Emissions Trading Authority (DEHST) during the first two auction years, 2010 and 2011, a 
total of 81.82 million EUAs were sold in 180 individual auctions. This amounts to a total 
value of over 1.15 billion Euros and average revenue of 14.08 Euros per EUA (DEHST web 
page, 2012, A). 
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2.5.1.1 The procedure 
A static uniform price process is applied at auctions and in addition a minimum and a 
maximum price are set. The clearing price is determined by ranking all bids entered, starting 
at the highest bid. Regarding the procedure itself, if two bids are equal they are ranked 
according to the time they were entered into the trading system. Each bidder can only see its 
own bids as auctions are conducted with a closed order book. The minimum bid size is 500 
EUAs in auctions on the spot market and 1,000 EUAs in auctions on the futures market. 
 In addition the weekly auctions are part of regular exchange trading. The DEHST believes 
that exchange trading is a secure and cost-efficient instrument since it will also be applied to 
Europe-wide auctions during the third trading period. In particular this process ensures that 
the high security standards of the exchange’s surveillance and procedural structures apply to 
primary market auctions (DEHST web page, 2012, B).  
Except the legally defined basic annual amount of 40 million EUAs, are also auctioned 
additional EUAs from the NER (called refinancing volume) to cover the auctioning costs 
incurred by the Federal Government.  Only for 2012 this additional amount of EUAs is 
auctioned to refinance expenses from reimbursing the general emissions trading fee in line 
with the emissions trading cost ordinance 2007 (special refinancing volume). 
According to the DEHST the annual refinancing volumes and special refinancing volumes 
are determined by the average clearing prices of the calendar months January to October and 
the nominal refinancing need (system costs). By the 5
th
 of November of the relevant year the 
total annual volume of allowances to be auctioned is determined. 
In 2010 and 2011, the total annual amount was around 41 million EUAs, which corresponds 
roughly to the amounts sold in 2008 and 2009. However, in 2012, due the special refinancing 
volume, the total annual volume will be clearly above that mark.  
As it is mentioned above auctions are performed twice a week at the spot and futures markets 
of the EEX. In 2010 and 2011, 300,000 T2PA or EUAs spot contracts (for immediate 
delivery) were auctioned on Tuesdays and 570,000 F2EA or EUAs futures contracts (for 
delivery in December of the respective year) on Wednesdays. From November, 870,000 
EUAs were auctioned on the spot market only, with exceptions for end-of-year auctions. 
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Depending on the total annual volume, 252,500 and 655,500 EUAs were auctioned 
respectively. 
From January 2012, because of the special refinancing volume the auction volumes were 
slightly increased compared to the previous years. In particular the weekly volume offered 
for F2EAs between January and October increased to 645,000 EUAs. However, the T2PA 
quantities offered for the same period remain at 300,000 EUAs. From November 2012, spot 
market quantities will increase to 945,000 EUAs. 
Regarding the participation, the potential buyer can participate either directly or via a broker 
or via another EEX member. The DEHST claims that this method is beneficial for small and 
medium-sized enterprises that have no dedicated trading department.  
 
2.5.1.2 German auctions assessment 
In order to assess the auctions held by Germany and draw some conclusions about their 
performance all the auctions carried out during the first half of 2012 are gathered in tables. 
Table 2.5 provides information regarding the T2PA auctions and Table 2.6 provides 
information regarding the F2EAs auctions. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 present the information on 
clearing prices and their comparison to the EEX prices in a graphical form. 
In the tables can be seen the dates of the auctions, the volume of EUAs, the minimum and 
the maximum prices, the cover ratio, the number of successful bidders and the total proceeds. 
Also information is provided regarding the clearing price of the process which can be 
compared with the EEX spot EUA contract closing price at the day of the auction and the 
ECX ICE Dec 12 Futures closing price at the day of the auction, also provided in the tables. 
Finally, it is presented the percentage difference between the secondary market EUA 
contract closing price and the clearing price. 
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Table 2.5: Germany emission allowances spot auctions during 1
st
 half of 2012 (EEX 
web page, 2012, A) 
Date Size (EUAs 
2 days 
spot) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
EEX spot 
EUA 
contract 
closing 
price at 
the day 
of the 
auction 
(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
EEX spot 
EUA 
contract 
closing 
price and 
clearing 
price (%) 
Cover 
ratio 
Number of 
successful 
bidders  
Total 
proceeds (€) 
03/01/12 300,000 6.31 6.02 7.01 6.26 -0.80 3.15 4 ~1,893,000 
10/01/12 300,000 6.83 5.19 6.89 6.84 0.15 25.78 2 ~2,049,000 
17/01/12 300,000 6.68 5.19 6.68 6.47 -3.25 15.05 1 ~2,004,000 
24/01/12 300,000 6.90 5.19 6.99 7.35 6.12 13.63 2 ~2,070,000 
31/01/12 300,000 7.66 5.19 7.71 7.82 2.05 7.79 5 ~2,298,000 
07/02/12 300,000 8.42 5.19 8.43 8.53 1.29 8.77 2 ~2,526,000 
14/02/12 300,000 7.60 7.46 7.65 7.89 3.68 5.24 3 ~2,280,000 
21/02/12 300,000 8.58 5.19 8.63 8.97 4.35 3.75 3 ~2,574,000 
28/02/12 300,000 9.17 5.19 9.18 8.84 -3.73 11.91 2 ~2,751,000 
06/03/12 300,000 8.44 5.19 8.47 8.31 -1.56 5.00 2 ~2,532,000 
13/03/12 300,000 7.65 7.50 7.65 7.60 -0.66 7.18 1 ~2,295,000 
20/03/12 300,000   7.25 7.12 7.34 7.17 -1.12 4.07 3 ~2,175,000 
27/03/12 300,000 6.90 5.19 7.01 7.12 3.09 5.83 3 ~2,070,000 
03/04/12 300,000 6.00 5.19 6.01 6.35 5.51 6.33 1 ~1,800,000 
10/04/12 300,000 6.54 6.38 6.55 6.77 3.40 13.45 2 ~1,962,000 
17/04/12 300,000 6.97 6.60 6.97 7.05 1.13 12.04 1 ~2,091,000 
24/04/12 300,000 7.06 6.72 7.10 7.09 0.42 6.08 3 ~2,118,000 
08/05/12 300,000 6.50 6.10 6.58 6.73 3.42 4.62 4 ~1,950,000 
15/05/12 300,000 6.49 6.22 6.54 6.45 -0.62 4.04 5 ~1,947,000 
22/05/12 300,000 6.65 6.30 6.71 6.89 3.48 4.31 5 ~1,995,000 
29/05/12 300,000 6.55 6.40 6.60 6.53 -0.31 3.95 4 ~1,965,000 
05/06/12 300,000 6.27 5.59 6.47 6.36 1.42 3.21 4 ~1,881,000 
12/06/12 300,000 6.54 5.59 6.65 6.63 1.36 5.89 3 ~1,962,000 
19/06/12 300,000 7.39 7.17 7.42 7.50 1.47 7.07 3 ~2,217,000 
26/06/12 300,000 8.00 7.80 8.15 7.96 -0.50 4.08 4 ~2,400,000 
Aggregate 7,500,000 - - - - - - - ~53,805,000 
Average - - - - - 1.19 7.69 2.88 - 
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Table 2.6: Germany emission allowances DEC 12 futures auctions during 1
st
 half of 
2012 (EEX and ICE ECX web pages, 2012, A) 
Date Size (Dec 
12 
Futures) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
ECX ICE 
Dec 12 
Futures 
closing 
price at 
the day 
of the 
auction 
(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
ECX ICE Dec 
12 Futures 
closing 
price and 
clearing 
price (%) 
Cover 
ratio 
Number of 
successful 
bidders  
Total 
proceeds (€) 
04/01/12 645,000 6.40 6.10 6.43 6.56 2.44 3.68 5 ~4,128,000 
11/01/12 645,000 7.08 6.05 7.25 7.18 1.39 8.91 4 ~4,566,600 
18/01/12 645,000 6.93 6.00 7.15 6.82 -1.61 6.33 3 ~4,469,850 
25/01/12 645,000 7.52 6.00 7.60 7.68 2.08 13.75 4 ~4,979,400 
01/02/12 645,000 8.29 8.10 8.33 8.27 -0.24 3.53 4 ~5,347,050 
08/02/12 645,000 8.41 8.34 8.45 8.48 0.83 1.93 6 ~5,424,450 
15/02/12 645,000 8.23 8.14 8.26 8.32 1.08 3.06 4 ~5,308,350 
22/02/12 645,000 9.18 9.00 9.25 9.34 1.71 2.42 3 ~5,921,100 
29/02/12 645,000 8.85 8.62 8.89 9.02 1.88 3.53 3 ~5,708,250 
07/03/12 645,000 8.61 8.26 8.67 8.68 0.81 6.88 3 ~5,553,450 
14/03/12 645,000 8.10 7.72 8.18 8.00 -1.25 3.67 3 ~5,224,500 
21/03/12 645,000 7.21 7.00 7.35 7.27 0.83 3.95 3 ~4,650,450 
28/03/12 645,000 7.23 7.00 7.32 7.34 1.50 5.00 3 ~4,663,350 
04/04/12 645,000 6.13 5.85 6.15 6.47 5.26 4.50 3 ~3,953,850 
11/04/12 645,000 6.77 6.15 6.79 6.76 -0.15 11.58 3 ~4,366,650 
18/04/12 645,000 7.26 6.66 7.31 7.30 0.55 10.90 4 ~4,682,700 
02/05/12 645,000 7.29 7.19 7.33 7.50 2.80 2.20 3 ~4,702,050 
09/05/12 645,000 6.56 6.00 6.60 6.86 4.37 4.25 2 ~4,231,200 
16/05/12 645,000 6.46 5.60 6.47 6.41 -0.78 4.47 1 ~4,166,700 
23/05/12 645,000 6.83 6.20 6.88 6.81 -0.29 4.61 5 ~4,405,350 
30/05/12 645,000 6.44 6.00 6.50 6.55 1.68 4.83 5 ~4,153,800 
06/06/12 850,000 6.42 6.00 6.95 6.47 0.77 5.26 3 ~5,457,000 
13/06/12 850,000 6.68 6.00 6.73 6.74 0,89 3.75 7 ~5,678,000 
20/06/12 850,000 7.44 7.10 7.44 7.46 0,27 5.89 2 ~6,324,000 
27/06/12 850,000 7.95 7.30 7.99 8.03 1.00 5.64 3 ~6,757,500 
Aggregate 16,945,000 - - - - - - - ~124,823,600 
Average - - - - - 1.11 5.38 3.56 - 
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The first conclusion that came out by looking the average percentage difference between the 
secondary market closing price and the clearing price of the auctions is that clearing prices 
generally did not deviate from lead markets by more than a few percentage points. In T2PA 
auctions the EEX spot EUA contract closing price is on average 1.19% higher than the 
auction clearing price, while in F2EA auctions the ECX ICE Dec 12 Futures closing price is 
on average 1.11% higher than the auction clearing price. Therefore, auctions were held 
almost in parallel to developments in the secondary market. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 provide a 
visual illustration of this argument.  
In order to examine further the relationship between the primary market prices and the 
secondary market prices, are calculated the correlation and the covariance between the 
clearing price of the primary market spot contract and the price of the secondary spot 
contract, and also between the clearing price of the primary market DEC 12 futures and the 
price of the secondary market DEC 12 futures. For the same pairs of variables are also 
performed mean equality tests and variance equality tests. 
Table 2.7: Correlation and covariance between different pairs of primary market 
contracts and secondary market contracts 
Pair of contracts under examination  Correlation Covariance 
Primary market spot and secondary market spot 0,997539767 0,19037698 
Primary market DEC 12 futures and secondary 
market DEC 12 futures 
0,996190859 0,19037698 
From Table 2.7 can be observed that the correlation between the two different pairs of 
contracts is very close to +1, indicating that the pairs of variables are related and are moving 
to the same direction. At the same time the covariance between the different pairs of 
contracts is a positive number in both cases, indicating that the pairs of variables are showing 
a similar behavior. 
Additionally, all the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for each of 
the different pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability of 
95% the means of each pair to be equal and a probability of at least 77% the variances of 
each pair to be equal (the tests results can be found in Appendix I). These probabilities are 
additional signs of co-movement of the variables. 
All the statistical tools that have been used tend to confirm that the same contracts of the two 
different products are moving in parallel. Thus, it may be concluded that the secondary 
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market has a large influence on the auctions, as the price of the latter is related to the price of 
the former. If someone consider that the level of the secondary market price seems to 
determine the clearing price, it is then obvious that a well-functioning secondary market has 
a positive effect on the primary market. 
Actually in certain dates that the spot price fluctuated aggressively the clearing price of the 
auction could be above the closing price in the secondary market since the participants in the 
auction was not able to calculate the depth of the secondary market downfall. Indicative 
examples are the spot auction on March 6
th
 (8.44 €/T2PA to 8.31 €/T2PA) and the future 
auctions on January 18
th
 (6.93 €/F2EA to 6.82 €/F2EA). 
Figure 2.6: T2PA clearing price versus EEX spot EUA contract closing price at the day 
of the auction 
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Figure 2.7: F2EA clearing price versus ECX ICE Dec 12 Futures closing price at the 
day of the auction  
 
Another conclusion is that when the demand for credits is high (expressed by the cover ratio 
to the Tables 2.5 and 2.6) the clearing price is close or even the same with the maximum 
price set in the auction.  
For instance in the spot auction held on January 17
th
 with a cover ratio of 15.05 the clearing 
price equals the maximum price (6.68 €/T2PA), while in the futures auction carried out on 
April 11
th
 with a cover ratio of 11.58 the clearing price is only two eurocent bellow the 
maximum price (6.77€/F2EA to 6.79€/F2EA).  
Additionally it is worth mentioning one tactic on the behalf of the seller. When the price in 
the secondary market is expected to face sharp decrease the auctioneer lowers the minimum 
price in order secure sufficient demand for allowances.  
An indicative example can be viewed in the minimum prices set in the spot auctions 
performed on March 20
th
 and April 3
rd
. In the first case with the secondary spot price been at 
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7.55 €/T2PA the minimum price is set at 7.25 €/T2PA, while in the latter case with the spot 
price been at 6.35 €/T2PA the minimum price is set at 5.19 €/T2PA. 
Potentially the above mentioned practice has an immediate effect on the potential buyers. 
When the boundaries are set in accordance with the secondary price movement the potential 
buyers are more confident on participating in the procedure. 
An interesting observation regarding the German case is the really small number of 
successful bidders. In a country with 2012 installations covered by EU ETS 
(www.carbonmarketdata.com, 2012) the highest number of successful bidders was 7 in the 
futures auction carried out on June 13
th
. On average 2.88 auctions participants submitted 
successful bids in the T2PA auctions, while the corresponding number for the F2EA auctions 
is 3.56. 
Probably this is because the interested firms in emission credits are buying allowances via a 
small number of members in EEX (investment banks etc). These EEX members are buying 
big amount of allowances in order to sell them later either to their clients or to the secondary 
market. 
Also, some conclusions derive from the comparison between the T2PA and the F2EA 
auctions. The average percentage difference between the secondary market EUA contract 
closing price and the clearing price is almost identical, as it is 1.19% for the T2PA auctions 
and 1.11% for the F2EA auctions. The derivative products clearing price formation seems to 
be in accordance with the spot products clearing price formation. Thus, the derivatives 
primary market seems to function well and the strategy undertaken by Germany regarding 
the futures auctions can be a leading example regarding the products are going to be offered 
during Phase III auctions. 
Additionally, the average cover ratio in the T2PA auctions is 7.69, while the average cover 
ratio in the F2EA auctions is 5.38. Someone could argue that this difference indicates that 
the auctions participants seem to prefer the spot contracts over the futures ones. 
Nevertheless, both numbers indicate that there is sufficient demand in the primary market for 
EUAs, which is another sign that the market operate smoothly. 
There is one final element that has to be pointed out. The success of the German auctions is 
probably due to the fact that there was a significant gap between the allowances allocated for 
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free and the verified emissions during the period 2008-2011 (data for 2012 is not available). 
In particular the freely allocated EUAs were 12.40% less than the verified emissions 
(European Environment Agency, 2012). Thus the interested firms had to buy a great volume 
of allowances for compliance under the EU ETS. 
 
2.5.2 The UK case 
United Kingdom is another Member State with long tradition in exchange markets but it 
chosen a different model than this of Germany. Although the British chose also the static 
uniform price method they decided not to perform regular auctions and only sell spot 
products. 
The UK’s Phase II National Allocation Plan (NAP II) states that the UK will auction 
approximately 85 million across the phase – 7% of allowances – plus any surplus from the 
NER and allowances from closures up to the 10% limit set by the Directive. The 7% for 
auctions has been taken from the allocation which would otherwise have been given for free 
to the Large Electricity Producers sector, as that sector is more protected from international 
competition and has greater potential for abatement than in other sectors. By the 27
th
 of 
September 2012 the United Kingdom had sold a total of 118.5 million allowances, having 
proceeds of 1,498,842,024€. 
UK auctions of EUAs are conducted by the UK Debt Management Office (DMO), on behalf 
of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The UK Debt Management 
Office is an Executive Agency of HM Treasury, which, amongst other financial market 
operations, has responsibility for the sale of UK Government bonds (gilts) and Treasury Bills 
through regular auctions and tenders.  
 
2.5.2.1 The auction model 
As it is mentioned above UK adopted the static uniform price process. The big difference is 
that the British designed the auction model in two parts to offer i) competitive bidding and ii) 
non-competitive bidding. Competitive bidding works using intermediaries known as Primary 
Participants, who collect and submit bids from end-users, referred to as ‘Indirect Bidders’.  
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Subsequent auctions may include a non-competitive element to facilitate direct access to the 
auctions for smaller compliance buyers. Under this facility, bidders will be entitled to bid 
non-competitively for up to 10,000 allowances per auction. This means that they will be 
guaranteed their requested allocation of allowances, with the clearing price to be determined 
by the result of the competitive bidding. The allotment will be subject to the total amount of 
non-competitive subscriptions not exceeding a total of 30% of the total amount available. In 
the event this level is exceeded, participants are liable to be scaled back with smaller bids 
taking priority (DMO and DECC, 2008, p. 4). 
Each competitive bid must be for one amount and at one clean price, expressed as a multiple 
of 0.01 of €1, for at least 1,000 tones and round multiples thereof.  All competitive bids at 
UK EUA auctions must be submitted via either the DMO’s chosen electronic platform 
(currently the Bloomberg Auction System) or, by prior arrangement only, by telephoning the 
DMO’s dealing desk.  
Another innovation regarding the British model is that HM Treasury may, before the close of 
the bidding window, determine a reserve price (minimum price) for an EUA auction. In the 
case that the clearing price determined by the competitive bids is less than the reserve price 
calculated by HM Treasury the DMO will announce the fact in the results of the auction.  
The Government believes that it is not desirable to publish the reserve price initially as there 
is a risk that it could be used to frame bids. The absence of a published reserve price should 
ensure that there is an unbiased price discovery role in the early auctions, allowing the 
natural differential between the auction clearing price and secondary market price to emerge. 
Where any UK EUA auction is uncovered, for whatever reason, unsold allowances may be 
retained by DECC for a sale at a future auction or by some other means (DMO and DECC, 
2008, p. 4). 
 
2.5.2.2 UK auctions assessment 
Once again the evaluation of the auctions’ performance is made through the conclusion of all 
the auction results in tables.  
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Table 2.8 provides information regarding the dates of the auctions, the volume of EUAs, the 
cover ratio and the total proceeds. Also information is provided regarding the clearing price 
of the process which can be compared with the BlueNext spot EUA contract after the end of 
the auction and the ECX ICE Futures after the end of the auction, also provided in the table. 
Additionally, it is provided the percentage difference between the BlueNext spot EUA 
contract closing price and the clearing price. 
Table 2.9 provides information regarding the successful competitive bids, the percentage of 
indirect bidders and the percentage of primary participants. A primary participant t is an ETS 
Registry account holder who fulfils certain eligibility criteria set out in the Community 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Only primary participants have direct access to UK EU ETS 
auctions. Nevertheless, anyone who has an ETS Registry account can place a competitive bid 
in the auction through a primary participant. These account holders who wish to place a 
competitive bid through a primary participant are known as indirect bidders.  
After a careful “investigation” in the tables the first conclusion is that clearing prices 
generally did not deviate from secondary market price. The BlueNext spot EUA contract 
closing price is on average 0.48% higher than the auction clearing price. Thus, auctions were 
held almost in parallel to developments in the secondary market. Figure 2.8 provide a visual 
illustration of this argument.  
In the case of UK clearing price and secondary market price seem to follow exactly the same 
path and have not so much difference as in the case of Germany. Nevertheless, it has to be 
pointed out that in the case of UK the secondary market prices are the prices exactly after the 
end of the auction, while in the case of Germany the secondary market prices are the closing 
prices at the day of the auction. So a direct comparison between the two cases would be 
wrong and no safe conclusions can be drawn for the two different models regarding the 
effectiveness on achieving a clearing price competitive to the secondary market price. 
Even so, it has to be mentioned that the British model too achieved in certain dates better 
clearing prices than the prices in the secondary market. An indicative example is the auction 
on February 2
nd
 (12.66 €/EUA to 12.60 €/EUA). 
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Table 2.8: UK emission allowances auctions during phase II (a) (DMO web page, 2012) 
Date Size (EUAs 2 
days spot) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
BlueNext 
spot EUA 
contract 
after the 
end of the 
auction(€) 
ECX ICE 
Futures 
after the 
end of the 
auction(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
BlueNext spot 
EUA contract 
closing price 
and clearing 
price (%) 
Times 
covered 
Total 
proceeds (€) 
19/11/2008 4,000,000 16.15 16.64 
3 
16.68
 4 2.94 4.15 64,597,981 
24/03/2009 4,000,000 10.98 11.15 11.48 
5 1.52 5.76 43,911,501 
04/06/2009 4,200,000 13.83 13.89 14.18 
5 0.43 4.98 58,086,000 
09/07/2009 4,200,000 13.38 13.46 13.55 
5 0.59 5.21 56,191,451 
10/09/2009 4,200,000 15.05 15.10 15.13 
5 0.33 5.19 63,207,592 
08/10/2009 4,200,000 13.36 13.47 13.50 
5 0.82 3.31 56,110,998 
05/11/2009 4,200,000 14.20 14.23 14.22 
5 0.21 4.43 59,632,616 
07/01/2010 4,900,000 
1 12.15 12.22 12.43 6 0.57 4.93 59,534,405 
04/02/2010 4,400,000 12.66 12.60 12.75 6 -0.48 6.93 55,703,367 
18/03/2010 4,500,000 
2 13.00 12.89 13.07 
6 -0.85 12.79 58,491,290 
10/06/2010 4,400,000 15.60 15.63 15.84 
6 3.65 5.46 68,633,136 
08/07/2010 4,400,000 14.65 14.62 14.79 
6 -0.21 5.14 64,456,338 
09/09/2010 4,400,000 15.58 15.66 15.75 
6 0.51 6.76 68,548,884 
07/10/2010 4,400,000 15.46 15.47 15.54 
6 0.06 6.28 68,022,068 
04/11/2010 4,400,000 14.51 14.56 14.61 
6 0.34 5.85 63,841,751 
13/01/2011 4,400,000 14.00 14.00 14.29 
7 0.00 6.61 61,585,300 
10/02/2011 4,400,000 14.36 14.39 
3 
14.71 7 0.21 6.77 63,176,964 
10/03/2011 4,400,000 15.59 15.46 
3 
15.79 
7 -0.84 8.49 68,593,662 
09/06/2011 3,500,000 16.34 16.36 
3 
16.60 
7 0.12 6.76 57,183,056 
07/07/2011 3,500,000 13.17 13.22 13.38 
7 0.38 6.00 46,095,000 
08/09/2011 3,500,000 12.31 12.38 
3 
12.47 
7 0.57 4.99 43,072,690 
06/10/2011 3,500,000 10.38 10.38 3 10.43 7 0.00 6.01 36,330,000 
10/11/2011 3,500,000 9.72 9.76 
3 
9.79 
7 0.41 6.54 34,015,140 
09/02/2012 3,500,000 8.11 8.15 
3 
8.37 
8 0.49 5.89 28,384,595 
08/03/2012 3,500,000 8.55 8.61 
3 
8.81 
8 0.70 4.61 29,920,298 
10/05/2012 4,000,000 6.67 6.72 
3 
6.82 
8 0.74 3.56 26,680,000 
05/07/2012 4,000,000 8.12 8.17
 3 
8.26 8 0.61 4.18 32,476,752 
06/09/2012 4,000,000 8.11 8.08 8.22 
8 -0.37 1.56 32,439,189 
27/09/2012 4,000,000 7.48 7.52 
3 
7.55 
8 0.53 3.89 29,920,000 
Aggregate 118,500,000 - - - - - 1,498,842,0
24 Average - - - - 0.48 5.62 - 
 
1 Up to 500,000 reserved for non-competitive bids 
2 Up to 100,000 reserved for non-competitive bids 
3 BlueNext spot EUA contract not available. Adjustment to spot price 
4 Dec 08 Futures 
5 Dec 09 Futures 
6 Dec 10 Futures 
7 Dec 11 Futures 
8 Dec 12 Futures 
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Table 2.9: UK emission allowances auctions during phase II (b) (DMO web page, 
2012) 
Date Times covered successful competitive bids Indirect Bidders Primary Participants 
19/11/2008 4.15 55 24% 76% 
24/03/2009 5.76 54 60% 40% 
04/06/2009 4.98 29 58% 42% 
09/07/2009 5.21 21 39% 61% 
10/09/2009 5.19 31 46% 54% 
08/10/2009 3.31 52 70% 30% 
05/11/2009 4.43 26 70% 30% 
07/01/2010 4.93 26 39% 61% 
04/02/2010 6.93 6 8% 92% 
18/03/2010 12.79 4 1% 99% 
10/06/2010 5.46 35 75% 25% 
08/07/2010 5.14 24 26% 74% 
09/09/2010 6.76 12 76% 24% 
07/10/2010 6.28 30 41% 59% 
04/11/2010 5.85 32 21% 79% 
13/01/2011 6.61 22 25% 75% 
10/02/2011 6.77 20 47% 53% 
10/03/2011 8.49 11 26% 74% 
09/06/2011 6.76 20 39% 61% 
07/07/2011 6.00 17 7% 93% 
08/09/2011 4.99 12 64% 36% 
06/10/2011 6.01 9 2% 98% 
10/11/2011 6.54 18 16% 84% 
09/02/2012 5.89 14 28% 72% 
08/03/2012 4.61 16 14% 86% 
10/05/2012 3.56 17 26% 74% 
05/07/2012 4.18 21 60% 40% 
06/09/2012 1.56 22 26% 74% 
27/09/2012 3.89 25 51% 49% 
Average 5.62 23.48 - - 
 
Once again, in order to provide a statistical argument regarding the co-movement of the 
two variables is calculated the correlation and the covariance between the UK auction 
clearing price and the secondary market price. Also, are performed a mean equality test 
and a variance equality test. 
The correlation between the two variables is 0.998867147 and the covariance is 
8.263839477. The positive sign of the covariance is indicating that the variables are 
showing a similar behavior, while the fact that the correlation is very close to +1 
indicates that the auctions clearing price and the secondary market price are related and 
are moving to the same direction.  
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Additionally, the mean equality test is showing a probability of 95% for the means of the 
variables to be equal and the variance equality test is showing a probability of at least 
87% the variances of the series to be equal (the tests results can be found in Appendix I). 
These probabilities are additional signs of co-movement of the variables. 
Consequently, from the indications that the clearing price is related with the secondary 
market price it may be concluded once again that the secondary market has a large 
influence on the primary market as and the smooth function of the secondary market is 
the key for the success of the auctions. 
An additional conclusion is that when the demand for credits is high (expressed by the 
cover ratio to the Tables 2.7 and 2.8) it seems that the clearing price is more likely to be 
closer or even higher than the secondary market price.  
For example in the auction performed on October 8
th
 2009 with a cover ratio of 3.99 the 
clearing price is 13.35 €/EUA and the secondary market price is 13.50 €/EUA, while in 
the carried out on March 18
th
 2010 with a cover ratio of 12.79 the clearing price is 13.00 
€/EUA and the secondary market price is 12.89 €/EUA.   
Figure 2.8: Clearing price versus BlueNext spot EUA contract after the end of the 
auction 
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Another interesting observation has to do with the number of the successful bids. The 
number of successful competitive bids is by far greater than this of German auctions. In 
particular the average number of successful bids is 23.48, while in the German spot 
auctions the corresponding number was 2.88. A reasonable assumption is that this 
happens because UK auctions are more spread over time and the volume of allowances 
auctioned every time is much bigger. 
However, if someone considers that in UK there are 1148 installations under the EU ETS 
(www.carbonmarketdata.com, 2012) it once again may be concluded that the interested 
firms in emission credits are buying allowances via a small number of auction 
participants. 
It may also be concluded that as in the case of Germany there is sufficient demand in the 
UK’s primary market for EUAs and the market is operating well. The average cover 
ratio is 5.62 which is a clear indication that the participation in the auctions is adequate. 
It is also interesting to notice that the number of allowances taken by primary 
participants is usually bigger than this of the indirect bidders (see Figure 2.9). Thus, it 
can be concluded that the participants in the UK auctions prefer to submit bids by their 
selves and not through an intermediate.  
Someone could argue that firms under the EU ETS prefer to be primary participants as 
they could take advantage of their knowledge of the market structure and behavior. For 
example they might be able to submit better bids than the indirect bidders and purchase 
allowances in lower prices than those in the secondary market. 
Ultimately, as in the case of Germany, the United Kingdom had also a considerable gap 
between the allowances allocated for free and the verified emissions during the period 
2008-2011 (data for 2012 is not available). The freely allocated EUAs were 8.3% less 
than the verified emissions (European Environment Agency, 2012). Consequently, the 
interested firms had to buy a great volume of allowances for compliance under the EU 
ETS. 
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Figure 2.9: Primary participants versus indirect bidders 
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In Table 2.10 is presented information regarding the dates of the auctions, the volume of 
EUAs offered, the volume of EUAs traded, the minimum and the maximum prices and 
the total proceeds. Also information is provided regarding the clearing price of the 
auction which can be compared with the BlueNext spot EUA contract closing price at the 
day of the auction and the ECX ICE Futures closing price at the end of the auction, also 
provided in the table. In addition it is presented the percentage difference between the 
BlueNext spot EUA contract closing price and the clearing price. Ultimately, Figure 2.10 
provides extra information regarding the guarantees and the number of participants.  
Table 2.10: Greek emission allowances auctions during phase II (Hellenic 
Exchanges Group, BlueNext, and ICE ECX web pages, 2012, A) 
Date 
 
Offered 
volume 
(EUAs 2 
days spot) 
Volume 
traded 
(EUAs 2 
days spot) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
BlueNext 
spot EUA 
contract 
closing 
price at 
the day of 
the 
auction(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
BlueNext 
spot EUA 
contract 
closing 
price and 
clearing 
price (%) 
Number of 
successful 
bidders 
Total 
proceeds 
(€) 
15/06/11 1,000,000 6,000 16.11 16.11 16.25 16.04 -0.44 2 96,600 
30/06/11 1,100,000 1,100,000 12.70 11.65 12.94 13.38 5.08 4 13,970,000 
14/07/11 1,500,000 1,500,000 11.91 10.67 12.05 12.16 2.06 6 17,865,000 
27/07/11 1,500,000 1,450,000 12.36 11.50 12.41 12.29 -0.57 3 17,922,000 
07/09/11 1,000,000 1,000,000 12.28 11.02 12.29 12.31 0.24 4 12,280,000 
21/09/11 1,000,000 260,000 11.68 11.42 11.70 11.71 0.26 2 3,036,800 
28/09/11 1,000,000 755,000 10.40 10.18 10.42 10.42 0.19 3 7,852,000 
12/10/11 1,000,000 1,000,000 10.70 9.95 10.70 10.65 -0.47 3 10,700,000 
26/10/11 1,000,000 1,000,000 10.18 9.33 10.30 10.10 -0.79 4 10,180,000 
16/11/11 929,000 929,000 9.81 9.71 9.82 9.85 0.41 2 9,113,490 
30/11/11 1,000,000 1,000,000 8.38 8.10 8.38 8.39 0.12 3 8,380,000 
18/01/12 1,000,000 1,000,000 6.76 6.50 6.90 6.61 -2.27 2 6,760,000 
25/01/12 1,000,000 1,000,000 7.27 6.50 7.27 7.36 1.22 1 7,270,000 
03/10/12 1,000,000 1,000,000 7.46 7.30 7.47 7.55 
1 1.19 3 7,460,000 
10/10/12 500,000 500,000 7.64 7.56 7.64 7.69 0.65 2 3,820,000 
17/10/12 500,000 500,000 8.13 8.03 8.15 8.25 1.45 2 4,065,000 
Aggregate 16,029,000 14,000,000 - - - - - - 140,770,95
0 Average - - - - - - 0.52 2.88 - 
1 BlueNext spot EUA contract closing price not available.  ICE ECX  Daily 
Futures closing price at the day of the auction. 
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Figure 2.10: Greek emission allowances auctions during phase II (Hellenic 
Exchanges Group web page, 2012) 
 
 
Netherlands carried out (by the time this thesis being written) four auctions via EEX, 
sold 6 million allowances and had total proceeds of more than 52 million €. Table 2.11 
provides information regarding the dates of the auctions, the volume of EUAs traded, the 
minimum and the maximum prices, and the total proceeds. Also information is provided 
regarding the clearing price of the auction which can be compared with the EEX spot 
EUA contract closing price at the day of the auction and the ECX ICE Futures closing 
price at the end of the auction, also provided in the table. Finally, it is presented the 
percentage difference between the EEX spot EUA contract closing price and the clearing 
price. 
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Table 2.11: Netherlands emission allowances auctions during phase II (EEX web 
page, 2012, A) 
Date Size (EUAs 
2 days 
spot) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
EEX spot EUA 
contract 
closing price 
at the day of 
the auction(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between EEX spot 
EUA contract 
closing price and 
clearing price (%) 
Cover 
ratio 
Number of 
successful 
bidders  
Total 
proceeds (€) 
27/10/11 2,000,000 10.30 6.99 10.50 10.35 0.48 4.04 6 ~20,600,000 
24/11/11 2,000,000 8.05 6.99 8.39 7.86 -2.42 2.35 5 ~16,100,000 
23/02/12 1,000,000 8.81 7.95 8.95 8.58 -2.68 3.73 5 ~8,810,000 
14/06/12 1,000,000 6.59 6.48 6.65 6.65
 0.90 2.08 4 ~6,590,000 
Aggregate 6,000,000 - - - - - - - ~52,100,000 
Average - - - - - -0,93 3.05 5.00 - 
 
Lithuania held only two auctions (by the time this thesis being written) via EEX, sold 1.7 
million credits and had proceed of about 12,4 million €. Table 2.12 provides information 
regarding the dates of the auctions, the volume of EUAs traded, the minimum and the 
maximum prices, and the total proceeds. Also information is provided regarding the 
clearing price of the auction which can be compared with the EEX spot EUA contract 
closing price at the day of the auction and the ECX ICE Futures closing price at the end 
of the auction, also provided in the table. Additionally, it is presented the percentage 
difference between the EEX spot EUA contract closing price and the clearing price. 
Table 2.12: Lithuanian emission allowances auctions during phase II (EEX web 
page, 2012, A) 
Date Size (EUAs 
2 days 
spot) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
EEX spot 
EUA 
contract 
closing 
price at 
the day of 
the 
auction(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
EEX spot 
EUA 
contract 
closing 
price and 
clearing 
price (%) 
Cover 
ratio 
Number of 
successful 
bidders  
Total 
proceeds (€) 
13/12/11 850,000 7.13 6.39 7.60 7.05 -1.13 3.34 5 ~6,060,500 
26/01/12 850,000 7.46 7.15 7.60 7.42 -0,54 7.16 3 ~6,341,000 
Aggregate 1,700,000 - - - - - - - ~12,401,500 
Average - - - - - -0,84 5.25 4 - 
 
 
Finally, Table 2.13 provides an overview regarding the auctions held by the five Member 
States under investigation during phase II. In particular it is displayed information 
regarding the auctioning format, the type of product offered, the total number of auctions 
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carried out, the average percentage difference between secondary market contract closing 
price and clearing price, and the average cover ratio. Also information is provided 
regarding the number of allowances auctioned during phase II, the average number of 
successful bidders, the number of installations under EU ETS in each country, the total 
proceeds for each Member State, and the overall deficit or surplus in allowance 
allocation over the period 2008 – 2011 (data for 2012 not available). 
Table 2.13: Overview of the auctions carried out by the five Member States during 
Phase II  
 
Germany United Kingdom Greece Netherlands Lithuania 
 
 
Auctioning format 
Static uniform 
price auctions 
with min. and 
max. prices 
Static uniform 
price auctions 
with competitive 
and non-
competitive 
bidding 
Static uniform 
price auctions 
with min. and 
max. prices and 
requirement for 
guarantees 
Static uniform 
price auctions 
with min. and 
max. prices 
Static uniform 
price auctions 
with min. and 
max. prices 
 
Type of product 
EUA 2 days spot 
contracts and 
EUA futures 
contracts  
 
EUA 2 days spot 
contracts 
 
EUA 2 days spot 
contracts 
 
EUA 2 days spot 
contracts 
 
EUA 2 days spot 
contracts 
 
Number of auctions 
during phase II 
146 EUA spot 
auctions in total 
 
131 EUA futures 
auctions in total 
 
 
30 in total 
 
 
18 by the end of 
October 2012 
 
 
4 in total 
 
 
2 in total 
Average percentage 
difference between 
secondary market 
contract closing price 
and clearing price (%) 
1.19 in EUA spot 
auctions 
 
1.11 in EUA 
futures auctions 
 
 
0.48 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
-0.93 
 
 
-0.84 
 
Average cover ratio 
per auction 
7.69 in EUA spot 
auctions 
 
5.38 in EUA 
futures auctions 
 
 
5.62 
 
 
n.a. 
 
 
3.05 
 
 
5.25 
Number of 
allowances auctioned 
during phase II 
 
More than 134 
million EUAs 
 
 
122.819 million 
EUAs 
 
More than 17 
million EUAs 
 
6 million EUAs 
 
1.7 million EUAs 
 
Average number of 
successful bidders 
2.88 in EUA spot 
auctions 
 
3.56 in EUA 
futures auctions 
 
 
22.62 
 
 
2.88 
 
 
5.00 
 
 
4.00 
Number of 
installations under 
EU ETS 
1 
 
2012 
 
1148 
 
164 
 
448 
 
114 
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Germany United Kingdom Greece Netherlands Lithuania 
 
Total proceeds 
More than 1.3 
billion € by mid-
2012 
More than 1.5 
billion € by the 
27
th
 of September 
2012 
More than 140 
million € by the 
17
th
 of 
September 2012 
More than 52 
million € by the 
17
th
 of 
September 2012 
More than 140 
million € by the 
17
th
 of 
September 2012 
Overall deficit or 
surplus in allowance 
allocation over the 
period 2008 – 2011 
(data for 2012 not 
available) 
2 
 
 
-12.40 
 
 
-8.3 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
1.50 
 
 
30.9 
1. Source: www.carbonmarketdata.com (2012 
2. The calculation is based on the data provided by the European Environment Agency 
(available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu).   
 
 
2.5.3.1 Small Member States auctions assessment 
The Member States under examination did not perform a great number of auctions, 
maybe with the exception of Greece, and thus is hard to draw reliable conclusions 
regarding the auctions performance. Nevertheless some observations are possible. 
The first observation is that in all three cases it is clear by the tables that clearing prices 
generally did not fluctuate from secondary market price, a sign of clear correlation 
between the primary and the secondary market. In particular in Greece the BlueNext spot 
EUA contract closing price is on average 0.52% higher than the auction clearing price, in 
Netherlands the EEX spot EUA contract closing price is on average 0.93% lower than 
the auction clearing price, while in Lithuania the EEX spot EUA contract closing price is 
on average 0.84% lower than the auction clearing price. Consequently, auctions were 
held almost in parallel to developments in the secondary market. 
In order to provide a statistical argument regarding the relationship between the clearing 
price and the secondary market price we examine the case of Greece, as it was the only 
Member State of the three that performed a sufficient number of auctions. In particular 
by using statistical tools it is calculated the correlation and the covariance between the 
Greek auctions clearing price and the secondary market price, while there are performed 
a mean equality test and a variance equality test. 
The correlation between the two variables is 0.975084 and the covariance is 5.726189. 
The positive sign of the covariance is indicating that the variables are showing a similar 
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behavior, while the fact that the correlation is very close to +1 indicates that the auctions 
clearing price and the secondary market price are related and are moving to the same 
direction.  
Additionally, the mean equality test is showing a probability of 95% for the means of the 
variables to be equal and the variance equality test is showing a probability of at least 
67% the variances of the series to be equal (the tests results can be found in Appendix I). 
These probabilities are additional signs of co-movement of the variables. 
The above indications strengthen even more the conclusion regarding the influence of 
the secondary market over the primary market. Even in the case that auctions are spread 
over time and are held by a small Member State the clearing price seems to be 
determined by the secondary market price. Thus, it is clear that an efficient secondary 
market is the key for the success of the auctions and hence of the EU ETS. 
Additionally, it may be pointed out that Lithuania and Netherlands performed their 
options at “the right time” as they achieved clearing prices better than the secondary 
market prices (Netherlands achieved a better clearing than secondary market price two 
times). 
 However someone could argue that this is because the number of auctions was really 
small and the installations in those countries were interested to buy credits. The small 
number of successful bidders does not justify this argument but again is possible that a 
small number of intermediates bought the allowances in order to sell them to the 
interested installations. 
The really small number of auctions might have a reasonable explanation. Unlike to what 
happen with Germany and UK, these two countries allocated for free more allowances 
than their verified emissions during the period 2008-2011 (data for 2012 is not 
available). In the case of Netherlands the freely allocated EUAs were 1.50% more than 
the verified emissions, while Lithuania allocated for free 30.9% more EUAs than their 
verified emissions (European Environment Agency, 2012). Therefore, there was an 
oversupply of EUAs in the installations of these countries and a greater number of 
auctions could lead to a failure. Nevertheless, someone could argue that in the auctions 
could participate interested installations from other Member States. 
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Another interesting observation is that Greece chosen to have more auctions but they 
were not able to sell all the available allowances. Probably this is because the supply was 
greater than needed. This argument is strengthened by the fact that during the period 
2008-2011 (data for 2012 is not available) Greece allocated for free 2.1% more 
allowances than their verified emissions (European Environment Agency, 2012). Also 
someone could assume that it is hard for a small Member State to perform many 
successful auctions in a competitive environment. 
From the above someone could point out that overallocation of allowances put at risk the 
success of the auctions. The Member States that overallocate the free allowances are 
either forced to perform a small number of auctions or there is not sufficient demand in 
the auctions they carry out.  
Finally, regarding Netherlands and Lithuania no observation can be made based on the 
number of the successful bids, as the number of the auction was really small. However, 
Greece performed a considerable amount of auctions and thus a conclusion is possible. 
In specific, the average number of successful bids was 2.88. This number is very small 
compared to the 164 installations covered by the EU ETS (www.carbonmarketdata.com, 
2012) indicating that, as in the cases of UK and Germany, the interested firms in 
emission credits are buying allowances via a small number of auction participants. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
The main conclusion that came out by this Chapter is that from the beginning of the EU 
ETS the secondary market had a large influence on the auctions. During phase I, when 
the scheme was in its infantry, only a limited number of auctions were carried out by just 
three Member States: Ireland, Hungary, and Lithuania. However, even in those early 
stages it was clear that clearing prices were following the secondary market price. 
In phase II Member States became more active on auctioning allowances and especially 
Germany held hundreds of auctions.  Nevertheless, the trend did not change in any 
auction held by any Member State during the second phase of the scheme: Clearing 
prices generally did not deviate from lead markets by more than a few tenths of a 
percent. 
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All the statistical tools that have been used tend to confirm that the secondary market 
price and the clearing price are closely related. In all the auctions under investigation the 
latter generally did not deviate from the former by more than a few percentage points. At 
the same time the correlation and the covariance between the prices indicate that the 
secondary market price and the clearing price are related, while they are showing a 
similar behavior and are moving to the same direction. Moreover, the mean equality tests 
and the variance equality tests performed are indicating a great probability of co-
movement of the variables. 
Thus, the level of the secondary market price seems to determine the clearing price of the 
auction. Consequently, it can be concluded that a transparent and smooth-functioning 
secondary market is the key for the success of the auctions and hence of the EU ETS. 
The European Commission shall take into account this observation as the scheme is 
entering in its third phase in January 2013.  
Regarding the first trading period it is concluded that the three Member States performed 
auctions had chosen a learning-by-doing tactic as there was no previous experience in 
similar processes. As far as the secondary market is concerned, overallocation of free 
allowances during the first Trading Period led in a dramatical price decrease in 2006 and 
high volatility throughout Phase I.  As a consequence some auctions were also far from 
successive. 
Concerning the second trading period it has to be noticed that there was some previous 
experience by the auctions held during phase I. Consequently the auctions were 
comparatively frequent with some Member States (Germany and UK) performing 
numerous of them. Also, someone could argue that this series of auctions is successful, 
especially compared to the auctions held during phase I. 
From the auctions carried out someone could point out that in most cases the interested 
firms in emission credits are buying allowances via a small number of intermediates. 
Also, it can be observed the ability of the sellers to adapt to price fluctuation, which is a 
strong sign that the primary market has obtained balance. In addition a very interesting 
price behavior is showing up: when the demand for credits in the auction is high the 
clearing price is close or even the same with the maximum price set.  
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Another conclusion derives from Germany’s futures auctions. The derivative products’ 
price behavior seems to be in accordance with the spot products price. The derivatives 
primary market seems to function well and the strategy undertaken by Germany 
regarding the futures auctions can be a leading example regarding the products are going 
to be offered during Phase III auctions.  
Additionally, this chapter presents the arguments of those in favor of auctioning and the 
supporters of the grandfathering solutions and concludes that auctioning of allowances 
prevails over free allocation. 
Finally, it is demonstrated that the auction method is considered to be a key element for 
the success of the scheme. All the Member States performed auctions during the first two 
trading period of EU ETS have chosen the uniform-price sealed-bid  auction format as it 
is considered to be simple and transparent,  while simplicity of the design facilitates 
participation, and avoids lock in. This is also the format chosen by the Commission to 
perform auction in Phase III of EU ETS. 
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Chapter 3: Auctioning as from 2013 and early auctions 
 
3.1 Introduction and literature review 
As it is presented in Chapter 1, auctioning of carbon allowances was the exception rather 
than the rule during the first and second trading period. Nevertheless, the third trading 
period (2013 – 2020) is expected to be the borderline, as auctioning is going to be the 
main allocation method as of 2013.  
Between 2005 and 2007 (1
st
 trading period) only four Member States decided to auction 
a very limited quantity of emission credits, and between 2008 and 2012 (2
nd
 trading 
period) free allocation was the main method for the distribution of allowances. From the 
start of 2013 (beginning of the 3
rd
 trading period) the concept is changing totally since 
half of the allowances are expected to be auctioned (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, C). In particular some one billion allowances will be sold 
per year. Additionally about 30 million EU aviation allowances will be auctioned per 
year from 2012 (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, D).  
This Chapter examines the next step under the EU ETS. In particular it provides an 
overview of the emissions trading auctioning system from 2013 onwards (phase III), 
including the so called “early auctions” and the auctions under the NER 300 initiative 
and is structured as follows; In Section 3.2 the main differences of Phase III of the 
Emissions Trading System are highlighted to as to set the background for the 
presentation of the auctioning system in Section 3.3.  Early auctions are discussed in 
Section 3.4. 
In particular, the Section 3.2 presents the major changes that the European Commission 
decided to implement as from the third trading period starting in 2013. These changes 
include the abolition of National Allocation Plans and the introduction of an EU wide 
cap, the implementation of new strict rules regarding the free allocation of emission 
allowances, the introduction of “Effort Sharing Decision”, the inclusion of new sectors 
and gasses in EU ETS, the banking of allowances, and the provision for a New Entrants 
Reserve.  
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The above mentioned modifications form a new “landscape” and affect the environment 
in which the auctions take place. Consequently, the major programmed changes are 
discussed one by one within this Section in detail and the new scenery formed is 
examined attentively.  
Nevertheless, the main target of this chapter is to provide a detailed description regarding 
the auctioning system from 2013 onwards. Section 3.3 provides information regarding 
the auction format chosen by the European Commission, the induction of a common 
auction platform and an auction monitor, the provision for a single European Union 
registry, the auctions calendar, the products to be sold, and the distribution of revenues. 
From the Sections 3.2 and 3.3 it is concluded that the European Commission has done 
some very important steps in order to achieve a smooth transmission from phase II to 
phase III. However, it is also clear that the new scheme needs some final modifications.  
European Commission has also decided that the appropriate way to ensure a seamless 
transition between trading periods is auction emission allowances for 2013 and 2014 
already in 2012.  The forth section of the Chapter (Section 3.4) discusses the early 
auctions and is divided in two parts: 
The first part (Subsection 3.4.1) discusses the auctioning of 120 million phase III 
emission allowances already in 2012, in addition to some 30 million aviation allowances 
(EUAAs). Up until the time this thesis being written no early auction has taken place. So 
this part displays the latest developments regarding the programming of these early 
auctions and highlights the remaining adjustments yet to be done.  
The second part (Subsection 3.4.2) provides a presentation of the early auctions under 
the NER 300 initiative. The auctioning started on June 2012 and this part provides 
information regarding the auctions held and assesses their performance. The analysis 
within this part is not based on any existing review article, because as far as I have 
searched no such exists. This thesis has used raw data obtained directly from the EEX 
which performed the auctions and to the best of my knowledge it offers the first 
empirical analysis of the design and results of the implemented emission allowances 
early auctions under the NER 300 initiative.   
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The main conclusion is that the early auctions under the NER 300 initiative share the 
same characteristics with the auctions held by the Member States during the phase II of 
the EU ETS. 
The dedicated web page of the DG Clima of the European Commission provides 
valuable and timely information regarding the changes in the EU ETS from 2013 
including information on the common auctions to be held by 24 Member States during 
the third trading period. Most of the material in this chapter is indeed drawn from that 
source.  
On-line information, mostly relevant to early auctions, as provided by the UK 
Department of Energy and Climate Change and the German Emissions Trading 
Authority and International Emission Trading Association was also used in this chapter. 
Additional background information was sourced from the client briefing of the firm 
CMS Cameron McKenna LLP (2009) and the paper by Sijm (2009).  Ultimately, the web 
pages of the European Investment Bank and the EEX, which provide the relevant 
information regarding the early auctions under the NER 300 program, were also utilized.  
The legal basis for the auctioning system from 2013 onwards stems from two sources. 
The first source is the Directive 2009/29/EC (amending Directives 2003/87/EC, 
2004/101/EC, 2008/101/EC, and the Commission Regulation No 219/2009) so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community. The second source is the Commission Regulation No 1031/2010 on the 
timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission 
allowances as amended by Commission Regulation No 1210/2011 regarding the 
determination of the volume of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned 
prior to 2013. 
Finally, it has to be pointed out that this Chapter is dealing with an extremely dynamic 
research subject for two reasons: a) the new scheme has not been implemented yet, and 
b) the European Commission has to do some final adjustments by the end of 2012. Thus, 
this thesis only presents the operating rules of the new scheme, just as these rules have 
been designed by the European Commission. 
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3.2 The Major changes 
European Commission decided to implement a number of modifications from the beginning 
of the third trading period that at first glance does not seem relevant with the auctions of 
emission credits. Nevertheless, these changes reform the scenery of the EU ETS and 
form the conditions under which auctions take place. 
 
3.2.1 No more NAPs 
The design of the emissions trading system from 2013 onwards (as set by Directive 
2009/29/EC) foresees a full harmonization and EU-wide rules for the distribution of 
emission credits. Auctioning of allowances will be the rule rather than the exception.  
No allowances will be allocated free of charge for electricity production. More or less the 
rest sectors under the EU ETS are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage. In plain words the companies of those sectors could decide to relocate their 
production to countries without a climate policy in order to take advantage of the 
economic benefits. Consequently, European Commission decided that companies of 
those sectors will receive the most allowances for free. 
In particular, for the sectors mentioned on the list of sectors exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage, the free allocation will correspond to 100% of their allowances. For 
the other sectors the allocation will correspond to 80% of their allowances in 2013, and 
will be reduced every year to reach 30% in 2020. 
Free allowances will be allocated based in benchmarks. If a succeptible to carbon 
leakage installation meets the benchmarks it will receive all allowances it needs for free. 
On the other hand, the companies that do not meet the benchmarks will have a shortage 
of allowances. 
According to European Commission “a benchmark does not represent an emission limit 
or even an emission reduction target but merely a threshold for the level of free 
allocation of an individual installation. The benchmarks have been developed per 
product, to the extent feasible. Generally speaking a product benchmark is based on a 
value reflecting the average greenhouse gas performance of the 10 % best performing 
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installations in the EU producing that product. The benchmarks were established on the 
basis of the principle ‘one product = one benchmark”, which means that the benchmark 
methodology does not differentiate by technology or fuel used, nor the size of an 
installation or its geographical location” (DG Clima of the European Commission web 
page, 2012, E).  
The allocation of free allowances will be calculated by multiplying a benchmark value 
with the historic production data of the installation, for each product falling under the 
definition of a product benchmark. 
In the case that a company’s product is not covered under the product benchmark rule, 
the credits will be distributed based on heat or fuel use for those products. For these 
installations it will also be possible to get allocation for process emissions (not related to 
energy use). Process emissions are already included in the product benchmarks, but not 
in the heat or fuel benchmarks (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, 
F). 
As a result, there are four allocation methods:  
a) Product benchmarks, estimated to cover around 75% of eligible emissions. 
b) Heat benchmark, estimated to cover around 20% of eligible emissions. 
c) Fuel benchmark, estimated to cover around 5% of eligible emissions. 
d) Process emissions, estimated to cover less than 1% of eligible emissions. 
However, in order to calculate the final annual amounts of allowances to be allocated 
free of charge over the third trading period the Member States were required to submit to 
the Commission by 30 September 2011 a list of installations under EU ETS in their 
territory and any free allocation to each of those installations. This list is referred as the 
National Implementation Measures (NIM). The Commission has to assess these 
submissions and it is expected to take its final decision. Operators should receive their 
allowances by 28 February 2013. 
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The above changes are expected to affect the installations behavior in a certain degree. 
Companies under the EU ETS have now to adopt in a new environment where the 
national governments are absent and EU is taking their position. As companies are the 
bidders in the auctions their capability to conform and to operate under the new scheme 
will have a direct impact in the auction results. 
 
3.2.2 Decreasing cap 
Each Member State within its National Allocation Plan (NAP) was determining the 
“cap” on the total amount of CO2 that installations covered by the EU ETS can emit. The 
European Commission had to assess the NAP and when necessary to reject it. For the 
third trading period the cap has been determined directly at EU level. In particular the 
cap for the year 2013 has been set at 2,039,152,882 allowances (DG Clima of the 
European Commission web page, 2012, G). 
The cap will decrease each year by 1.74% (or by 37,435,387 allowances) of the average 
annual total quantity of allowances issued by the Member States in 2008-2012. This 
annual reduction will continue beyond 2020 but may be subject to revision not later than 
2025. The determination of a cap at EU level is not expected to affect directly the 
auctions (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, G). 
Figure 3.1: Cap of allowances during third trading period 
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3.2.3 Effort Sharing Decision 
European Commission also decided the implementation of the “Effort Sharing Decision” 
as from. This decision set annual binding GHG emission targets for Member States for 
the third trading period and these targets concern the emissions from sectors not included 
in the EU ETS. 
The goal for EU as a whole is to achieve a 10% decrease of emissions from the covered 
sectors in 2020 compared with 2005 levels. Nevertheless, each Member State will 
contribute to this effort according to its relative wealth. This decision together with the 
reduction that will come from the sectors covered by the EU ETS will accomplish the 
overall emission reduction goal of 20% cut below 1990 levels by 2020 (DG Clima of the 
European Commission, 2012, H). 
Figure 3.2: Effort sharing targets for 2020 compared to 2005 emission levels (DG 
Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, I) 
 
In addition, there will not be a EU – wide policy regarding the measures to be taken but 
every Member State will be responsible for the implementation of the decision. 
The decision provides some flexibility to the Member States in order to achieve their 
targets. A Member State itself can carry forward from the following year emission 
allocation of up to 5% during 2013-2019. Additionally an overachievement during the 
third trading period can be carried over to subsequent years, up to 2020. 
[79] 
 
There is also a provision for transactions between Member States. In particular, during 
the third trading period a Member State can transfer part of their annual emission 
allocation for a given year to other Member States under certain conditions. 
At a first glance this decision does not seem to have any effect on the auctions that are 
going to be held. Although, if Member States and companies start to be active in the 
battle for reduction of GHGs, then a green - change in the mentality of the business 
scenery cannot be excluded.  
This change of thought could lead to cleaner technologies and as a consequence in a 
limited demand for emission allowances. Nevertheless, since the power sector will still 
have to buy all the credits needed and if we take into account that such a technology 
bloom is rather unlikely, then the conclusion is that the effects of this decision in the 
auctions results are expected to be imperceptible over the next years. 
  
3.2.4 New sectors and gasses  
In the first two trading periods the EU ETS is covering only carbon dioxide emissions. 
As for sectors it is covering power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, 
coke ovens, iron and steel plants and installations producing cement, glass, lime, bricks, 
ceramics, pulp, paper and board.  
As from the start of the third trading period the EU ETS will include more greenhouse 
gasses and sectors. Specifically, it will cover nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from the 
production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the 
aluminium sector. As from 2013, companies that perform activities which result in these 
emissions will be included in the EU ETS. Also the scheme will include more 
CO2 emissions from installations producing bulk organic chemicals, hydrogen, ammonia 
and aluminium (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, G).  
The fact that more gasses and sectors are going to be under the scheme is expected to 
influence the auctions during the third trading period. More market participants are 
expected to offer more liquidity in the market and increase the competitiveness among 
the bidders. 
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Table 3.1: Sectors and greenhouse gasses covered by the EU ETS (CMS Cameron 
McKenna LLP client briefing, 2009, p. 7) 
 
 
3.2.5 Banking of allowances 
For the first two trading periods there was no possibility for banking of allowances. 
Thus, an operator could not bank phase I allowances in order to be transformed into 
phase II allowances, However, from 2013, as foreseen by Commission Regulation 
920/2010, an operator can take advantage of the provision that allows the banking of 
allowances from the second trading period, to the third trading period. The banking of 
allowances is carried out through the deletion of phase 2 allowances and simultaneous 
creation of an equal amount of phase 3 allowances on the same registry accounts 
(European Commission Regulation No 920/2010, 2010, a. 57). 
The provision for banking of allowances may affect the auctioning results, especially 
during the early years of the third trading period, as some installations that had a surplus 
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of credits during phase II can use them for compliance in phase III. This could result in a 
slightly lower demand and as a result in lower clearing prices.  
 
3.2.6 New entrants  
In the ETS Directive there is also a provision about new entrants in the system. In 
specific, 5% of the total amount of allowances will be put into a reserve for new 
installations or airlines that enter the market after 2013.  
The above provision has a direct link with the auctions that are going to be held in the 
third trading period. In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be 
distributed to Member States for auctioning. In this way the amount of allowances to be 
auctioned during phase III may increase. 
 
3.3 The auctioning system in the third trading period 
According to the decision of the European Commission, from 2013 all emission credits 
not distributed for free must be auctioned. This sum corresponds to about one billion 
EUAs to be auctioned per year, in addition to some 30 million EUAAs (the auctions of 
EUAAs is starting in 2012). 
As it is seen in chapter 2, not all the Member States carried out auctions during the first 
two trading periods. However, the auctions held by certain Member States, and 
especially Germany and UK, provided valuable information to the European 
Commission regarding which strategy to follow during the third trading period. 
Below there are presented the decisions of the European Commission regarding the 
accomplishment of auctions from 2013 onwards. In specific it is examined the auction 
format chosen, the induction of a common auction platform, the auctions calendar, the 
products to be sold, the eligible bidders and auctioneers, the provision for a single 
European Union registry and the distribution of revenues. 
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3.3.1 A common platform but not for all 
The auctions of EUAs and EUAAs during the third trading period are governed by the 
so-called Auctioning Regulation (European Commission Regulation No 1031/2010). The 
Regulation in question provides for the establishment of a common EU-wide auction 
platform, while it allows Member States to establish national platforms. UK, Germany 
and Poland judged that it was in their favor to appoint their own auction platforms. 
It has to be clarified that the platforms that are going to be selected (or already have been 
selected) are not going to held auctions for entire the third trading period. The maximum 
appointment duration for any auction platform is five years.  
Up until the time this thesis being written has entered into force the joint procurement 
agreement between the Commission and the 24 Member States for the common auction 
platforms. The agreement lays down the rules under which the Commission and the 
Member States will conduct the joint procurement procedure.  Thus, there is not yet a 
selection of the common platform.  
In particular the joint procurement agreement provides for (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, D): 
 the Commission is to arrange for the overall orientation, preparation and 
organisation of the joint procurement procedures; 
 the Commission is to be the sole representative towards third parties and to 
provide administrative support in the course of the joint procurements and the 
resulting contracts; 
 the Member States, represented in a Joint Procurement Steering Committee 
(JPSC), are to provide steering input. Main decisions, notably adoption of 
tender documents and award decisions, require prior approval by the 
(participating) Member States by means of qualified majority vote in the 
JPSC. 
 opt-out Member States will be given observer status as regards the 
procurement of the common auction platforms; 
 a Contract Management Committee consisting of representatives from the 
Commission and the Member States will manage the contracts with the 
common auction platforms and the single auction monitor. 
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UK, Germany and Poland decided to opt out of the planned common platform. These 
Mpember States have the obligation to notify the Commission by the time they will 
determine the identity of their intended opt-out platforms and the details of the auctions 
to be conducted by them. The Commission has to verify that the platform satisfies the 
rules of the EU ETS Regulation and the objectives of the ETS Directive. If this is the 
case, the Commission will submit a draft amendment of the Auctioning Regulation with 
a view to approving the platform. 
Currently (October 2012) only UK has notified the Commission that they have selected 
London-based ICE Futures Europe as their preferred auctioning platform to conduct 
sales of Phase III and aviation EU ETS allowances. UK is currently waiting the 
completion of the European Commission notification and listing process. The approval 
procedure for the UK platform is expected to be completed by early November (DG 
Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, J). 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure a timely appointment and to mitigate the risk of any 
unexpected issues with the joint procurement process, the 24 Member States and the 
Commission participating in the joint action procured a transitional auction platform, 
which is meant as a temporary fall-back.  
The Contract Notice for the call for tenders was published on 24 March 2012 and it 
clarifies that a tender may be submitted either individually by a natural or legal person or 
jointly by several persons. It also sets some specific conditions regarding the economic 
operators to whom the contract is to be awarded. In particular the tenderers, a) shall 
ensure that the auctions will be conducted on an auction platform authorised as a 
regulated market, c) shall ensure that the auction platform will be connected to at least 1 
clearing system or settlement system, c) are required to prove that they have professional 
and technical capacity to perform the contract, and d) are required to prove that they 
have economic and financial capacity to perform the contract (TED of the European 
Commission, 2012). 
Furthermore, whereas all other auction platforms have to respect the Auctioning 
Regulation in full, the transitional auction platform is exempt from some provisions, so 
fewer adaptations from its established market practice would be required.  
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On 10 September 2012 the European Commission announced that it has signed a 
contract with the European Energy Exchange (EEX) to appoint the latter as the 
transitional common auction platform. According to the contract Notice for the call for 
tenders the duration of the contract is 3 years. Nevertheless, the contract can be 
terminated earlier if the definitive common auction platform becomes operative. 
The Commission estimates that the EEX will auction at least 250 million allowances 
before it will be replaced by the winning bidder of a forthcoming tender procedure for 
the next common auction platform. (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 
2012, K). 
EEX also won the tender for the German transitional auction platform.  On 30 August 
2012, the Commission approved this by means of an amendment to the Auctioning 
Regulation.  
Finally, Poland notified the Commission that, until the appointment of their auction 
platform, they intend to use the transitional common auction platform. (DG Clima of the 
European Commission web page, 2012, L).  
 
3.3.2 How what and when to auction  
Another major issue is the auction format. The Auctioning Regulation foresees a single-
round, sealed bid, uniform price auction (see Chapter 2), as it is considered that this 
scheme facilitates the participation of small emitters. 
In particular, bidders shall submit their bids during one given bidding window without 
seeing bids submitted by other bidders. Each bidder can place any number of bids and 
the bidding window must be open for at least two hours (European Commission 
Regulation No 1031/2010, 2010, a. 8).  
The clearing price will be announced by the closing of the bidding window and 
Successful bidders will be the ones who have placed bids for allowances at or above the 
clearing price. All successful bidders will pay the clearing price. 
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Regarding the lot size, a lot auctioned by the common auction platform shall be 500 
allowances, while one lot auctioned by an opt-out auction platform shall be 500 or 1, 000 
allowances. 
Concerning the products to be auctioned, the auctioning regulation provides for credits to 
be sold in the form of either two-day spot or five-day futures. The exact product 
specifications will be determined in the procurement of the auction platform. 
Even though the Commission has selected EEX as the transitional common auction 
platform, by the time this thesis being written there are no fixed days regarding the 
auctions of Phase III allowances. On a preliminary basis, the Commission expects that 
the auction calendars for 2013 are going to be as follows (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, K): 
 EEX, in its capacity as the common auction platform, intends to continue 
weekly auctions of general allowances on Tuesdays and Thursdays, but in the 
morning; 
 EEX intends to auction general allowances for Germany once a week on 
Friday mornings; 
 ICE intends to auction general allowances for the UK fortnightly on 
Wednesday mornings; 
 EEX and ICE would conduct all aviation allowance auctions on certain other 
Wednesday mornings. 
It has to be pointed out that the Auctioning Regulation provides that the common auction 
platform will hold auctions at least weekly for EU allowances (EUAs) and at least once 
every two months for EU Aviation Allowances (EUAAs), given their smaller 
quantity. The Regulation also clarifies that the auction platform shall determine the dates 
and times of the auctions taking account of public holidays that affect international 
financial markets and any other relevant events or circumstances that, in view of the 
auction platform, might affect the proper conduct of the auctions necessitating changes. 
No auctions shall be held in the two weeks over Christmas and New Year of each year 
(European Commission Regulation No 1031/2010, 2011, a. 8).  
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All the details of the auctions (such as the dates, the bidding window etc) are set out in 
the auction calendar. As a rule, the auction calendar of the common auction platform will 
be determined and published by 28 February of the preceding year. The auction calendar 
of any opt-out auction platform will be determined and published by 28 February of the 
preceding year. Since 2012 is considered to be a transitional period there is flexibility in 
the publication of the auction calendars and no publication has take place by the time this 
dissertation is prepared.  
The provision for a fixed auction calendar well in advance has set to provide certainty to 
the market. It has to be noticed that, after it has been fixed, the calendar can only be 
adjusted in a limited number of well-defined circumstances (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, D). 
 
3.3.3 How much to auction 
After the assessment of the National Implementation Measures (NIMs) from the 
European Commission, the total quantity of allowances to be auctioned in total and by 
each Member State will be determined as follows (CMS Cameron McKenna LLP client 
briefing, 2009, p. 8): 
 88% of allowances will be distributed between Member States according to 
their verified emissions in 2005 or the average for the period of 2005-2007 
(whichever is higher). 
 
 10% of allowances will be distributed to Member States with low income per 
capita to encourage investment in climate friendly technologies. 
 
 2% of allowances will be distributed among Member States, which, in 2005, 
achieved emission reductions of 20% below the levels set for the base year 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The exact volume of allowances to be auctioned as from 2013 has not been defined yet. 
Nevertheless, the Auctioning Regulation provides for the determination of this volume.  
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In particular, the volume of allowances to be auctioned by all Member States in 2013 
and 2014 shall be the quantity of allowances determined by the cap set for the calendar 
year concerned, less the allocation free of charge, less half of the total volume of any 
allowances auctioned in 2011 and 2012. The volume of allowances to be auctioned each 
calendar year as from 2015 onwards shall be the quantity of allowances determined by 
the cap set for the calendar year concerned, less the allocation free of charge. 
Furthermore, in the case that the Commission decides to include additional activities and 
gases in the scheme, the total quantity to be auctioned shall be determined in the same 
way and shall be added to the volume of allowances to be auctioned in a given calendar 
year. 
Also, the total volume of allowances to be auctioned in the final year of each trading 
period shall take account of: a) any cessation of operations of an installation covered by 
the EU ETS, b) any adaptation of the level of free allocation, and c) the number of 
allowances remaining in the reserve for new entrants. 
Finally, regarding the volume to be auctioned by each Member State the Auctioning 
Regulation states that the share of allowances to be auctioned annually shall be the 
Member States’ share determined pursuant to the 88-10-2 rule, less any transitional free 
allocation made by that Member State, plus any allowances of additional activities and 
gases included in the scheme to be auctioned. 
 
3.3.4 Who is selling to whom? 
The goal of the European Commission regarding the new implemented scheme is the 
establishment of a well-functioning and effective competition within the carbon market. 
Under this condition Commission decided that in the phase III auctions is eligible to 
submit bids any ETS operator or aviation operator, and so are their parent, subsidiary or 
affiliate undertakings.  
Also it is given the opportunity to the operators to form business groupings to bid as an 
agent on their behalf, which is considered to be a useful “tool” for small  and medium 
enterprises and small emitters covered by the EU ETS. 
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Furthermore, any credit firm or investment institution, regulated and authorized under 
EU law, may apply for admission to bid. In addition, the Regulation provides for an 
additional category, namely intermediaries that benefit from an exemption from the 
authorisation requirements in EU law, but that have been authorised under rules laid 
down in the Auctioning Regulation. This is particularly relevant for intermediaries such 
as fuel traders, so these could easily add allowances to the products they offer to ETS 
operators (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, D).  
The access to the actions is going to be very simple as all transactions will happen 
through internet, while the auction platforms shall offer dedicated connections. 
 Additionally, in order to prevent fraudulent acts (such as market abuse, criminal activity 
etc) the auction platforms are obliged to consider each application for admission and 
must carry out a minimum of customer due diligence checks. 
In auctioning regulation there are also provisions about the small emitters and the small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). The provision for business grouping, is estimated that 
offer SMEs the advantage of minimal transaction cost as well as certainty on price and 
quantity of allowances they wish to receive (DG Clima of the European Commission 
web page, 2012, D). 
Concerning the auctioneer this is not allowed to be a Member State itself. Each country 
has to appoint an auctioneer, which can be either a public or a private party. The 
auctioneer will be responsible for offering the allowances to be sold to the auction 
platform on behalf of the appointing Member State, it will receive the auction proceeds 
and disburse them to the appointing Member State. However, as it is expected, neither 
the auctioneer nor the auction platform or its staff may apply for admission to bid. 
 
3.3.5 Registry  
With the beginning of the first trading period each Member State had to have an 
operational registry for the EU ETS. These registries recorded the holding of emission 
allowances and the transactions concerning those credits. Essentially registries operated 
as the bank of the EU ETS. 
[89] 
 
However, Directive 2009/29/EC provides for the replacement of all the EU ETS 
registries hosted in the Member States into a single European Union registry, operated by 
the Commission. This centralized registry has already replaced the national registries and 
it includes accounts for stationary installations, as well as accounts for aircraft operators. 
In particular the Union registry covers all EU Member States as well as Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein. It is an online database that records (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, M): 
a) National plans indicating the allowances assigned to each Member State in 
phase 2 of the ETS (2008-2012), which will be replaced by National 
Implementation Measures in phase 3 (2013-2020); 
b) Accounts of companies or physical persons holding those allowances; 
c) Transfers of allowances performed by the account holders; 
d) Annual verified CO2 emissions from installations; 
e) Annual reconciliation of allowances and verified emissions, where each 
company must have surrendered enough allowances to cover all its verified 
emissions. 
As a consequence of the above modification the Community Independent Transaction 
Log (CITL) (which was checking records and was authorizing all the transactions that 
took place between accounts in the national registry) was replaced by the European 
Union Transaction Log (EUTL) which has the same role. 
 
3.3.6 Distribution of revenues – Payer of the auction process 
The revenue accrue from auctions of emission credits during the third trading period will 
go to the Member States according to their auctioning rights. It also has to be clarified 
that ETS Directive recommends that at least half the revenue, and all of the revenues 
from auctioning allowances in respect of aviation, should be used to fight and adapt to 
climate change.  
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Regarding the cost of the auction process, it is expected to be paid by the bidders through 
the fees they pay to an auction platform to participate in the auctions. 
 
3.3.7 A fair market 
European Commission has set the target for fair and orderly auctioning during the third 
trading period.  This goal is tried to be ensured through the Auctioning Regulation, 
which set rules regarding the access to the auctions and the auction calendar, while it 
includes detailed provisions to mitigate the risk of anti-competitive behavior. .   
The Auctioning Regulation also tries to obtain fair treatment of clients. In particular it 
lays down an authorisation requirement and conduct rules for intermediaries in case they 
are not covered by such conduct rules provided for in the EU Financial legislation (DG 
Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, D). 
Finally, there is the provision that the auction platform must be a regulated market. This 
provision ensures that the platform meets strict standards and that it will be supervised 
by the competent national authority for financial markets of the Member State in which it 
is located. 
At this point it has to be noticed that a joint procurement agreement between the 
Commission and the Member States has entered into force for the auction monitor that 
will survey the auctions conducted on all auction platforms. However, an investigation 
on the monitoring rules in place to prohibit market abuse is presented in detail in Chapter 
5. 
 
3.4 Early auctions 
As it is presented above the European Commission, through the Auctioning Regulation, 
tries to obtain an orderly transmission from the second to the third trading period. Under 
this fundamental condition, in the Auctioning Regulation there is a provision for the 
auctioning of 120 million phase III emission allowances already in 2012, in addition to 
some 30 million aviation allowances. 
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At the same time the Commission via the so called NER 300 program intends to found 
innovative low-carbon projects within the borders of the European Union. For the 
monetization of NER 300 the Commission decided to sell 300 million emission 
allowances (some of them through auctions) from the New Entrants Reserve set up for 
the phase III of the EU ETS.  Further details on the NER 300 program are provided in 
section 2.5.2 of this chapter. 
Below it is presented all the relevant information regarding the early auctions of the 120 
+30 million allowances and any early auction of the 300 million allowances for the 
founding of the NER 300 program.  
 
3.4.1 Auctioning of the 120+30 million allowances 
A reasonable question that someone might have is why the Commission decided that 
early auctions are a necessity. The rationality behind this decision stems from the idea to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the secondary market and also a smooth transition to 
Phase III. 
Specific installations under the EU ETS, and especially the power sector, tend to sell 
their products several years in advance (forward sales). At the same time those 
companies normally acquire contracts of emission allowances to hedge the risk of price 
fluctuation. Thus, the Commission estimates that the early auctions will ensure the 
proper function of the secondary market during this transitional period (DG Clima of the 
European Commission web page, 2012, D). 
Regarding the volume of phase III emission credits to be auctioned during 2012, it has 
already been clarified that the Regulation provides for the sale of 120 million 
allowances, in addition to some 30 million aviation allowances. The determination of the 
shares of each Member States in these early auctions is also based on the 88-10-2 rule. 
 
 
 
[92] 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Volume of allowances to be sold through early auctions by Member State 
in 2012 (German Emissions Trading Authority, 2012, C, p. 32) 
 
Nevertheless, up until the time this dissertation being written no early auction has taken 
place. The early auctions for the 24 Member States plus Poland are going to be 
performed by the transitional auction platform (EEX). According to the European 
Commission EEX intends to conduct auctions of general allowances on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays, and auctions of aviation allowances mostly on Wednesdays and some on 
Mondays. These auctions are expected to start by end-October, while the precise start 
date remains to be confirmed (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, 
J). 
The German early auctions are starting from 26 October and they are going to be 
performed by EEX on a weekly basis on Friday mornings. Two auctions of aviation 
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allowances are envisaged on Wednesday 31 October and Wednesday 14 November. All 
the products are going to be sold in the form of spot contracts. 
 
Table 3.3: Auction calendar of German early auctions (EEX web page, 2012, B) 
Date Product code Volume EUAs Volume EUAAs 
26/10/12 T3PA 3,000,000 - 
31/10/12 EAA2 - 2,500,000 
02/11/12 T3PA 3.000,000 - 
09/11/12 T3PA 3,000,000 - 
14/11/12 EAA2 - 2,500,000 
16/11/12 T3PS 3,000,000 - 
23/11/12 T3PA 3,000,000 - 
30/11/12 T3PA 3,000,000 - 
07/12/12 T3PA 3,000,000 - 
14/12/12 T3PA 2,531,000 - 
Aggregate - 23,531,000 5,000,000 
Finally, UK has also announced provisional dates for the phase III and aviation 
allowances early auctions. The auction calendar is subject to completion of the EU 
approval process and no specific volumes or type of products have been announced by 
the time this thesis been written. In particular, the UK intends to perform two auctions of 
EUAs through ICE on Wednesday 21 November and Wednesday 5 December, and two 
auctions of aviation allowances on Monday 26 November and Monday 10 December 
(DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, J).  
 
3.4.2 NER 300 
NER 300 funds innovative carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects and renewable 
energy sources (RES) technologies. The program involves all Member States and has as 
a goal the demonstration and the commercialization of these innovative technologies.  
The program will be funded from the sale of 300 million phase III allowances from the 
New entrants Reserve set up for the third trading period. The projects to be funded 
selected via two calls for proposals. The first call will be monetized through the sale of 
200 phase III allowances, while the second call from the sale of the rest 100 million 
phase III credits (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, N).  
[94] 
 
Responsible for the implementation of the program is the European Commission, but the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) is liable for the sale of the allowances. The credits 
were delivered by the Commission on December 2, 2011 and the funding of the first 
tranche of 200 million allowances has to be completed by October 2, 2012. Regarding 
the sale of the second tranche (100 million credits) may not continue immediately after 
the first tranche is finalized and there is a possibility to be completed by end 2013 (EIB 
web page, 2012, A).  
Table 3.4 Overview of emission allowances sales under NER 300 (EIB, 2012, C, p. 2) 
 
EIB is using various sales channels such as: over the counter (OTC) transactions, on-
exchange sales and auctions (EIB web page, 2012, B). Table 3.4 provides all the relevant 
information regarding the sale channel, the volume sold, the executed average price and 
the value of sold allowances. 
By July 2012 the total volume of EU allowances sold under the NER 300 initiative was 
162,100,000 with a total value of 1,302,447,930. In order to perform the sales EIB 
selected two carbon exchanges: ICE Futures Europe and European Energy Exchange 
(EEX). This choice ensures that EIB can use all the available sales chanels. 
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3.4.2.1 Auctioning of allowances under NER 300 
EIB started to auction allowances in June 2012 and has agreed with both the eligible 
exchanges to perform these sales. The Bank decided that it was in its interest to split the 
auctions into two blocks of two months each (EIB web page, 2012, D).  
Figure 3.3 EIB NER 300 Auction Calendar – June 2012 (EIB web page, 2012, E) 
 
The first block of auctions started on 7
th
 of June 2012 and lasted until the 31
st
 of June and 
EIB had chosen EEX to conduct the sales. In order to perform an assessment of the 
auctions under the NER 300 this dissertation has collected all the relevant information 
regarding this specific block of auctions. 
The format chosen for this block of auctions was the single round, sealed bid, uniform 
price auction. The frequency was daily, except Wednesdays, and the volume auctioned 
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was 625,000 credits per auction. The contracts were EUA DEC 13 futures (F2EA) and 
the binding window was open for two hours. 
Regarding the second block of auctions, from 1
st
 of August 2012 – 30th of September 
2012, EIB had chosen both EEX and ICE to conduct auctions. The format chosen for this 
block was again the single round, sealed bid, uniform price auction. The frequency was 
daily and the volume auctioned was 500,000 credits per auction. The contracts were 
EUA DEC 13 futures and the binding window was open for two hours. 
 
3.4.2.2 Auctions assessment 
In order to assess the auctions held by EIB and draw some conclusions about their 
performance all the auctions carried out during the first block are gathered in Table 2.6.  
The table provides information regarding the dates of the auctions, the volume of EUAs, 
the minimum and the maximum prices, the cover ratio, the number of successful bidders 
and the total proceeds. Also information is provided regarding the clearing price of the 
process which can be compared with the EEX Dec 13 Futures (F2EA) closing price at 
the day of the auction, also provided in the tables. Finally, it is presented the percentage 
difference between the ECX ICE DEC 13 futures contract closing price and the clearing 
price of the auction. 
The first conclusion that came out by a close look to the above table is that the auctions 
results are similar to those of the auctions held by the Member States for phase II 
emission allowances (see Chapter 2). In specific, the ECX ICE Dec 13 Futures closing 
price is on average 1.16% higher than the auction clearing price. Therefore, the clearing 
prices generally did not deviate from lead markets by more than a few eurocents and 
once again the auctions were held almost in parallel to developments in the secondary 
market. Figures 2.4 provide a visual illustration of this argument. 
It has to be noticed that in certain dates the clearing price of the auction was even above 
the closing price in the secondary market. This might happened because the spot price 
fluctuated and the bidders were not able to calculate the depth of the secondary market 
downfall. Indicative examples is auction on June 11th (7.26 €/F2EA to 7.11 €/F2EA) and 
the auction on July 17
th
 (8.22 €/F2EA to 8.17 €/F2EA). 
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Furthermore, by using statistical tools it is examined whether there are indications that 
the auctions clearing price and the secondary market price are moving in parallel. In 
particular it is calculated the correlation and the covariance between the series, while 
there are performed a mean equality test and a variance equality test. 
The correlation between the two variables is 0.9833376 and the covariance is 0.35845. 
The positive sign of the covariance is indicating that the variables are showing a similar 
behavior, while the fact that the correlation is very close to +1 indicates that the auctions 
clearing price and the secondary market price are related and are moving to the same 
direction.  
Additionally, the mean equality test is showing a probability of more than 93.5% for the 
means of the variables to be equal and the variance equality test is showing a probability 
of at least 70% the variances of the series to be equal (the tests results can be found in 
Appendix I). These probabilities are additional signs of co-movement of the variables. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the secondary market seems to have large influence over 
the primary market, as the price of the latter is related with the price of the former.  
Figure 3.4: F2EA clearing price versus EEX Dec 13 Futures closing price at the 
day of the auction 
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Table 3.5 EIB NER 300 auctions results during the first block of auctions (EEX 
web page, 2012, A) 
Date Size (Dec 
13 
Futures) 
Clearing 
price(€) 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price 
ECX ICE 
Dec 13 
Futures 
closing 
price at 
the day of 
the 
auction(€) 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
ECX ICE Dec 
13 Futures 
closing 
price and 
clearing 
price (%) 
Cover 
ratio 
Number of 
successful 
bidders  
Total 
proceeds (€) 
07/06/12 625,000 6.83 6.69 6.86 6.97 2.01 3.59 2 ~4,268,750 
08/06/12 625,000 6.93 6.75 7.1 7.06 1.84 2.31 3 ~4,331,250 
11/06/12 625,000 7.26 6.60 7.27 7.11 -2.11 5.70 2 ~4,537,500 
12/06/12 625,000 7.03 6.55 7.05 7.16 1.82 8.03 3 ~4,393,750 
14/06/12 625,000 7.18 6.97 7.25 7.36 2.45 7.18 4 ~4,487,500 
15/06/12 625,000 7.41 6.65 7.60 7.75 4.39 7.81 5 ~4,631,250 
18/06/12 625,000 7.65 7.00 7.75 7.83 2.30 8.47 4 ~4,781,250 
19/06/12 625,000 8.01 7.60 8.15 8.05 0.50 12.86 3 ~5,006,250 
21/06/12 625,000 7.92 7.44 8.05 8.01 1.12 9.37 2 ~4,950,000 
22/06/12 625,000 8.32 8.20 8.45 8.61 3.37 4.33 3 ~5,200,000 
25/06/12 625,000 8.28 7.77 8.33 8.58 3.50 3.32 8 ~5,175,000 
26/06/12 625,000 8.62 8.00 8.75 8.58 -0.47 5.20 2 ~5,387,500 
28/06/12 625,000 8.43 8.20 8.55 8.46 0.35 10.87 5 ~5,268,750 
29/06/12 625,000 8.81 8.40 8.90 8.77 -0.46 10.04 6 ~5,506,250 
02/07/12 625,000 8.62 7.90 8.75 8.64 0.23 4.54 3 ~5,387,500 
03/07/12 625,000 8.84 6.64 8.90 8.84 0.00 3.91 3 ~5,525,000 
05/07/12 625,000 8.80 8.40 8.95 8.86 0.68 5.16 2 ~5,500,000 
06/07/12 625,000 8.57 8.20 8.80 8.55 -0.23 3.37 5 ~5,356,250 
09/07/12 625,000 8.29 7.80 8.32 8.47 2.12 5.17 3 ~5,181,250 
10/07/12 625,000 8.36 7.85 8.36 8.44 0.95 5.17 1 ~5,225,000 
12/07/12 625,000 8.14 7.65 8.19 8.12 -0.25 5.60 5 ~5,087,500 
13/07/12 625,000 7.94 7.00 7.99 8.11 2.10 4.64 4 ~4,962,500 
16/07/12 625,000 7.92 7.50 8.10 8.03 1.37 3.63 5 ~4,950,000 
17/07/12 625,000 8.22 8.10 8.23 8.17 -0.61 2.14 3 ~5,137,500 
19/07/12 625,000 7.17 6.90 7.35 7.30 1.78 6.06 6 ~4,481,250 
20/07/12 625,000 7.36 6.75 7.37 7.57 2.77 4.24 4 ~4,600,000 
23/07/12 625,000 7.38 6.85 7.38 7.59 2.77 4.03 3 ~4,612,500 
24/07/12 625,000 7.67 7.50 7.71 7.64 -0.39 2.88 5 ~4,793,750 
26/07/12 625,000 7.30 6.80 7.32 7.42 1.62 3.72 2 ~4.562.500 
27/07/12 625,000 7.33 6.70 7.35 7.38 0.68 6.77 4 ~4,581,250 
30/07/12 625,000 7.06 6.55 7.09 7.03 -0.43 4.17 3 ~4,393,750 
31/07/12 625,000 7.27 6.97 7.35 7.38 1.49 3.55 4 ~4,543,750 
Aggregate 28,000,000 - - - - -  - - ~156,806,250 
Average - - - - - 1.16 5.56 3.66 - 
Another conclusion is that when the demand for credits is high (expressed by the cover 
ratio to the Table 3.5) the clearing price is close to the maximum price set in the auction. 
For example in the auction held on June 29
th
 with a cover ratio of 10.04 the clearing 
price was 8.81 €/F2EA and the maximum price was 8.90 €/F2EA. 
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Furthermore, this is the second series of derivatives auctions (after those of Germany) 
and delivered once again successful results. Therefore, someone could argue that the 
Commission should also consider the auctioning of derivative products during the third 
trading period.  
In addition, the average cover ratio in the auctions is 5.56 and is pretty close with the 
corresponding ratio of the German derivatives auctions (5.38). This ratio offers another 
indication that the market operates smoothly, since it discloses that there is sufficient 
demand in the primary market for EUAs. 
It is interesting to notice a tactic on the behalf of the seller that can also be observed in 
the German auctions for phase II emission Allowances. When the price in the secondary 
market is expected to face sharp decrease the auctioneer lowers the minimum price in 
order secure sufficient demand for allowances.  
An indicative example can be viewed in the minimum prices set in the spot auctions 
performed in July 17
th
 and July 19th. In the first case with the secondary future price 
been at 8.17 €/F2EA the minimum price is set at 8.10 €/F2EA, while in the latter case 
with the spot price been at 7.30 €/F2EA the minimum price is set at 6.90 €/F2EA. 
As it is discussed in Chapter 2 potentially the above mentioned practice has an 
immediate effect on the potential buyers. When the boundaries are set in accordance with 
the secondary price movement the potential buyers are more confident on participating in 
the procedure. 
One more similarity with the German case is the small number of successful bidders. On 
average 3.66 auctions participants submitted successful bids in the T2PA auctions. Once 
again it can be assumed that probably this is because the interested firms in emission 
credits are buying allowances via a small number of members in EEX (investment banks 
etc). These EEX members are buying big amount of allowances in order to sell them 
later either to their clients or to the secondary market. 
The overall conclusion is that the derivatives primary market seems to functioning well, 
the auctions deliver almost the same results with those held for phase II allowances, and 
the strategy undertaken is the same that Germany followed in the auctions for the second 
trading period allowances. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
There is one central conclusions deriving from this Chapter. The European Commission 
tries to obtain an orderly transition from the second to the third trading period. This 
effort is conspicuous in both the decisions regarding the accomplishment of auctions 
from 2013 onwards and the implementation of early auctions. 
In terms of auctions accomplishment the European Commission has taken some specific 
decisions in order to facilitate the transition from phase II to phase III: 
 There will be a common auction platform, as the European Commission 
estimates that this choice is the most cost efficient, most transparent, would 
best ensure respect of the principle of non-discrimination, and would offer the 
greatest level of harmonization and predictability as compared to auctioning 
through two or more parallel national auction platforms. Nevertheless, the 
Commission allows for any Member State to set up its own auction platform. 
 In order to ensure a timely appointment and to mitigate the risk of any 
unexpected issues with the joint procurement process, the 24 Member States 
and the Commission participating in the joint action procured a transitional 
auction platform, which is meant as a temporary fall-back. 
 The single-round, sealed bid, uniform price auction, was selected as the 
auction format, since it is considered to facilitate the participation of small 
emitters. 
 The auctions are going to be open to every interested party (ETS operators, 
aviation operators, investment institutions, etc).  Goal of the European 
Commission is the establishment of a well-functioning and effective 
competition within the carbon market. 
 The establishment of a single European Union registry, operated by the 
Commission. In this way all the data is allocated in a single databank, while 
this format offers enhanced registry security measures.  
 The Auctioning Regulation provides for a fair and smooth auctioning as it 
includes detailed provisions to mitigate the risk of anti-competitive behavior. 
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Regarding the implementation of early auctions, the European Commission decided that 
they are also necessary in order to achieve its goal. The rationality behind this decision 
stems from the idea to ensure the smooth functioning of the secondary market and also a 
smooth transition to Phase III. 
From the above it is concluded that European Commission has done some very 
important steps in order to achieve a smooth transition from phase II to phase III.  
Nevertheless, the third trading period has not started yet and the European Commission 
has to make some final adjustments by January 2013. In particular, the European 
Commission:  
 Has to determine the volume of allowances to be auctioned by each Member 
State during phase III in order to be clear for every market participant. 
 Has to select the common auction platform. 
 After the appointment of the common auction platform has to plot the auction 
calendar. 
 Has to approve the ICE Futures Europe as the auctioning platform for UK. 
 Has to decide on the auction calendar for the early auctions of the 24 Member 
States. 
 Has to approve the auction calendars of UK and Germany regarding the early 
auctions. 
Another conclusion is that the smooth transition from the second to the third trading 
period is not the only reason behind the Commission’s decision to perform early 
auctions. Via the so called NER 300 program the Commission intends to fund innovative 
low-carbon projects within the borders of the European Union. 
Up until the time this dissertation being written early auction has taken place only under 
the NER 300 program. The main conclusion deriving from these auctions is that the 
auctions results are identical with those of the auctions held by the Member States during 
the phase II of the EU ETS. Once again the secondary market seems to have a large 
influence over the auctions, as the statistical tools that have been used are indicating that 
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the secondary market price level determines the clearing prices of the auctions. 
Furthermore, the interested firms in emission credits are buying allowances via a small 
number of intermediates, the primary market seem to have obtain balance, while demand 
is high and it determines the level of the learing prices.  
Finally, this is the second series of derivatives auctions (after those of Germany) and 
delivered once again successful results. Therefore, someone could argue that the 
Commission should also consider the auctioning of derivative products during the third 
trading period.  
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Chapter 4: The international primary market and the 
European secondary market for emission allowances 
 
4.1 Introduction and literature review 
This Chapter aims at providing a thorough review of all GHG emissions trading products 
as offered in both primary and secondary markets and it examines whether the carbon 
market has obtained the characteristic of the other commodity markets across the globe. 
Under this scope there are presented all the different emission products available, their 
price and volume statistics, and their contract types, while there is special reference to 
European exchange platforms in place. 
To the best of my knowledge this Chapter gathers for the first time such an amount of 
the various trading analytics of the different emission credit products transacted both in 
the primary and in the secondary market.  
The chapter is divided into two main Sections. The Section 4.2 deals with the three 
products linked to the Kyoto Protocol; Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), Certified 
Emission Reduction Units (CERs) as offered in the primary market.  For information of 
the specifics of the EUA primary market the reader is referred to Chapter 2.  
The trading analytics of the AAUs are presented in the Subsection 4.2.1, CERs are 
discussed in the Subsection 4.2.2, while the Subsection 4.2.3 provides information 
regarding the primary market for ERUs. 
Within this Section the reader may find statistics regarding the prices and the traded 
volumes of emission credits, while it is provided information regarding the most active 
players in market. In particular for CERs and ERUs is also provided information 
regarding the number of projects, the number of credits issued, and the various types of 
projects. 
All the relevant data regarding the transactions of emission credits in the primary market 
was collected from the web page of the UNFCCC, the various annual “State and Trends 
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of the Carbon Market Report” of the World Bank, and the United Nations Environment 
Programme Risø Centre (UNEP Risø Centre). 
From this part of the Chapter it is concluded that the emission credits are traded as any 
other commodity, the primary carbon market seems to operate smoothly, while the CER 
is the dominant product in this market. 
The Section 4.3 of this Chapter focuses on the secondary market of all GHG emission 
related products as realized through the European exchange platforms. This part of the 
Chapter tries to offer a spherical analysis of the trading analytics of the various emission 
credit products transacted in the secondary market. Also by examining the prices and the 
volumes of the traded emission allowances tries to draw some conclusions regarding the 
secondary carbon market behavior. 
This section is divided into five parts. The Subsection 4.3.1 discusses the rules governing 
the European secondary carbon market, while Subsection 4.3.2 presents the trading 
activity of the largest European exchanges in place. The subsection 4.3.3 displays the 
trading analytics of the EUAs, the transactions of CERs and ERUs in the European 
secondary market are discussed in the subsection 4.3.4, and finally the Subsection 4.3.5 
presents the special characteristic of the European Union Aviation Allowances (EUAAs) 
market. 
This section provides information regarding the specific rules in place for the 
commodities trading in the European exchanges, while it explicates the market structure 
and its special characteristics, such as the liquidity and the volume of transactions. It also 
presents the different forms of contracts offered by the European carbon exchanges.  
Additionally, by using statistical tools it examines the relationship between the different 
products and the different contracts of the same product. In particular is investigated the 
degree of interdependence between the four main products traded in the European carbon 
exchanges (EUAs, CERs, ERUs, and EUAAs) and the price interrelationship of the 
different contracts (spot, futures) offered for each product. 
In order to draw conclusions regarding the statistical relationships between the variables 
the series are divided in pairs and are estimated the correlation and the covariance 
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between the variables. For the same pairs of variables are also performed mean equality 
tests and variance equality tests. 
The European Commission web page provides information about the specific rules 
regarding the carbon products that a party or a firm can use for compliance under the EU 
ETS, and the relevant data emanates from the “carbonmarketdata” web page. 
The statistics about the transacted volumes and the prices of EUAs, CERs, and ERUs are 
coming from the various annual “State and Trends of the Carbon Market Report” of the 
World Bank, and especially from the web pages of the three major European exchanges: 
ICE ECX, BlueNext, and EEX. Ultimately the details about the introduction of European 
Union Aviation Allowances derive from the web pages of the International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA), and the European Commission. 
The main conclusion deriving from this Section is that there are clear indications that the 
European carbon exchanges have indeed obtained the characteristics of the exchanges for 
other types of commodities such as stock exchanges. Furthermore, there are indications 
that the different products are related, while the different contracts of the same product 
seem to move in parallel.  
 
4.2 Emission trading 
Emission trading is one of the three market-based mechanisms provided by the Kyoto 
Protocol. It has already been mentioned in the introduction of the thesis that over the 
period 2008-2012 the levels of allowed emissions of the Annex B countries are divided 
into AAUs. Under the emission trading scheme the counties can trade their surplus of 
AAUs, while there is also a provision for the trading of ERUs and CERs.  
It also has to be noted that under the EU ETS the tradable asset is the European Union 
Allowance (EUA), which equals one AAU. Nevertheless the AAUs are not a direct 
substitute for EUAs, since they are not allowed for compliance in the EU ETS 
(Ramming, 2008, p. 2).  
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4.2.1 International trading of AAUs 
International Emission Trading became functional in late 2008. However, during this 
first year took place only 3 transactions of AAUs. These transactions are presented in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Transactions of AAUs in 2008 (World Bank, 2009, p. 56) 
 Seller Buyer Indicative 
volume 
(MtCO2e) 
Reported 
price  
(€/AAU) 
Indicative  
value  
(US$ mlln) 
2008 Hungary Belgium 2 14-15 - 
2008 Hungary Spain 6 14-15 - 
2008 Slovakia US (private) 10 6.05 - 
Total for 2008 - - 18 - 212 
 
In 2009 the demand for AAUs skyrocketed and the volume of AAUs transacted was 
more than 8.5 times bigger than the previous year (see Table 4.2). Japan became the 
prominent buyer, while the Eastern European countries dominated on the sale side as it is 
clear in Figure 3.1. The AAU price was between 8 € and 10 € as the market seemed to 
have found a balance (World Bank, 2010, A, p. 51). 
Figure 4.1: AAU primary transactions up to December 2009 by country (World 
Bank, 2010, B, p. 84) 
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Over the next year the trend seemed to follow a different direction. The AAU price fell 
to the 5-7 € level as the demand started to decline, while the volume sold was less than a 
half in comparison with 2009. In 2010 Annex B countries get close to fully complying 
with their Kyoto obligations, governments reduce the pace of their purchases, and 
trading opportunities for private sector players decline in tandem (World Bank, 2011, 
p.53). 
In 2010 Japan and Japanese enterprises were still the dominant buyer but purchased less 
quantities compared to the previous year. On the sale side the Eastern European 
countries were still the key players. 
In 2011 the market went further down with the prices falling below 5€ and the volume of 
transacted AAUs declining by 23% to 47 million tons. The downward trend attributed to 
the lower-than-expected emissions and the length in allowance supply. Once again Japan 
was the main buyer, while Estonia sold the largest number of AAUs, followed by 
Lithuania (World Bank, 2012, p. 61).  
Table 4.2: Transactions of AAUs between 2008 and 2011 (World Bank, 2009:2012) 
 
Volume 
(MtCO2e) 
 
Annual 
volumetric 
change (%)  
Indicative 
price 
(€/AAU) 
Indicative value 
(US$ mlln) 
2008 18 - 14-15 212 
2009 155 +760% 8-10 1000 
2010 61 -39% 5-7 626 
2011 47 -23% 1-5 318 
Aggregate 281 - ΝΑ 2156 
 
4.2.2 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
In the introduction of the thesis the CERs are defined as the carbon credit deriving from 
the Clean Development Mechanism and are issued by the Clean Development 
Mechanism Executive board. 
This Section of the Chapter presents the trading analytics of the CERs traded in the 
primary market (pCERs). The statistics and the characteristics of the CERs transacted in 
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the secondary market (sCERs) are examined later in the next Section of the Chapter 
(Section 4.3). 
It is also important to be clarified that the CERs traded in the primary market are divided 
into two main groups. In particular there are CERs for compliance at the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (pre-2013 pCERs) and CERs for compliance 
from 2013 onwards (post-2012 pCERs).  
 
4.2.2.1 CDM projects at a glance 
In order to allow for a more thorough investigation and understanding of the dynamics of 
the primary CER market, it is useful to investigate the current status of CDM projects, 
their type and their geographical distribution. 
Figure 4.2: CDM projects registered until 2011 and projects at validation in 2012 
(World Bank, 2012, p. 55) 
 
From figure 4.2 is obvious that over the last years the number of registered CDM 
projects is growing steadily. In specific until the 12th of September 2012, 4597 projects 
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were registered and 131 were requiring registration, while the expected CERs until the 
end of 2012 were 2.16 billions (see Table 3.5). 
Table 4.3: Registered CDM projects and CERs (UNFCCC web page, 12/09/2012, 
H) 
 Annual Average CERs Expected CERs until end of 
2012 
CDM project pipeline: > 
5600 of which: 
N/A > 2,700,000,000 
 4597 are registered 643,550,866 > 2,160,000,000 
 131 are requesting 
registration 
17,699,050 > 0 
Regarding the registered projects by Annex I and non Annex I parties (see Figure 4.3), 
United Kingdom possesses almost the one third of projects, while Switzerland is 
following in the list holding the one fifth of projects. Japan and Netherland have together 
another 19% and Sweden owns the 7.11%. 
Figure 4.3: Registered projects by Annex I and Non Annex I investor parties 
(UNFCCC, 2012, I) 
 
 
On the other hand Chine has received the lion’s share of CDM project investments, as 
more than half of the registered projects are within its territory (see Figure 4.4). India is 
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next as it has received almost the 20% of the investments, while the other countries 
shares are below 5%. 
Figure 4.4: Registered project activities by host party (UNFCCC web page, 2012, I) 
 
Concerning the scope of the registered projects, energy industries seems to attract the 
majority of investors, while waste handling and disposal and manufacturing industries 
are following (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Distribution of registered project activities by scope (UNFCCC web page, 
2012, I) 
 
Sectoral Scope 
 
Registered Projects 
Energy industries (renewable - / non-renewable sources) 3757 
Energy distribution 0 
Energy demand 48 
Manufacturing industries 250 
Chemical industries 81 
Construction 0 
Transport 15 
Mining/mineral production 59 
Metal production 9 
Fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil and gas) 181 
Fugitive emissions from production and consumption of 
halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
29 
Solvent use 0 
Waste handling and disposal 671 
Afforestation and reforestation 39 
Agriculture 157 
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4.2.2.2 Transactions of CERs 
First launched in 2002 the primary markets CERs for compliance at the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (pre-2013 pCERs) followed a sharp upward route until 
2007 and since then the trend has been reversed. As it can be seen in Figure 3.5 the price 
and the volumes were increasing steadily for five years but over the last four years are 
following the opposite direction. 
Figure 4.5: Volumes and average prices of pre-2013 CER transactions (World 
Bank, 2012, p.49) 
 
 
There are two reasons for this sharp decline of price and volumes. The first reason is that 
both supply and demand were similarly hit by the economic downturn in 2008. The 
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second reason is that the commitment period comes to an end and the market for these 
assets is becoming narrow (World Bank, 2012, p.48). 
Table 4.5: Average prices, volumes and value of pCERs transactions (World Bank, 
2006:2012) 
 
Year 
CERs 
Average price 
($/pre-2013 CER) 
Volume 
(mtCO2e) 
Value 
($million) 
2002 3* n.a n.a. 
2003 4.9 n.a. n.a. 
2004 5.6 97 485 
2005 7.2 341 2,417 
2006 10.9 450 4,813 
2007 13.6 552 7,433 
2008 16.1 404 6,511 
2009 12.7 211 2,678 
2010 11.8 224* 2,675* 
2011 10.9 263* 2,980* 
Aggregate - >2,542 >29,992 
*Both pre-2013 CERs and post-2012 CERs 
Despite however the uncertainty that dominates the post-Kyoto period, a market for 
CERs for compliance from 2013 onwards (post-2012 pCERs) emerged in 2009.  Post-
2012 pCERs are sold as forward products for delivery after 2012. 
Table 4.6: Volumes and value for CER transactions in the primary market (World 
Bank, 2010–2012) 
 2010 2011 
volume 
(mtCO2e) 
value 
($million) 
volume 
(mtCO2e) 
value 
($million) 
Pre- 
2013  
124 1,458 91 990 
Post-
2012 
100 1,217 173 1,990 
Total 224 2,675 263 2,980 
From Table 4.6 it can be seen that post-2012 market is a very different case than the pre-
2013 one. In 2011 the market for post-2012 pCERs grew rapidly and was about twice the 
size of the post-2013 market.  
Regarding the countries selling pre-2013 pCERs, China is the dominant player in the 
market since 2005. Over this period China’s share is larger than the aggregate of all the 
other developing countries (see Figure 4.6). China has also the lion’s share in the market 
of post-2012 CERs (see Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.6: pre-2013 volumes transacted by seller 2002-2011 (World Bank, 2012, 
p.53) 
  
Figure 4.7: post-2012 volumes transacted per seller, 2010-2011 (World Bank, 2012, 
p.53) 
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On the demand side the European countries are the most energetic players. More or less 
the picture is the same as in the case of the registered projects by Annex I and Non 
Annex I investor parties. (See Figure 4.3). UK is the major player in the market since 
2006 (see Figure 4.8), while Switzerland had a robust increase in 2010 and in 2011 in 
both pre-2013 and post-2012 markets compared to previous years. The Swiss market 
share in 2011 came right after the UK (World Bank, 2012, p.53). 
Figure 4.8: Annual volume of CDM & JI transactions (World Bank, 2010, p.40) 
 
 
4.2.3 Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
The thesis’ introduction defines the ERUs as the carbon credits issued under a Joint 
Implementation, which is the third market-based mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. 
One ERU is equivalent to one tonne of CO2. 
In this Section the reader may find information regarding the statistics and the 
characteristics of the ERUs traded in the primary market (pERUs). The trading analytics 
of the ERUs transacted in the secondary market (sERUs) are presented in the next 
Section of the Chapter (Section 4.3). 
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At this point it must be noted that the reader shall trace back to the thesis’ introduction to 
find details regarding the Track 1 and Track 2 procedures, since their data is also 
discussed in this Section.  
 
4.2.3.1 JI projects at a glance 
In order to obtain a spherical understanding of the primary market for ERUs, it is once 
again useful to investigate the current status of JI projects, their number under Track 1 
and Track 2 procedures, their type and their geographical distribution.  
Figure 4.9: Cumulative ERU issuance per track q1 2009 – q1 2012 (World Bank, 
2012, p. 60) 
 
The ERUs were introduced in the market after the beginning of 2008. Nevertheless their 
volume is experiencing a big increase from the middle of the year 2010.  
A total of 603 projects under both Track 1 and Track 2 procedures were underway by 
September 2012. In specific 363 projects were under Track 1 procedure and 240 were 
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under track 2 procedure. The ERUs issued were more than 225 millions (see Table 4.7). 
Thus, ERUs continue to face a steady growth in 2012. 
Table 4.7: Status of JI projects (UNEP Risø Centre web page, 2012, A) 
 
 
Also from Table 4.7 it is concluded that the Eastern European countries monopolize 
ERU issuance and are host countries for the vast majority of JI projects. Ukraine and 
Russian Federation are granted with the greatest quantities of ERUs, while in their 
territory there is the greatest number of established projects.  
Another interesting observation is that Developed countries such as Germany, France 
and Sweden are issuing a small number of ERUs. This is an indication that firms prefer 
to invest in projects in other countries where the abatement costs are lower. 
Table 4.8: Buyers of JI projects (UNEP Risø Centre web page, 2012, B) 
Buyers Number of projects 
 JI track 1 JI track 2 Total JI 
Austria 10 11 21 
Belgium 3 2 5 
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Buyers Number of projects 
Canada 1 - 1 
Denmark 20 8 28 
Estonia 2 2 4 
Finland 10 7 17 
France 15 2 17 
Germany 20 17 37 
Greece - - 0 
Hungary 1 - 1 
Iceland - - 0 
Ireland - 1 1 
Italy - - 0 
Japan 16 9 25 
Latvia 11 - 11 
Luxembourg 3 1 4 
Netherlands 81 83 164 
New Zealand - - 0 
Norway 2 1 3 
Poland 2 - 2 
Portugal - - 0 
Spain 2 9 11 
Sweden 8 8 16 
Switzerland 51 22 73 
United K. 21 36 57 
NEFCO 1 11 12 
WBCF 8 - 8 
n.a. 92 65 157 
Total 380 295 664 
 
On the other hand the most active country in buying JI projects is Netherlands as they 
already possess 164 projects (see Table 4.8). Switzerland is second with 73 purchased 
projects and United Kingdom follows with 57 projects. 
Finally, regarding the scope of JI projects, CH4 reduction& Cement &Coal mine/bed has 
a share of 40.1%, while Energy efficiency follows with a 29.9% and HFCs, PFCs and 
N2Oreduction is third with 10,9% (see Figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10: ERUs until 2012 (%) in each category (UNEP Risø Centre web page, 
2012, B) 
  
4.2.3.2 Transactions of ERUs 
There are two trends that someone can notice in the average price of ERUs in the 
primary market since 2004 that the volume of ERUs has increased in the international 
scenery. From 2004 to 2008 the ERUs average price faced a steady increase, but since 
then it is following the opposite direction (see Figure 4.11). 
Figure 4.11: Average price of pERUs since 2004 (World Bank, 2005:2012) 
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However, this is not the case for the volumes transacted in the primary market, as they 
faced many ups and downs. The highest volumes transacted in 2007 and 2010, but the 
market seemed unable to sustain in this level and the volumes felt over the subsequent 
years (see Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9: Average prices, volumes and value of pERUs transactions (World Bank, 
2005:2012) 
Year Average 
price  
($/pERU) 
Volume 
(mtCO2e) 
Value 
($million) 
2004 6 9.1 54 
2005 6 11 68 
2006 8.70 16 141 
2007 12.2 41 499 
2008 14.6 25.2 367 
2009 13.4 26.5 354 
2010 13 41 530 
2011 12.1 28 339 
One reason for the decrease of the ERUs price over the last years is probably the 
worldwide economic crisis, as the prices started to decline from 2008 onwards. Another 
reason might be the uncertainty regarding the future. In particular the EU ETS allows the 
surrender of ERUs generated and issued until 2012 as well as ERUs generated and issued 
from 2013 onward, from projects registered before 2013. However, the Kyoto 
framework does not enable ERUs to be created from 2013 onward in the absence of new 
quantified emission targets in place for host countries.  
Regarding the countries selling pERUs, the Russian Federation and Ukraine are the 
dominant players in the market over the last years. During this period and especially 
during the last two years the two countries’ share is more than 90% of all pERUs sales 
(see Figure 4.11).  
On the other hand the European countries have the lion’s share in the demand side (see 
Figure 4.8). Since the European countries are the most active buyers of JI projects (see 
Table 4.8) naturally they are the most interested in purchasing pERUs in order to fulfill 
their commitments under the EU ETS. 
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Figure 4.12: Annual pERUs volumes transacted per seller since 2003 (World Bank, 
2012, p.61) 
 
4.2.4 Primary carbon market assessment 
Within this Section it is shown that over the years the primary market for emission 
credits has met a substantial growth over the last years. By 2011 had been traded 281 
million AAUs with a total value of more than 2.1 billion $, more than 2.54 billion CERs 
with a total value of more than 29.99 billion $, and 197.8 million ERUs with a total value 
of about 2.35 billion $ (see Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10: Average prices, volumes and value of emission credits transactions 
(World Bank, 2005:2012) 
 
 
 
Year 
AAUs CERs ERUs 
Average 
price ($) 
Volume 
(mtCO2e) 
Value 
($million) 
Average 
price ($/pre-
2013 CER) 
Volume 
(mtCO2e) 
Value 
($million) 
Average 
price 
($/pERU) 
Volume 
(mtCO2e) 
Value 
($million) 
2002 - - - 3* n.a n.a. - - - 
2003 - - - 4.9 n.a. n.a. - - - 
2004 - - - 5.6 97 485 6 9.1 54 
2005 - - - 7.2 341 2,417 6 11 68 
2006 - - - 10.9 450 4,813 8.7 16 141 
2007 - - - 13.6 552 7,433 12.2 41 499 
2008 11.8** 18 212 16.1 404 6,511 14.6 25.2 367 
2009 13.9 155 1,000 12.7 211 2,678 13.4 26.5 354 
2010 7.8 61 626 11.8 224*** 2,675*** 13 41 530 
2011 6.6 47 318 10.9 263*** 2,980*** 12.1 28 339 
Aggregate - 281 2,156 - >2,542 >29,992 - 197.8 2,352 
Moreover, the primary market has many participants, it is open to everyone interested to 
perform trading, and the prices are following the participants’ expectations, while its 
value is a sign of sufficient liquidity. Thus, it can be concluded that the market seems to 
operate smoothly. 
Figure 4.13: Average prices of CERs, ERUs, and AAUs since 2002 (World Bank, 
2005:2012) 
 
Regarding the three different carbon products traded in the market, the CER was 
achieving the better prices until 2008, but after 2009 it was the AAU that was traded in 
higher prices (see Figure 4.13). 
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Nevertheless, the primary market of CERs is the largest of all three both in terms of 
volume and value. The primary market of ERUs is the smallest in terms of volume, but 
this is not the case in terms of value. Finally, the primary market of AAUs is second in 
terms of volume. However, it has to be pointed out that AAUs are traded in the market 
since 2008, while the transactions of CERs began in 2002 and the trade of ERUs in 2004. 
 
4.3 The EU secondary market 
This Section focuses in the European secondary market, as developed due to the EU 
ETS, and attempts to draw conclusions by examining the various EUA, CER and ERU 
products offered by the exchanges currently in operation in the EU.  
All the assets in the market derive from the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms that are 
presented in section 3.2 of this Chapter. However, the EU ETS is regional emission 
trading scheme and it have its own specific rules regarding the commodities trading in 
the European exchanges. These norms are presented bellow in order the reader to 
understand the context in which the various carbon assets are traded. 
As a result it will be provided information regarding the market structure, its special 
characteristics, such as the liquidity and the volume of transactions, plus the 
opportunities for the counterparts. 
 In addition all the “tools” available for the participants (such as spot and future 
contracts) will be evaluated. The results are once again presented in tables, since 
tabulating helps in making comparisons and drawing quantitative conclusions. 
In this way the allowances market can be viewed as any other exchange market.  All the 
material has been gathered from the major European Emission Exchanges and the World 
Bank.  
Also there it is provided information regarding the introduction of aviation allowances 
(EUAAs) in the scheme and the special characteristics of this particular market. 
Ultimately, there is a short presentation regarding the trading schemes in other regions 
across the planet. 
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It finally has to be pointed out that in order to provide a statistical argument regarding 
the co-movement of the different contracts this thesis has collected all the EEX daily 
closing prices of several contracts from the 30
th
 of April 2012 to the 30
th
 of September 
2012.  
In particular have been gathered the closing prices of the following contracts: EUA spot, 
EUA DEC 12 futures, EUA DEC 13 futures, EUA DEC 14 futures, CER DEC 12 
futures, CER DEC 13 futures, ERU DEC 12 futures, ERU DEC 13 futures, EUAA spot, 
and EUAA DEC 12 future. The characteristics of each contract are discussed in the 
Subsections 4.3.3.1, 4.3.4.1, and 4.3.5.1. A Table with all the closing prices collected can 
be found in Appendix II. 
The 30
th
 of April was selected as the starting date since it was the first trading day for the 
EUAA DEC 12 futures, the ERU DEC 13 futures, and the ERU DEC 13 futures.  
In order to draw conclusions regarding the statistical relationships between the different 
variables the different contacts are examined in pairs and are calculated the correlation 
and the covariance, while there are performed mean equality tests and variance equality 
tests. The results of the mean equality tests and variance equality tests can be found in 
Appendix II. 
 
4.3.1 The rules 
The European Commission has set specific rules regarding carbon products that a 
Member State can use for compliance under the EU ETS.  These rules clearly affect 
directly both the prices and the volumes of the trading assets. The next paragraphs 
outline the basic trading rules 
1. The first rule has to do with the AAUs.  Although an EUA (the tradable asset 
under the EU-ETS system) equals one AAU, AAUs cannot be used as 
substitutes for EUAs, and are not allowed for compliance in the EU ETS. 
2. An entity under the EU ETS cannot use unlimited number of CERs and ERUs 
but only a small percentage.  
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As a result the volumes of these products as traded in the European exchange platforms 
are much lower compared to the EUAs, which is the dominant product. 
In specific, during phase I Member States could allow operators to use CERs and ERUs 
from project activities in the Community scheme up to a percentage of the allocation of 
allowances to each installation. This percentage was to be specified by each Member 
State in its National Allocation Plan for the first trading period. Additionally the 
Directive 2004/101/EC (amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms) defined that the percentage should be consistent 
with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and 
decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. In Phase II the 
scheme allows market participants to use CERs and ERUs for an average quantity of 
13.5% of their allocation, (CDC climat web page, 2012). 
Τhe maximum amount of these credits to be used by installations in a Member State 
during the second trading period has been decided by each Member State through its 
National Allocation Plan. The limit on the use of credits does not imply that a company 
cannot generate and sell more (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, 
O). As a result this limit varies from 0% in Estonia to 20% in Germany, Spain, Norway, 
and Lithuania. 
Table 4.11: Percentage of ERUs and CERs surrendered by country between 2008 
and 2011 (www.carbonmarketdata.com, 2012) 
country 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2008 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2009 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2010 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2011 
Austria 3.33 % 1.43 % 3.87 % 6.61 % 
Belgium 2.78 % 1.38 % 1.28 % 14.91 % 
Bulgaria 0.00% 0.00 % 8.95 % 26.80 % 
Cyprus 100.00 % 0.00% 100.00 % 100.00 % 
Czech 
Republic 
2.30 % 4.23 % 6.84 % 8.50 % 
Denmark 3.01 % 0.54 % 2.82 % 18.02 % 
Estonia 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.08 % 
Finland 3.46 % 4.12 % 4.71 % 11.15 % 
France 4.64 % 3.80 % 4.40 % 27.93 % 
Germany 4.99 % 6.20 % 8.25 % 16.91 % 
Greece 0.28 % 0.24 % 6.11 % 18.73 % 
Hungary 5.21 % 8.15 % 7.16 % 8.99 % 
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country 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2008 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2009 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2010 
% CERs-ERUs 
surrendered 2011 
Ireland 3.50 % 1.30 % 6.48 % 12.40 % 
Italy 3.36 % 4.60 % 7.02 % 11.86 % 
Latvia 3.76 % 19.63 % 7.09 % 2.60 % 
Lithuania 7.41 % 26.70 % 13.27 % 26.93 % 
Luxembourg 4.15 % 1.07 % 8.33 % 11.86 % 
Malta 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Netherlands 2.38 % 0.94 % 2.37 % 4.56 % 
Poland 2.29 % 5.56 % 7.83 % 13.74 % 
Portugal 6.64 % 5.40 % 6.61 % 12.05 % 
Romania 1.40 % 7.64 % 17.78 % 9.94 % 
Slovak 
Republic 
8.35 % 5.69 % 20.17 % 4.98 % 
Slovenia 9.00 % 6.66 % 6.16 % 9.97 % 
Spain 11.18 % 5.59 % 12.93 % 20.97 % 
Sweden 2.95 % 2.45 % 3.50 % 8.20 % 
United 
Kingdom 
1.75 % 2.18 % 3.29 % 7.25 % 
 Average 4.02 % 4.26 % 7.01 % 14.14 % 
However, the European Commission decided that in phase III the overall use of credits is 
limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing 
installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level 
of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this 
means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their 
allocation during the period 2008-2012, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the 
lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2012 period. New 
sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum 
access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2013-2020. The precise 
percentages will be determined through comitology (DG Clima of the European 
Commission web page, 2012, P).  
Regarding the aviation sector operators, they can only use CERs and ERUs for up to 
15% of their compliance obligations in 2012 and up to just 1.5% from 2013 
During Phase III Kyoto credits will no longer be de facto compliance units and their 
fungibility into EUAs will be conditional. CERs and ERUs issued against emissions 
reductions taking place before 1 January 2013 (CP-1), will have to be swapped into 
EUAs by March 31, 2015. Credits issued against emission reductions occurred after 
2012 (CP-2), but generated from projects registered before December 31, 2012, will be 
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fully fungible throughout Phase III.  Finally, CP-2 credits from projects registered after 
December 31, 2012, will only be eligible (and swapped into EUAs) if they come from a 
project in a Least Developed Country (LDC) or a country with whom the EU has signed 
a bilateral agreement (World bank, 2012, p.21).  
 
4.3.2 The exchanges 
All the trading volumes, types of contracts and prices under this sector of the chapter 
have been collected from the three of the biggest exchanges in operation under the EU 
ETS, which are: ICE ECX, BlueNext and EEX. Also a portion of data has been collected 
from the World Bank. 
Figure 4.14 illustrates that during 2011 the ICE ECX traded the lion’s share of EUA 
allowances as the 90% of the transactions took place in this platform. Greenx is second 
with 6% of the transactions, EEX is third with 1.4%, and BlueNext is forth with a share 
of 1%. 
Figure 4.14: EUA Trade in the largest European exchanges in 2011 (Carbon 
Market Europe, 6/1/2012)  
 
 
In the CERs market in 2010 the ICE ECX was again the dominant platform as it 
performed the 90% of the transactions, followed by the BlueNext platform with the 5% 
of the trade (see Figure 4.15). EEX performed only the 0,2% of the transactions. 
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Figure 4.15: CER Trade in the largest European exchanges in 2010 (Carbon 
Market Europe, 7/1/2011)  
 
Finally, in the ERUs market the ICE is again first in the transactions performed with 
67% and BlueNext is following with 25% (see Figure 4.16). EEX started transactions of 
ERUs in 2012. 
Figure 4.16: ERU Trade in the largest European exchanges in 2010 (Carbon 
Market Europe, 7/1/2011)  
 
 
From the above Figures is clear that ICE ECX is the key player in the market and as a 
result this platform is the most reliable in order to draw some conclusions regarding the 
performance of the secondary carbon market. 
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4.3.3 EUAs 
Since there are restrictions regarding the use of international credits for compliance 
under the EU ETS the EUAs volumes are by far greater than these of the CERs and 
ERUs (see Figure 4.17).  
Another implication of the restricted use of CERs and ERUs is that their price in the 
secondary market is at any given time lower than the price of EUAs. Nevertheless the 
evolution of prices over time is following the same pattern, which is a sign of strong 
relationship between the variables.  
This behavior is normal since all the different assets are essentially expressing the same 
basic subject and the choices of the participants in the market that form the prices are 
more or less the same regardless the underlying product. 
However, from the mid-2012 the EUAs seem to follow a different direction from the 
CERs and the ERUs. This observation is discussed in detail in subsection 4.3.4.2 
Figure 4.17: prices and volumes for EUAs, CERs and ERUs in the secondary 
market, 2008-2011 (World Bank 2012, p. 18) 
 
[129] 
 
The EU ETS launched in 2005 and the carbon credits start to be traded in the secondary 
market. The Table 4.12 shows the volumes traded since 2005 and by a close look it is 
clear that the market of secondary EUAs is growing exponentially over the years both in 
terms of volume and value. Figure 4.18 provides a visual illustration of the above 
argument. 
From the 321 millions traded in 2005 with a value of 7.9 billion dollars the transacted 
volume in 2011 launched to 6.8 billion EUAs in 2011 with a value of 147.8 billion 
dollars. These numbers and especially the liquidity are the first clear indication that the 
secondary market over the years has obtained the characteristics of the exchanges for 
other types of commodities (e.g. stock exchanges). 
Table 4.12: EUAs volume traded and value (World Bank, 2006:2012) 
Year volume (mtCO2e)   value (US$ million) 
2005 321 7,908 
2006 1,104 24,436 
2007 2,060 49,065 
2008 3,093 100,526 
2009 6,326 118,474 
2010 6,789 133,598 
2011 7,853 147,848 
 
Figure 4.18: EUAs volume and value evolution (World Bank, 2006-2012) 
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4.3.3.1 Contract types and features 
Concerning the EUA contracts trading in the European carbon exchanges they are 
divided in four main categories: a) spot contracts, b) futures contracts, c) option 
contracts, and d) swap contracts. 
As it can be observed in Figure 4.19 the largest volumes of EUAs are traded via futures 
contracts. The spot contracts market faced a sizeable increase until 2009 but their 
volumes started to decline after this point at time. The options contracts had only a 
infinitesimal share in the market in 2008 but their market is facing a great boom over the 
years. 
According to the World Bank in 2011 the EUA futures contracts represented over 88% 
of all EUA transactions, the options contracts counted for about the 10% of EUA 
transacted value, while spot contracts had only a share of 2% of the annual trading value 
(World Bank, 2012, p.32). 
It is interesting to point out that 42% of the traded spot contracts value consisted of 
primary transactions. Thus, almost half of the spot EUA value is accruing from the 
auctions held by Member States (World Bank, 2012, p.32).  
The large volumes of futures contracts and the expanding volume of options contract in 
the secondary market is a natural outcome. Many installations, and especially the power 
sector, tend to sell their products several years in advance (forward sales). As a result of 
this strategy these companies tend to acquire futures or options contracts of emission 
allowances to hedge the risk of price fluctuation.  
Regarding the specific features of each particular contract type, a futures contract is a 
contractual agreement to buy or sell a particular asset in the future at a pre-
determined price (see Table 4.13). In the European carbon exchanges the futures 
contracts traded are either of quarterly expiries (these contracts normally expire in 
March, June, September and December) or of annually expiries (these contacts have 
December expiries for 2012 up to 2020).  
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Figure 4.19: Annual EUA volumes per contract, 2008-2011 (World Bank, 2012, p. 
32) 
 
From the three carbon exchanges under investigation, only the ICE ECX offers quarterly 
contracts, while all three platforms are offering contracts with annual expiries. It has to 
be mentioned that one lot, which is the minimum trading size, corresponds to 1,000 tCo2 
in all three platforms. 
Table 4.13: Special features of EUA futures contracts, ICE ECX EUA futures 
contract (ICE ECX web page, 2012, B) 
Description 
 
The ICE ECX EUA Futures Contract is a deliverable contract where 
each Clearing Member with a position open at cessation of 
trading for a contract month is obliged to make or take delivery of 
emission allowances to or from National Registries in accordance 
with the ICE Futures Europe Regulations. 
Units of Trading One lot of 1,000 CO2 EU Allowances. Each EU Allowance being an 
entitlement to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gas. 
Minimum Trading Size 1 lot 
Contract Months Contracts are listed on an quarterly expiry cycle such that March, 
June, September and December contract months are listed up to 
June 2013 and annual contracts with December expiries for 2013 
up to 2020. 
Expiry Last Monday of the contract month 
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Trading System Trading will occur either on the ICE Futures electronic platform 
WebICE or through a conformed Independent Software Vendor 
including Aegis Software, Communicating Ltd, CQG, EasyScreen, 
Ffastfill, GL Trade, ION Trading, Neotick, Nyfix, Object Trading, 
Patsystems, Rolfe & Nolan, RTS, Stellar Trading Systems, Trading 
Technologies and Trayport. 
Trading Model Continuous trading throughout trading hours 
Settlement Price Trade weighted average during the daily closing period (16:50:00 - 
16:59:59 hours UK local time) with Quoted Settlement Prices if 
low liquidity 
Settlement The contracts are physically settled and delivered by the transfer 
of the EU Allowances from the seller's account to the buyer's 
account in a national registry. All transfers always pass through 
your clearing member's account and ICE Clear Europe. Delivery 
takes place 3 days after the last trading day. 
An options contract is a contract that gives the holder (buyer) the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy or sell an underlying security at a given price on or before a specified 
maturity date (see Table 4.14). In specific a call option gives the holder the right to buy 
an asset, while a put option gives the holder the right to sell an asset. 
Only the ICE ECX offers options contracts from the three platforms under investigation. 
As in the case of the future contracts, the options contracts are either of quarterly expiries 
(expiry in March, June, September and December) or of annually expiries (December 
expiries for 2012 up to 2020).  
Table 4.14: Special features of EUA options contracts, ICE ECX EUA futures 
options (ICE ECX web page, 2012, C) 
Description 
 
The ICE ECX EUA Options Contract is an option on the ECX EUA 
Futures Contract. At expiry, one lot of ECX EUA Options will 
excercise into one lot of ECX EUA Futures. ECX EUA Options are 
European style such that it is automatically exercised at expiry in 
the money. 
Units of Trading One ICE ECX EUA Options Contract. 
Minimum Trading Size 1 lot 
Contract Series Up to 8 contract months are listed on a quarterly expiry (March, 
June, September and December), with 3 new contract months 
listed on expiry of the December contract. Additional December 
contracts are listed through 2014. 
 Last Trading Day Three Exchange Tranding days before the expiry of the 
corresponding March, June, September, or December contract 
month of the ICE ECX EUA Futures Contract. 
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Exercise and Automatic 
Exercise 
ICE ECX EUA Options will be exercised into ICE ECX EUA Futures 
contracts and are of European-style exercise, such that at expiry 
automatic exercise will occur of options which are one or more 
ticks in the money (at-the-money and out-of-the-money options 
will expire). 
Trading System Trading occurs on ICE Futures' electronic platform (known as the 
ICE platform) which is accessible via WebICE or through a 
conformed Independent Software Vendor. 
Trading Model  Continuous trading throughout trading hours 
Under a spot contract EUAs are sold for delivery at an agreed gay no later than the same 
day, or the first trading day after the sale, or the second trading day after the sale. All the 
three platforms under investigation are offering spot contracts. BlueNext is currently the 
leading spot exchange in the world for EUAs (BlueNext, 2012, B).  
Table 4.15: Special features of EUA spot contracts, EEX EUA spot (EEX web page, 
2012, C, p. 36) 
Contract EU Allowances for the 2nd period EU ETS (2008 to 2012) 
Delivery Day t+1 
Contract size 1,000 EUA (1,000 t CO2) 
Tick size EUR 0.01 per t CO2 
Fulfillment Delivery versus payment 
Transaction 
fees 
Exchange fee: EUR 0.005 per t CO2 
OTC registration: EUR 0.005 per t CO2 
+ Clearing fee: EUR 
0.001 per t CO2 
Finally, swaps are portfolios of forward contracts that trade for the same settlement price 
across a range of maturities. They are usually cash-settled although there are some cases 
of physical swaps.  
Only BlueNext offers swap contracts from the three platforms under investigation.  In 
particular it offers an outright spreads contract which allows the members to price the 
difference between spot CER and EUA contracts. The spread is an instrument by itself 
for trading but, once traded, it will be “broken” into two legs (one for EUA and one for 
CER) that will be physically delivered.  
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Table 4.16: Special features of swap contracts, BlueNext outright spreads 
CER/EUA (BlueNext web page, 2012, C) 
Description The BlueNext Outright Spread contract allows members to price the 
difference between spot CER and EUA contracts. Placing a “bid spread” on 
the trading screen or via the OTC registration system will mean you wish to 
buy CER and sell EUA and the reverse is true for an “ask spread”. The spread 
will be an instrument by itself for trading but, once traded, it will be 
“broken” into two legs (one for EUA and one for CER) that will be physically 
delivered. 
Contract BlueNext Spot Outright Spread CER/EUA 
Mnemonic 
Code 
CER/EUA (o) 
Underlying CERs and EUAs 
Price Tick 0.01 €/t 
Min. Price 0.01 €/t 
Volume Tick 1,000 tons (central market) and 1 ton (OTC registration system) 
Min. Volume 1,000 tons (central market) and 1 ton (OTC registration system) 
Trading 
System 
Continuous through Global Vision (Trayport) 
Trading Hours 8:00 am to 6:00 pm (UTC+1) on the central market from Monday to Friday 
8:00 am to 6:30 pm (UTC+1) on the OTC registration systems from Monday 
to Friday 
Delivery Place Union registry interfacing with the delivery vs. payment scheme 
 
 
Delivery & 
Settlement 
Delivery and Settlement operated by BlueNext. 
Delivery consists of the transfer of : 
EUAs on the Union registry from the buyer’s account to the seller’s account 
via BlueNext’s transit account. 
CERs on the Union from the seller’s account to the buyer’s account via 
BlueNext’s transit account. 
 
4.3.3.2 Transaction types 
Under the EU ETS the transactions may performed in several ways. For example 
negotiations between the buyer and the seller may happen within platforms, as in the 
case of screen transactions, or on off-exchange platforms. Nevertheless, the later may 
still be intermediated by brokers or cleared on the exchanges. All the different types of 
transaction are presented in Table 4.17. 
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Table 4.17: Types of transactions (World Bank, 2012, p. 33) 
Negotiation 
within  
exchanges 
Negotiation outside exchanges 
   Cleared at exchanges Not cleared 
Exchange-
based: assets 
negotiated 
within the 
exchanges’ 
platform (i.e., 
screen) 
Intermediated Not 
intermediated 
Intermediated Not 
intermediated 
Over-the-Counter (OTC): 
assets negotiated 
outside the exchanges, 
with the intermediation 
of brokerage firms, still 
cleared at exchanges 
Over-the-
Counter (OTC): 
assets 
negotiated 
outside the 
exchanges, with 
the 
intermediation 
of brokerage 
firms, not 
cleared at 
exchanges 
Billateral: assets 
negotiated 
bilaterally 
(buyers and 
seller), without 
intermediation 
of brokerage 
firms, still 
cleared at 
exchanges 
Billateral: assets 
negotiated 
bilaterally 
(buyer and 
seller), without 
intermediation 
of brokerage 
firms, not 
cleared at 
exchanges 
Regarding the market share for each different trading alternative Figure 4.20 illustrates 
the progress of each different type in the secondary spot and futures markets – for both 
EUAs and international credits (CERs and ERUs) since 2008. Screen trades are facing a 
constant growth over the last years, while the trading values for OTC and bilateral values 
seem stabilized.  
In 2011 screen trades for EUAs, CERs, and ERUs combined to represent 49% of all 
trade values, reaching US$82.9 billion. OTC trades reached 39% (most cleared at the 
exchanges), while bilateral trades had a share of 12%. 
Figure 4.20: Trading alternatives: exchange, OTC, and bilateral trades (World 
Bank, 2012, p. 33) 
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4.3.3.3 The EUA price 
The price of EUA is very volatile over the eight years that the secondary market 
operates. Until the April of 2006 the price was steadily above 20 €/EUA and it had even 
reach the 35 €/EUA. However, when the 2005 verified emissions published the 
participants in the market realized that there were an oversupply of allowances and the 
price collapsed (see Figure 4.21).  
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the second phase of the EU ETS in 2008 the price had 
recovered and once again it was above 20 €/EUA. However, the global economic crisis 
sank the prices once again in levels just above the 10 €/EUA. 
Figure 4.21: EUA price fluctuations from 2005 to 2011 (Climate Economics Chair 
web page, 2012) 
 
 
By the start of 2009 and until the middle of 2011 the price were stabilized in the area of 
15 €/EUA. Since January 2011 Eurozone has entered in a very severe dept crisis and the 
European firms are keeping losing in terms of productivity. As a result the EUA price 
has declined further and from January 2012 until September 2012 the price is between 6 
€/EUA and 9 €/EUA (see Figure 4.22). 
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Figure 4.22: EUA DEC 12 future price fluctuations between October 2011 and 
September 2012 (EEX web page, 2012) 
 
There is one specific link that connects the productivity loss by the firms and the fall of 
the EUA prices. When the firms produce less, they also emit fewer emissions. Thus, they 
have a surplus of freely allocated allowances. This is why the crisis affect the EUA 
prices in a great degree. 
This argument is strengthened by the data provided in Table 4.18. Only during 2008 the 
verified emissions were less than the freely allocated allowances. Over the next years 
(when the prices declined) and as a result of the fewer emissions we can notice an 
overallocation of allowances under the EU ETS. 
Table 4.18: Overall deficit or surplus in allowance allocation over the period 2008 – 
2011 for all the Member States under the EU ETS (EEA web page, 2012) 
 
Year 
Freely allocated 
EUAs (KtCO2e) 
Verified emissions 
(KtCO2e) 
Surplus or deficit 
2008 1,958,493 2,119,779 -7.6% 
2009 1,974,033 1,879,516 +5.0% 
2010 1,998,341 1,938,532 +3.1% 
2011 2,001,386 1,898,311 +5.4% 
 
Another interesting observation regarding the EUA prices has to do with the price levels 
of the different contracts. As it can be noticed by Figure 3.21 the prices of EUA spot, 
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EUA DEC 12 futures, EUA DEC 13 futures, and EUA DEC 14 futures are following the 
same pattern but in different price levels and they seem to be closely related. 
Figure 4.23: Comparison of prices between EUA spot contract, EUA DEC 12 
futures contract, EUA DEC 13 futures contract, and EUA DEC 14 futures contract 
(EEX web page, 2012, E) 
 
This is a normal behavior and it is another sign that the market is functioning smoothly. 
In the futures market a contract with a longer expiry date is expected to be more 
expensive than one of the same underlying asset with a shorter expiry date.  
From the derivatives theory we know that in principle the longest the expiry of a future 
contract the highest the price someone pays to acquire it, since the calculation of price 
take into account the total cost of carrying a product in the future. These costs are storage 
costs, insurance costs, transportation costs, and financing costs. The above behavior is 
observed clearly in the EUA futures market. 
To provide a statistical argument regarding the co-movement of the different contracts, 
they are examined in pairs and are calculated the correlation and the covariance, while 
there are performed mean equality tests and variance equality tests.  
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Table 4.19: Correlation and covariance between different pairs of EUA contracts 
Pair of contracts under examination  Correlation Covariance 
EUA spot and EUA DEC 12 futures 0.986863 0.334378 
EUA spot and EUA DEC 13 futures 0.985102 0.340193 
EUA spot and EUA DEC 14 futures 0.982424 0.355307 
EUA DEC 12 futures and EUA DEC 13 futures 0.998451 0.331913 
EUA DEC 12 futures and EUA DEC 14 futures 0.997195 0.347168 
In the Table 4.19 someone can observe that the correlation between the different pairs of 
EUA contracts is always very close to +1, indicating that the pairs of variables are 
related and are moving to the same direction.  
Moreover, the covariance between the different pairs of EUA contracts is a positive 
number in all the cases, indicating that the pairs of variables are showing a similar 
behavior. 
Finally, all the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for each of 
the different pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a 
probability of 95% the means of each pair to be equal and a probability between 62% 
and 84% the variances of each pair to be equal (from all the pairs under investigation 
only the pair of the DEC 12 futures and the DEC 14 futures has a relatively low 
probability between 35% and 68% the variances of the contracts to be equal), which is 
another sign of co-movement of the variables. 
Thus, all the statistical tools that have been used are tend to confirm that the contracts of 
the same product with different maturities are moving in parallel, a sign that the 
secondary market has the same behavior as any other secondary market for commodities. 
 
4.3.4 CERs and ERUs 
International credits became valid for compliance under the EU ETS as from the first 
trading period. However, CER products started to be traded in European exchanges in 
2008, while ERUs transactions in the three major platforms began in late 2010 (EEX 
started to trade ERUs in early 2012). 
The volumes of international credits traded in the major European platforms are 
significantly lower than those of the EUAs (see Table 4.20). This is because the 
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participants in the market can use only a limited percentage of international credits in 
their allocations. Naturally the international credits contracts represented only 18.5% of 
all emission contracts transactions in 2011, while their share in 2010 was about 16% 
(World Bank, 2011:2012). 
Regardless the fact that the offsets market share is significantly lower than this of the 
EUA market, the volumes of traded CERs and ERUs have a constant growth. Since 2008 
the market volume has almost doubled and during 2011 about 1.8 billion international 
credits were transacted (see Table 4.20).  
Table 4.20: CERs, ERUs, and EUAs volume traded and value (World Bank, 
2009:2012) 
 
Year 
CERs and ERUs EUAs 
volume 
(mtCO2e) 
value (US$ 
billions) 
volume 
(mtCO2e) 
value (US$ 
billions) 
2008 <800 26.2 3,093 100.526 
2009 >1,000 17.5 6,326 118.474 
2010 1,300 20.5 6,789 133.598 
2011 1,800 23.1 7,853 147.848 
Aggregate ~4,900 87.3 24,061 500.446 
Source: The World Bank, “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012”. 
However, the market value picked in 2008 as the prices were between 20 €/CER and 30 
€/credit (see Figure 4.17). Over the next years the price declined largely and as a result 
the value in the market was lower than this of 2008 although the volumes were much 
greater. 
Regarding the volumes of each individual international credit traded in the market, CERs 
transactions have the lions share. As it can be seen in Table 4.21 since the fourth quarter 
of 2010 that ERU products are traded in the market the spot and derivatives CERs 
transactions represent more than 90% of all the credits transacted. The values of spot and 
derivatives ERUs transactions represent about the one twentieth of the market volume. 
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Table 4.21: Volumes of CERs and ERUs traded and their share in the secondary 
market of international credits (BlueNext web page, 2012, D)  
 Quarter CERs (ktCO2e) CERs 
share 
ERUs (ktCO2e) ERUs 
share 
Total 
2010 Q4 160,215 98.0% 2,664* 2.0% 162,879 
 
2011 
Q1 234,719 98.7% 2,975 1.3% 237,694 
Q2 217,911 98.5% 3,483 1.5% 220,794 
Q3 323,921 94.5% 17,745 5.2% 341,666 
Q4 442,225 94.0% 27,992 6.0% 470,217 
2012 Q1 282,996 97.9% 6,174 2.1% 289,170 
Q2 238,684 94.0% 15,248 6.0% 253,932 
* The trading of ERUs in the secondary market started in November 2010. As a result this number 
includes the ERUs traded during the last two months of 2010. 
 Note: For the calculation of the above numbers have been used:  
- The spot CER contracts and spot ERU contracts volumes traded under the BlueNext platform. 
- The future DEC 11 CER, DEC 12 CER, DEC 13 CER, and DEC 14 CER contracts volumes traded 
under the ICE ECX platform. 
- The future DEC 11 ERU and DEC 12 ERU contracts volumes traded under the ICE ECX platform. 
-All the relevant data has been derived by the BlueNext monthly publication “Tendances Carbone”. 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Volumes of CERs and ERUs traded since the fourth quarter of 2010 
(BlueNext web page, 2012, D) 
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4.3.4.1 Contract types and features 
As in the case of EUAs the international credits contracts that are traded in the three 
major exchanges are divided in spot contracts, futures contracts, and option contracts, 
while the swap contact offered by BlueNext include the physical delivery of CERs. 
Futures contracts represent by far the largest share of volume transacted in the market 
(see Figure 3.23).  
Figure 4.25: annual CER and ERU volumes, 2008-2011 (World Bank, 2012, p. 38) 
 
From figure 4.25 is clear that the market participants prefer futures rather than spot 
contracts.  According to the World Bank in 2011 the CER and ERU futures contracts 
represented over 92% of all secondary offset volumes traded. Moreover by 2011 the 
secondary CER and ERU futures volumes had increased by 122% compared to 2008 
(World Bank, 2012, p. 32).  
Once again the big volume of derivative contracts can be considered as a natural 
behavior on behalf of the market participants. As it has already been mentioned, many 
installations, and especially the power sector, tend to sell their products several years in 
advance (forward sales). As a result of this strategy these companies tend to acquire 
futures or options contracts of emission allowances to hedge the risk of price fluctuation. 
Secondary CER and ERU derivative contracts are to a grand extend similar with the 
respective EUA secondary derivatives. In the European carbon exchanges the futures 
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contracts transacted are either of quarterly expiries (these contracts normally expire in 
March, June, September and December) or of annually expiries (these contacts have 
December expiries for 2012 up to 2020 for CERs and up to 2015 for ERUs). Only the 
ICE ECX offers quarterly contracts, while all three platforms under investigation are 
offering contracts with annual expiries. However, BlueNext is not offering ERU futures. 
Table 4.22: Special features of ERU futures contracts, ICE ECX ERU futures 
contract (ICE ECX web page, 2012, D) 
Description 
 
Contracts are for physical delivery through the transfer of ERUs between 
National Registry Accounts. 
Units of Trading One lot of 1,000 Emission Reduction Units (ERU). Each ERU being an 
entitlement to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gas. 
Minimum Trading Size 1 lot 
Contract Months Contracts are listed on an quarterly expiry cycle such that March, June, 
September and December contract months are listed up to March 2013. 
Expiry Last Monday of the contract month 
Trading Mechanism Contracts are traded on the ICE Platform. 
Delivery/Settlement 
Terms 
The contracts are physically deliverable by the transfer of ERUs from the 
Person Holding Account of the Selling Clearing Member at a Registry to 
the Person Holding Account of ICE Clear Europe at a Registry and from 
the Person Holding Account of ICE Clear Europe at that Registry to the 
Person Holding Account of the Buying Clearing Member at a Registry. 
Initially this will be restricted to the UK Registry. 
Delivery is between Clearing Members and ICE Clear Europe during a 
Delivery Period. The Delivery Period is the period beginning at 19:00 
hours on the Business Day following the last trading day and ending at 
19:30 hours on the third Business Day following that last trading day. 
There are provisions for 'Late' and 'Failed' delivery within the contract 
Rules. 
The EDSP will be the Settlement Price on the day the contract expires. 
The Settlement Price is the weighted average price of trades during a 10 
minute period from 16:50 London Time. 
 
Concerning the options contracts, from the three platforms under investigation only ICE 
ECX offers them. Similarly to the EUA options contracts the secondary CER and ERU 
options contracts are either of quarterly expiries (expiry in March, June, September and 
December) or of annually expiries (December expiries for 2012 up to 2014 for CER 
contracts and up to 2012 for ERU contracts).  
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Table 4.23: Special features of CER options contracts, ICE ECX CER futures 
options (ICE ECX web page, 2012, E) 
Description 
 
The ICE ECX CER Options Contract is an option on the ECX CER 
Futures Contract. At expiry, one lot of ECX CER Options will 
exercise into one lot of ECX CER Futures. ECX CER Options are 
European style such that it is automatically exercised at expiry in 
the money. 
Units of Trading One ICE ECX CER Options Contract. 
Minimum Trading Size 1 lot 
Contract Series Up to 8 contract months are listed on a quarterly expiry (March, 
June, September and December), with 3 new contract months 
listed on expiry of the December contract. Additional December 
contracts are listed through 2014. 
 Expiration Day Three Exchange Trading Days before the expiry of the 
corresponding March, June, September or December contract 
month of the ICE ECX CER Futures Contract. 
Exercise and Automatic 
Exercise 
ICE ECX CER Options will be exercised into ICE Futures ECX CER 
Futures contracts and are of European-style exercise, such that at 
expiry automatic exercise will occur of options which are one or 
more ticks in the money. (At-the-money and out-of the-money 
options will lapse). 
Trading System Trading occurs on ICE Futures' electronic trading platform (known 
as the ICE Platform) which is accessible via Web ICE or through a 
conformed Independent Software Vendor. 
Trading Model  Continuous trading throughout trading hours 
Finally, the CER spot contracts are offered from BlueNext and ICE ECX but only 
BlueNext is offering ERU spot contracts. The features of spot contracts are exactly the 
same as in the case of the EUA spot contracts. 
Table 4.24: Special features of CER spot contracts, BlueNext EUA spot (BlueNext 
web page, 2012, E) 
Contract BlueNext Spot CER 
Mnemonic Code CER 
 
 
Underlying 
CERs delivered by the Executive Committee of CDM Board, 
whose projects have been selected following the advice of 
BlueNext’s Expert Committee. 
 
BNS CER underlying includes only projects involving the 
destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
from adipic acid production. 
Price Tick 0.01 €/t 
Minimum Price 0.01 €/t 
Volume Tick 1,000 tons (central market) and 1 ton (OTC registration system) 
Minimum Volume 1,000 tons (central market) and 1 ton (OTC registration system) 
Trading System Continuous through Global Vision (Trayport) and OTC 
registration system 
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Trading Hours 
8:00 am to 6:00 pm (UTC+1) on the central market from Monday 
to Friday 
8:00 am to 6:30 pm (UTC+1) on the OTC registration system 
from Monday to Friday 
Delivery Place Union registry interfacing with the delivery vs. payment scheme 
 
Delivery & Settlement 
Delivery and Settlement operated by BlueNext. 
Delivery consists of the transfer of the underlying from the 
seller’s account to the buyer’s account via the Union registry for 
CER. 
OTC Registration Available for members and registering brokers. 
It is possible to register OTC transactions on a specific CDM or JI 
project. 
Table 4.25 is providing a summary regarding the different types of contracts offered by 
the three European exchanges under investigation. 
Finally, it has to be pointed out that the transaction types presented in section 4.3.3.2, as 
the data is referring to all the three different types of emission allowances (EUA, CER, 
ERU). 
Table 4.25: Contracts offered by the three exchanges under investigation 
Exchange Continuous Exchange Trading 
Spot Futures Options Swap 
EUA CER ERU EUA CER ERU EUA CER ERU EUA CER 
ICE/ECX Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
EEX Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
BlueNext Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
 
4.3.4.2 The CER and ERU prices 
The secondary CER market price reached its highest level in 2008 with a price of more 
than 30 $/CER (see Figure 4.17). However, the global financial crisis had as a result the 
CER prices to decline. In 2009 the CER prices were stabilized just below 20 €/CER. The 
price remained at this levels until the middle of 2011 when the growing concerns 
regarding the Eurozone forced it below the level of 10 €/CER. Since then the price is 
falling constantly and by September 2012 it has fall back to 2.50 €/credit.  
The ERU transactions in the European platforms started in late 2010 and since then they 
have almost the same behavior as the CERs prices (see Figure 4.17). 
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Figure 4.26: CER DEC 12 future price fluctuations between October 2011 and 
September 2012 (EEX web page, 2012, F) 
 
It has already been pointed out that the prices of secondary offsets since the beginning of 
the second trading period seemed to be closely related to the prices of EUAs and they 
followed the same patterns (see Section 4.3.3).  
However, from the mid-2012 the CER and ERU prices have felt to very low levels 
and they do not seem to be related with the EUA price (see Figure 4.27). This 
phenomenon is due to two reasons according to the World Bank. The first reason is that 
the proportion of CERs and ERUs in the EU Scheme is limited and their eligibility is 
uncertain until their usage. In addition, it is clear that the supply of CERs and ERUs will 
be much greater than their import limit into the EU Scheme, and that these credits will be 
available much earlier than the expiration of their eligibility period (World Bank, 2012, 
p. 38).  
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Figure 4.27: EUA DEC 12 futures, CER DEC 12 futures, and ERU DEC 12 futures 
prices fluctuations between 30
th
 of April 2011 and 30
th
 of September 2012 (EEX 
web page, 2012, E) 
 
In order to provide a statistical argument that the CER and ERU prices are no longer 
related to the EUA prices are examined the correlation and the covariance between the 
EUA DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 12 futures, and also between EUA DEC 12 
futures and ERU DEC 12 futures. For the same pairs of contracts are also performed 
mean equality tests and variance equality tests. 
The correlation between the EUA DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 12 futures is -
0.1081466, while between EUA DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 12 futures is -
0.1380684. The negative sign indicates that the EUAs are moving to the opposite 
direction than the CERs and the ERUs, while the fact that the correlation in both cases is 
close to zero indicates that there is less of a relationship. 
The covariance between the EUA DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 12 futures is -
0.039662757, while between EUA DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 12 futures is -
0.049568949. The negative sign in both cases indicates that the pairs of variables are 
showing opposite behavior. 
Additionally, the mean equality tests performed for each of the different pairs (the tests 
results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability of 0.0% for the means to 
be equal, meaning that there are no signs of co-movement. However, the variance 
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equality tests (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability 
between 17% and 58% the variances to be equal (from the five methods only Siegel-
Tukey gives a probability of 95% the variances of the DEC 12 EUA and the DEC 12 
CER contracts to be equal and a probability of 95% the variances of DEC 12 EUA and 
DEC 12 ERU to be equal), which is a sign of co-movement of the variables.  
Consequently, the three out of the four statistical tools that have been used are tend to 
confirm that the CER and ERU prices are no longer moving in parallel with the EUA 
prices. 
Regarding the relationship between the prices of CERs and ERUs, they seem to move 
in parallel (see Figure 4.28). This observation is not far from truth as the spread 
(difference of prices) between CER prices and ERU prices indicates (see Figure 4.29). 
Figure 4.28: CER DEC 12 futures, CER DEC 13 futures, ERU DEC 12 futures, 
and ERU DEC 13 futures prices between 30
th
 of April 2012 and 30
th
 of September 
2012 (EEX web page, 2012, E) 
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At the most the spread between the two assets has reached the 0.20 €, while for long 
periods of time it was bellow 0.10 €. According to the World Bank this small difference 
reflects the lower liquidity in the ERUs market (World Bank, 2012, p.38). 
Figure 4.29: Spread CERs versus ERUs (World Bank, 2012, p.38) 
 
Furthermore, in order to have more indications that the CER and ERU prices are closely 
related, are examined the correlation and the covariance between the CER DEC 12 
futures and the ERU DEC 12 futures, and also between CER DEC 13 futures and ERU 
DEC 13 futures. For the same pairs of contracts are also performed mean equality tests 
and variance equality tests. 
The correlation between the CER DEC 12 futures and the ERU DEC 12 futures is 
0.9969655, while between CER DEC 13 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures is 0.9969655. 
The correlation between the two pairs of contracts is very close to +1, indicating that the 
pairs of variables are related and are moving to the same direction. 
The covariance between the CER DEC 12 futures and the ERU DEC 12 futures is 
0.402466879, while between CER DEC 13 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures is 
0.4180726. The positive sign in both cases indicates that the pairs of variables are 
showing similar behavior. 
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In addition, the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for the two 
pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability of 95% the 
means of both pairs to be equal and a probability of at least 75% the variances of both 
pairs to be equal, which is another sign of co-movement of the variables. 
Thus, the statistical tools that have been used are tend to confirm that the same contracts 
of the different products are moving in parallel, a sign that CER and ERU prices are 
moving in parallel. Someone could also argue that this is a sign that the market is 
following the participants’ expectations. Both CERs and ERUs are international credits 
and their use for compliance under EU ETS is limited. Thus someone could expect the 
two products to have a small price difference and the prices of the two products to move 
in parallel. The statistical tools used tend to confirm that the price of the CERs and the 
price of the ERUs is following the participants’ expectations.  
Finally, the CER and ERU futures contracts with different expiry dates are 
presenting exactly the same behavior as the EUA contracts. In particular the prices of 
CER DEC 12 futures and CER DEC 13 futures seem to be closely related as they follow 
the same pattern but in marginally different price levels. This is also the case for the 
ERU DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures (see Figure 4.28).  
Once again in order to provide a statistical argument regarding the co-movement of the 
different contracts, are examined the correlation and the covariance between the CER 
DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 13 futures, and also between ERU DEC 12 futures 
and ERU DEC 13 futures. For the same pairs of contracts are also performed mean 
equality tests and variance equality tests. 
The correlation between the CER DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 13 futures is 
0.9969676, while between ERU DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures is 0.9954207. 
The correlation between the two pairs of contracts is very close to +1, indicating that the 
pairs of variables are related and are moving to the same direction. 
The covariance between the CER DEC 12 futures and the CER DEC 13 futures is 
0.41773934, while between ERU DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures is 
0.403393545. The positive sign in both cases indicates that the pairs of variables are 
showing similar behavior. 
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In addition, the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for the two 
pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability of 95% the 
means of both pairs to be equal and a probability of at least 74% the variances of both 
pairs to be equal (from the five methods only Siegel-Tukey gives a relatively low 
probability of 40% the variances of the DEC 12 CER and the DEC 13 CER contracts to 
be equal and a relatively low probability of 46% the variances of  the DEC 12 ERU and 
the DEC 13 ERU to be equal), which is another sign of co-movement of the variables. 
Thus, the statistical tools that have been used are tend to confirm that the different 
contracts of the same product are moving in parallel, a sign that CER and ERU 
secondary markets are functioning smoothly. 
Table 4.26: Summary: Correlation and covariance between different pairs of CER 
and ERU contracts 
Pair of contracts under examination  Correlation Covariance 
EUA DEC 12 futures and CER DEC 12 futures -0,1081466 -0,039662757 
EUA DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 12 futures -0,1380684 -0,049568949 
CER DEC 12 futures and ERU DEC 12 futures 0,9969655 0,402466879 
CER DEC 13 futures and ERU DEC 13 futures 0,9939284 0,4180726 
CER DEC 12 futures and CER DEC 13 futures 0,9969676 0,41773934 
CER DEC 12 futures and CER DEC 13 futures 0,9954207 0,403393545 
 
4.3.5 Aviation in the EU ETS 
The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that aviation 
today is responsible for 2 percent of global CO2 emissions with a total climate change 
impact of 3 percent. The above percentage might seem negligible but it has been 
estimated that from 1990 to 2010 overall CO2 emissions from aviation – which are 
directly related to the amount of fuel consumed – have increased by 80 percent. In 
addition the IPCC estimates that this share will grow to 5% by 2050 undermining efforts 
made by other industrial sectors to fulfill Europe's Kyoto commitments. 
According to International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) due to an emissions 
growth forecast of 667% from 2006 to 2050, the sector stands to become a more 
important source of GHG emissions in the future unless mitigation policies are being 
taken (IETA web page, 2012). It is unlikely that the airline industry will be able to 
improve fuel efficiency at the same rate as air traffic expands and if total EU emissions 
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were to be cut by 80% in 2050, airlines would need almost the entire allocation of CO2 
allowances in the EU’s ETS (Anderson et al., 2006, p. 3).  
As a result European Union decided took action in order to mitigate the climate impacts 
of aviation. Specifically the European Commission decided to include aviation into the 
EU ETS as of 2012 and impose a cap on CO2 emissions from all international flights – 
from or to anywhere in the world – that arrive at or depart from an EU airport. 
The European Commission concluded that the participation of all aircraft operators in the 
EU ETS is the most cost-efficient and environmentally effective option for controlling 
aviation industry emissions.  
Starting from January 2012 emissions from all domestic and international flights that 
arrive at or depart from an EU airport will be covered by the EU ETS. In addition to the 
27 EU Member States, the EU ETS for aviation covers three EEA-EFTA States (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) and will extend to Croatia by 1 January 2014. 
The EU ETS for aircraft operators is divided into two trading periods for airlines: 2012-
2013 and 2013-2020.  
For the 2012-2013 trading period, the total amount of European Union Aviation 
Allowances (EUAAs) available to the airline industry is capped at 97% of the average 
annual aviation emissions for the years 2004-2006 (known as the “historical aviation 
emissions”, equals 212,892,052 tonnes of CO2), or 214,777,670 aviation allowances. 
During this trading period, 85% of the total available allowances will be allocated to 
airlines free of charge and the remaining 15% will be auctioned by Member States more 
(DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, Q). 
Regarding the 2013-2020 trading period (Phase III of EU ETS as a whole), the total 
amount of available EUAAs is going to decrease to 95% of historical aviation emissions, 
or 210,349,264 aviation allowances. 82% of the total available allowances will be 
allocated free of charge, 15% will be auctioned and 3% will be set aside in a special 
reserve for new entrants and fast-growing airlines. 
Operators that emit more than their allocated emissions have to buy additional 
allowances for surrender from the primary or the secondary market. If at the end of a 
reporting year, the operator does not surrender allowances equal to its total emissions 
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will face a penalty of € 100 per missing allowance on top of the obligation to purchase 
and surrender missing allowances. Additionally, an operating ban may be imposed on the 
aircraft operator. 
It is important to be clarified that for the aircraft operators is possible to surrender EUAs 
for compliance under the EU ETS. However, EUAAs can only be used by aircraft 
operators.  
Moreover the aircraft operators can also surrender carbon offset credits such as CERs 
and ERUs. In particular operators can use CERs and ERUs for up to 15% of their 
compliance obligations in 2012 and up to 1.5% from 2013 (Directive 2008/101/EC). 
 
4.3.5.1 EUAA contracts and prices in the secondary market 
With the beginning of the first trading periods for airlines in 2012 the first EUAA 
products appeared in the European exchanges. By October 2012 the EUAA contracts 
that are traded in the exchanges under investigation are divided in spot contracts and 
futures contracts. However, no traded volume was available. 
From the three exchanges under investigation only BlueNext was not performing 
transactions of EUAAs by the time this thesis being written. Currently, EEX and ICE 
ECX are performing trading of both futures contracts, while only EEX is offering EUAA 
spot contracts. 
In the European carbon exchanges the futures contracts transacted are either of quarterly 
expiries (these contracts normally expire in March, June, September and December) or 
of annually expiries (these contacts have December expiries for 2012 up to 2020). Only 
the ICE ECX offers quarterly contracts, while both EEX and ICE ECX are offering 
contracts with annual expiries up to 2020. 
Table 4.27: Special features of EUAA futures contracts, ICE ECX EUAA futures 
contract (ICE ECX web page, 2012, F) 
Description Contracts are for physical delivery through the transfer of EUAAs 
between National Registry Accounts. 
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Units of Trading One lot of one thousand (1,000) EUAAs only to the extent such EUAAs 
are valid, as of the time of their delivery to the Clearing House, for the 
purposes of meeting the requirements of the Directive. Neither the 
Clearing House nor the Exchange makes any representation or warranty 
whatsoever as to whether any EUAAs delivered pursuant to an EUAA 
Contract are or are not valid in this regard. 
Minimum Trading Size 1 lot 
Contract Months December contract months and quarterly contracts are listed from 2012 
up to 2020. In addition, the nearest two monthly contracts will also be 
listed so that there are always three prompt contracts available to trade, 
including the quarterly. 
Expiry Last Monday of the contract month 
Trading Mechanism Electronic futures, Exchange for Physical (EFP), Exchange for Swap (EFS) 
and Block Trades are available for this contract. 
Delivery/Settlement 
Terms The contracts are physically deliverable by the transfer of EUAAs from 
the Holding Account of the Selling Clearing Member at a Registry to the 
Holding Account of ICE Clear Europe at a Registry and from the Holding 
Account of ICE Clear Europe at that Registry to the Holding Account of 
the Buying Clearing Member at a Registry. 
Delivery is between Clearing Members and ICE Clear Europe during a 
Delivery Period. The Delivery Period is the period beginning at 19:00 
hours on the Business Day following the last trading day and ending at 
19:30 hours on the third Business Day following that last trading day in 
accordance with the ICE Clear Europe Clearing Rules and Procedures as 
appropriate. 
Provision is made for delayed and failed delivery in the Regulations. 
Members’ attention is drawn to the additional delivery terms outlined in 
Circular 11/038, it being understood that for the purpose of these 
additional terms, EUAs will be deemed to include EUAs and EUAAs. 
 
Regarding the features of the EUAA spot contracts are exactly the same as in the case of 
the EUA, CER, and ERU spot contracts. 
Table 4.28: Special features of EUAA spot contracts, EEX EUAA spot (EEX web 
page, 2012, G) 
Description EU Aviation Allowances (EUAA) 
Units of Trading One thousand (1,000) EUAAs  
Pricing EUR per EUAA 
Contract Minimum 
Price Change 
EUR 0.01 per EUAA multiplied by the contract volume means € 10.00 
Fulfilment Date On the first settlement day after the conclusion of the contract. 
Register Account ECC AG keeps an account in trust for all trading participants at an 
appropriate registry authority which has the effect that the respective 
trading participants own a proportionate part of the total stock of EU 
Aviation Allowances recorded in this account.   
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Fulfilment 
Fulfilment is carried out by means of transferring of the EUAA within the  
internal inventory accounts of the trading participants and the changes  
in the proportionate part of the total stock of EU Aviation Allowances in  
the account at the registry authority kept in trust by ECC AG.    
Upon payment of the purchase price, the buyer of an EEX Spot Contract 
regarding EUAA purchases the corresponding proportionate part  
of the total stock of EU Aviation Allowances which is booked in the 
account of ECC AG at the respective register.  
The seller of an EEX Spot Contract regarding EUAA transfers its 
corresponding proportionate part of the total stock, which is booked in 
the  account of ECC AG at the register authority, on the delivery day. 
 
Return Every co-owner in the total stock of EUAA in the account of ECC AG at 
the registry is entitled to demand the transfer to an account to be 
specified by the trading participant at a suitable national registry from 
ECC AG on the first business day of ECC AG after said request at any 
time, however, no later than by 31 March of the year following the end 
of a compliance period. 
 
In order to draw some conclusions regarding the EUAA price this thesis has collect all 
the EEX daily closing prices of the EUAA spot, EUAA DEC 12 futures, and EUAA 
DEC 13 futures contracts from the 30
th
 of April 2012 to the 30
th
 of September 2012. The 
30
th
 of April was the first trading day in the EEX for the EUAA DEC 12 futures and 
EUAA DEC 13 futures contracts, while the EUAA spot contract is offered since the 25
th
 
of June 2012. 
Figure 4.30: EUAA spot, EUAA DEC 12 futures, and EUAA DEC 13 futures prices 
between 30
th
 of April 2012 and 30
th
 of September 2012 (EEX web page, 2012, E) 
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From Figure 4.30 it seems that the prices of EUA spot, EUA DEC 12 futures, EUA DEC 
13 futures, and EUA DEC 14 futures are following the same pattern but in different price 
levels and they seem to be closely related. This is a behavior that has also been observed 
for the contracts offered for EUAs, CERs, and ERUs. 
It has already been mentioned that this is normal behavior and it is another sign that the 
market is functioning smoothly, as a contract with a longer expiry date is expected to be 
more expensive than one of the same underlying asset with a shorter expiry date. 
In order to provide a statistical argument regarding the co-movement of the different 
contracts, they are examined in pairs and are calculated the correlation and the 
covariance, while there are performed mean equality tests and variance equality tests. 
Table 4.29: Correlation and covariance between different pairs of EUAA contracts 
Pair of contracts under examination  Correlation Covariance 
EUAA spot and EUAA DEC 12 futures 0,994928031 0,190979714 
EUAA spot and EUAA DEC 13 futures 0,987425251 0,195271204 
EUAA DEC 12 futures and EUAA DEC 13 futures 0,997741425 0,357103433 
Once again, we observe that the correlation between the different pairs of EUA contracts 
is very close to +1 in all the cases, indicating that the pairs of variables are related and 
are moving to the same direction.  
Additionally, in all three cases the covariance between the different pairs of EUA 
contracts is a positive number, indicating that the pairs of variables are showing a similar 
behavior. 
Also, all the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for each of the 
different pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a probability of 
95% the means of each pair to be equal and a probability of at least 67% the variances of 
each pair to be equal (from the five methods only Siegel-Tukey gives a low probability 
of 15% the variances of the spot EUAA and the DEC 13 EUAA contracts to be equal 
and a relatively low probability of 45% the variances of  the DEC 12 EUAA and the 
DEC 13 EUAA to be equal), which is another sign of co-movement of the variables. 
Therefore, there are clear indications that the different contracts of the same product are 
moving in parallel, a sign that the EUAA secondary market has the same behavior as any 
other secondary market for commodities. 
[157] 
 
Moreover is interesting to analyze the difference between the various EUAA contract 
prices and the corresponding EUA contract prices. As it has already been mentioned the 
two products are linked. In particular any aircraft operators can surrender EUAs for 
compliance, while the rest operators under the EU ETS cannot use EUAAs.  
As a result of the above mentioned rule, someone should expect two thinks: a) The two 
contracts to move in parallel because they are closely linked and b) the various EUAA 
contract prices to be always in lower levels than the corresponding EUA contract prices, 
as EUAAs can only be used by a limited number of operators.  
From Figure 4.31 it can be concluded that so far this is exactly the case for the EUAA 
and EUA prices, which is an indication that the market so far is following the market 
participant expectations and thus is operating smoothly. 
Figure 4.31: Comparison between EUAA and EUA contract prices (EEX web page, 
2012, E) 
 
In order to strengthen the argument that the EUAA prices are related with the EUA 
prices are once again used statistical tools. In particular are examined the correlation and 
the covariance between the EUAA spot contract and the EUA spot contract (the series 
start in 25
th
 of June 2012 when the EUAA spot contract introduced to the secondary 
market), and also between EUAA DEC 12 futures and EUA DEC 12 futures. For the 
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same pairs of contracts are also performed mean equality tests and variance equality 
tests. 
Table 4.30: Correlation and covariance between different pairs of EUAA and EUA 
contracts 
Pair of contracts under examination  Correlation Covariance 
EUAA spot and EUA spot 0,997539767 0,19037698 
EUAA DEC 12 futures and EUA DEC 12 futures 0,996190859 0,19037698 
From Table 4.31 can be observed that the correlation between the two different pairs of 
contracts is very close to +1, indicating that the pairs of variables are related and are 
moving to the same direction. Moreover, the covariance between the different pairs of 
contracts is a positive number in both cases, indicating that the pairs of variables are 
showing a similar behavior. 
Finally, all the mean equality tests and the variance equality tests performed for each of 
the different pairs (the tests results can be found in Appendix I) are showing a 
probability of 95% the means of each pair to be equal and a probability of at least 64% 
the variances of each pair to be equal (from the five methods only Siegel-Tukey gives a 
low probability of 15% the variances of the spot EUA and the spot EUAA contracts to be 
equal), which is another sign of co-movement of the variables.  
Thus, all the statistical tools that have been used are tend to confirm that the same 
contracts of the two different products are moving in parallel. Thus, it can be concluded 
that there are indications that so far the EUAA secondary market seems to function well, 
since the EUAA price tends to follow the participants’ expectation. 
 
4.3.6 European secondary carbon market assessment 
Within this Section is demonstrated that there are clear indications that the European 
secondary market over the years has obtain the characteristics of the others secondary 
commodity market across the globe. In particular the European carbon exchanges seem 
to share the same characteristics with the exchanges for other types of commodities such 
as stock exchanges. 
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This conclusion is primary justified by the fact that the carbon products offered in the 
European carbon platforms are offered in a wide variety of choices as in the case of any 
other commodity market. Then the observation that the prices of the contracts of the 
same product with different maturities tend to move in parallel is another indication that 
strengthen the above argument, since this is a behavior that is met in all the developed 
commodity markets. 
Additionally, there are indications that the price is following the participants’ 
expectations, which is a sign is functioning properly. This argument is strengthen by the 
observation that the price of EUAA seems to be related with the EUA price, while the 
CER price seems to be related with the ERU price. 
Also, the fact that the secondary market has met a significant growth over the last years 
both in terms of value and volume, is a clear indication of growing liquidity and demand 
in the market.  
Regarding the different products offered in the market, the EUA has the lion’s share in 
the market both in terms of volume traded and value, while the CER is second and the 
ERU third. Nevertheless, the individual secondary markets of all the products, including 
the newly introduced EUAA, seem to operate smoothly, as the prices fluctuation tends to 
follow the market participants’ expectation 
Finally, in terms of contract type the market participants seem to prefer by far the 
derivative contracts. In particular, the majority of the transactions is performed through 
futures contracts. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In Chapter 2 it is demonstrated that the primary market of emission allowances is closely 
linked to the secondary market. This Chapter moves one step forward as it evinces that 
all GHG emissions trading products as offered in primary and mainly in secondary 
markets are transacted worldwide as any other commodity. 
The evolution of prices according to the market participants’ expectations, the increasing 
transacted volumes, the open access to all interested parties, the different contract types, 
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and the growing volume and value of the carbon market are strong indications that 
especially the European secondary carbon market share the same characteristics as any 
other commodity market across the globe. 
For the European secondary carbon market in particular it can be concluded by the 
second Section of this Chapter that there are clear indications that it has obtained the 
characteristics of the exchanges for other types of commodities such as stock exchanges. 
This conclusion is justified in many ways.  
Initially, the three main carbon products traded in the European carbon exchanges 
(EUAs, CERs, and ERUs) are offered in a wide variety of choices as in the case of any 
other commodity. In particular the carbon contracts are offered in the form of spot 
contracts, option contracts, future contracts, and swap contracts. The EUAAs that have 
been introduced in the market in 2012 are also offered in the form of spot and futures 
contracts. 
Additionally, the traded volumes and value have faced a sharp increase since the 
implementation of the secondary market in 2005, which is a clear indication of growing 
liquidity and demand in the market. For example from the 321 millions EUAs traded in 
the European exchanges in 2005 with a value of 7,9 billion dollars the transacted volume 
in 2011 launched to 6.8 billion EUAs in 2011 with a value of 147.8 billion dollars. 
Moreover, this Chapter tries to indicate that the European secondary market has obtain 
two specific characteristics of the other commodity markets in place: a) the prices of the 
contracts of the same product with different maturities tend to move in parallel, and b) 
the price of the different products is following the participants’ expectations. All the 
statistical tools that have been used tend to confirm both arguments.  
In particular, for all four carbon products offered by the European exchanges the 
correlation and the covariance between the prices of the contracts of the same product 
with different maturities are indicating that the variables are related, are moving to the 
same direction, and are showing a similar behavior. Also, the mean equality tests and the 
variance equality tests performed are indicating a great probability of co-movement of 
the variables. Thus, the investigation tends to confirm the first argument. 
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In order to confirm the second argument this thesis is making a simple assumption: If the 
market is following the participants’ expectation then the price of the EUAs should be 
related with the price of the EUAAs and the price of the CERs should be related with the 
price of the ERUs. This assumption is based on the specific characteristics of the four 
products, as in theory the EUAs and the EUAAs are closely linked, while the CERs and 
the ERUs are both international credits and their use for compliance under EU ETS is 
limited. 
The statistical tools tend to confirm the second argument. For each of the pairs of 
products the correlation and the covariance between the prices of the contracts of the 
different products with same maturities are indicating that the variables are related, are 
moving to the same direction, and are showing a similar behavior. Also, the mean 
equality tests and the variance equality tests performed are indicating a great probability 
of co-movement of the variables.  
Another conclusion regarding the European secondary carbon markets is that the 
different EUA contracts dominate the market both in terms of value and volume. In 
particular in 2011 were traded 7.85 billion EUAs with a value of 147.85 billion US$, 
while the volume of CERs and ERUs traded was 1.8 billion allowances with a total value 
of 23.1 billion US$. Also, in terms of contract type the market participants seem to prefer 
by far the futures contracts. 
Regarding the primary market it also seems to operate smoothly even though its value 
and volume of transactions are much smaller than these of the secondary market. The 
market has many participants, it is open to everyone interested to perform trading, the 
prices are following the participants’ expectations, while its value is a sign of sufficient 
liquidity.  
In particular, in the primary market are traded the three products linked to the Kyoto 
Protocol: AAUs, CERs, and ERUs. Each product has different characteristics and is 
traded in different terms. Thus, someone could consider that each product is part of a 
different market and these different markets together form the primary carbon market. 
AAUs’ primary market is the youngest as it launched in 2008. The volumes are 
relatively small (from 2008 to 2011 were traded 281 mtCO2e), its total value from 2008 
to 2011 was 2,156 billion US$ and the price is facing a constant decrease over the years. 
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Japan is the dominant player in the demand side, while Eastern European countries 
dominate on the sale side. 
The primary market of CERs is the largest of all three both in terms of volume (in 2011 
were traded 263 mtCO2e) and value (2,98 billion US$ in 2011). The market is divided in 
pre-2013 pCERs and post-2012 pCERs. The former is traded since 2002 and blossomed 
until 2007, while the later became functional in 2010 and by the end of 2011 was about 
twice the size of the post-2013 market. Prices met a constant increase until 2007 but over 
the last four years are following the opposite direction. China is the dominant player on 
the supply side of the market since 2005, while the European countries are the most 
energetic players on the demand side. 
Finally, the primary market of ERUs is the smallest in terms of volume (from 2004 to 
2011 were traded 197.8 mtCO2e), but this is not the case in terms of value (2,352 billion 
US$ from 2004 to 2011). This fact might seems peculiar but is explained by the much 
higher prices that the ERUs are sold in the primary market in comparison with AAUs. 
The Russian Federation and Ukraine are the dominant sellers in the market over the last 
years. The European countries have the lion’s share in the demand side. 
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Chapter 5: The monitoring rules 
 
5.1 Introduction and literature review 
As established in Chapter 4, the European carbon market over the years has met with a 
significant growth. Several carbon exchanges are in operation offering a wide variety of 
carbon products. Given the upward trend of the carbon market size and its growing 
sophistication, market monitoring to secure that market abuse is prevented is a necessity 
to ensure proper functioning of the market.  Proper market functioning is in turn a 
necessity towards ensuring that the ultimate target of the EU ETS system, that is efficient 
combating of climate change, is fulfilled. 
The scope of this Chapter is to investigate and present the monitoring rules currently in 
place to prohibit market abuse, including the recent REMIT regulation for monitoring 
the wholesale energy markets, and the potential interdependences with EU ETS. In this 
context the Chapter provides a detailed presentation of all the legal “tools” in place 
constituting the market oversight framework.  The next paragraphs provide an overview 
of the EU legal framework on ETS market monitoring with a brief reference on the 
sources utilized for this purpose. 
Note that besides the more specific “market related” rules deriving from various pieces 
of legislation reviews herein, the Commission has a general monitoring role over the 
European carbon market. The latter is presented in detail in Section 5.2.  
The Commission’s general monitoring role is set by Directive 2009/29/EC, which is the 
amendment of Directive 2003/87/EC and specifies the rules of the EU ETS from 2013 to 
2020. For the purposes of this Chapter, additional data on the Commissions role as 
specified by Directive 2009/29/EC was obtained from the Commission press release on 
December 21, 2010 entitled “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council - Towards an enhanced market oversight framework for the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme”. 
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Emission allowance derivatives are currently regulated by the Market Abuse Directive 
(Directive 2003/6/EC) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 
2004/39/EC).  All the relevant information is discussed in Section 5.3. 
Directive 2003/6/EC itself provided most of the relevant material.  Additional 
information reported here was obtained from the Commission press release on October 
20, 2011 entitled “Proposals for a Regulation on Market Abuse and for a Directive on 
Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse: Frequently Asked Questions”. 
Regarding the regulatory framework set in Directive 2004/39/EC, once again most of the 
data has been collected by the Directive itself. There is also information provided by the 
law firm LK Shields Solicitors and a Commission press release on October 29, 2007 
entitled “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID): Frequently Asked 
Questions”.  
In 2011, the Commission proposed for the review of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), for a Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR), for a Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) aiming to update the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD), and finally for a Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive 
(CSMAD). Section 5.4 displays all the relevant information.  
The Commission decided to amend the existing financial markets framework for two 
reasons. The first reason was that some incidents during the period 2009-2010 showed 
that there are loopholes in the current financial market legislation. Additionally, the spot 
transactions are currently not subject to equivalent rules with the derivatives transactions 
at the EU level and are not supervised. Thus, the spot trading of emission allowances is 
not protected against market abuse. 
The data about Market Abuse Regulation and Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 
Directive was obtained derived from two Commission press releases both issued on 
October 20, 2011. The first is entitled “Getting tough on insider dealing and market 
manipulation”, while the second’s title is “Proposals for a Regulation on Market Abuse 
and for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse: Frequently Asked 
Questions” 
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The information regarding the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Markets 
in Financial Instruments Regulation has been collected by two Commission press 
releases both issued on October 20, 2011. Title of the first document is “New rules for 
more efficient, resilient and transparent financial markets in Europe” and the second 
document is entitled “Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID): Frequently Asked Questions”. 
The auctions of emission allowances to be held as from 2013 and the early auctions of 
phase III emission allowances are covered by the auctioning Regulation No 1031/2010 
amended by the Regulation No 1210/2011. All the relevant material regarding the rules 
governing the auctions of emission credits from 2013 onwards and the early auctions of 
phase III emission allowances came from the above mentioned Regulations and are 
discussed in Section 5.5. 
Finally, Section 5.6 investigates the implemented framework to the energy markets by 
the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Markets Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) 
(Regulation No 1227/2011) and its interconnections with European carbon markets. The 
information regarding REMIT derives by the Regulation itself. It has to be pointed out 
that there is not literature available regarding the implications of REMIT in the carbon 
markets since its implemementation is not due before at least the first half of 2013, so 
that all the conclusions presented here are based on empirical observations and 
conjectured. 
This Chapter aims at offering a complete view of the regulated framework governing the 
European carbon markets, while it tries to point out the place of the emission allowances 
under the financial market legislation. 
The main conclusion deriving from this Chapter is that the European Commission 
through constantly evolving rules tries to obtain fair and efficient trading conditions for 
all market participants and to protect the market from fraudulent acts. 
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the regulatory framework in place to prohibit market abuse 
 
 
5.2 The role of the European Commission 
With the amendment of the ETS Directive 2003/87/EC by the Directive 2009/29/EC the 
European Commission acquired a dual task regarding the EU ETS oversight. 
1. The first task of the European Commission is to “monitor the functioning of 
the European carbon market”. Starting in 2010 the Commission shall submit 
annually a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the 
functioning of the carbon market including the implementation of the auctions, 
liquidity and the volumes traded. If necessary, Member States shall ensure that 
any relevant information is submitted to the Commission at least two months 
before the Commission adopts the report” (Directive 2009/29/EC, 2009, a. 
10(5)).  
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Thus, the ETS directive gives the Commission a key role over the scheme. 
Furthermore, in the case that the carbon market is not functioning properly the 
Commission has to take action. In particular the Commission shall submit a 
report to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied by any 
appropriate legislative proposal aiming at increasing the transparency of the 
carbon market and improving its functioning (European Commission, 2010, A, 
p. 7). 
The framework that determines the rules for the proper function of the market 
derive from the financial markets legislation, while the big number of energy 
companies in the scheme implies that energy markets legislation is also 
applicable. Additionally, the auctioning regulation sets out a framework that 
aims to ensure the integrity and transparency of the auctions in emissions 
allowances. 
2. The second task of the European Commission was “by 31 December 2010 to 
examine whether the market for emissions allowances is sufficiently protected 
from insider dealing or market manipulation and, if appropriate, shall bring 
forward proposals to ensure such protection. The relevant provisions of 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
maybe used with any appropriate adjustments needed to apply them to trade in 
commodities” (Directive 2009/29/EC, 2009, a. 12(1a)).  
Therefore the Commission had also the obligation to examine if the carbon 
market as a whole is functioning smoothly and if the rules in place were 
protecting the market sufficiently. In the case that the Commission ascertained 
that the market is vulnerable had to bring forward proposals to secure the 
market’s safety. 
In December 2010 the European Commission issued a first assessment 
regarding the levels of protection of the carbon market and during the first half 
of 2011 launched a broad stakeholder consultation. The Commission’s 
assessment made clear that the market is not sufficiently protected.  
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Consequently, the Commission judged that protective measures only against 
insider dealing and market manipulation were not enough. As a result on 
October 2011 the Commission adopted a proposal for the review of the 
financial markets rules. 
The findings of the Commissions assessment, the specific proposals of the 
Commission regarding the review of the financial legislation and their 
repercussions in carbon market are presented in Section 5.4. 
 
5.3 The financial markets legislation 
Appropriate market oversight framework is achieved by way of transparency 
requirements as well as by preventing and sanctioning market misconduct, in particular 
insider dealing and market manipulation (jointly referred to as market abuse) (European 
Commission, 2010, B).  
This market oversight framework is currently provided by the financial markets 
legislation. The legislation in question applies also to the carbon markets since the 
transactions involve the use of financial instruments, while the trading is carried out by 
authorised financial intermediaries or is channeled through marketplaces and/or 
infrastructures organised and supervised in accordance with financial market regulation 
(European Commission, 2010, A, p. 7).  
In particular there are two directives under the financial markets legislation that regulate 
the function of the market: the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
  
5.3.1 Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 
The MAD “shall apply to any financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated 
market in at least one Member State, or for which a request for admission to trading on 
such a market has been made, irrespective of whether or not the transaction itself actually 
takes place on that market” (Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003, a. 9).  
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Consequently the emission credit derivatives that conform to the above definition are 
regulated by the MAD. Therefore these financial instruments are already subject to the 
prohibitions of insider dealing and market manipulation set out in the MAD. 
The scope of MAD is to prevent market abuse. In particular MAD prohibits those who 
possess inside information from trading in related financial instruments (insider 
dealing), and also prohibits  the manipulation of markets through practices such as 
spreading misleading signals to the market that result in abnormal prices (market 
manipulation) (European Commission, 2011, A). 
MAD  designates that “in relation to derivatives on commodities, ‘inside information’ 
shall mean information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, 
directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives and which users of markets on 
which such derivatives are traded would expect to receive in accordance with accepted 
market practices on those markets” (Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003, a. 1(1)).  
Member states must prohibit insider dealing by any person who possesses inside 
information a) by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer; or b) by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer; 
or c) by virtue of his having access to the information through the exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties; or d) by virtue of his criminal activities (Directive 
2003/6/EC, 2003, a. 2(1)).  
Furthermore, MAD defines market manipulation as (Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003, a. 
1(2)):  
a) Transactions or orders to trade:  
- which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, 
demand for or price of financial instruments, or  
- which secure, by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or 
several financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level, 
unless the person who entered into the transactions or issued the orders to trade 
establishes that his reasons for so doing are legitimate and that these transactions 
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or orders to trade conform to accepted market practices on the regulated market 
concerned. 
b) Transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any other 
form of deception or contrivance; 
c) Dissemination of information through the media, including the Internet, or by 
any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as 
to financial instruments, including the dissemination of rumours and false or 
misleading news, where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought 
to have known, that the information was false or misleading. 
According to article 5 of the MAD Member States shall prohibit any person from 
engaging in market manipulation. 
In addition each Member State shall apply the above mentioned prohibitions to a) 
transactions of derivatives on a regulated market situated or operating within its territory; 
or b) actions carried out on its territory concerning financial instruments that are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market in a Member State (Directive 2003/6/EC, 
2003, a. 10). Also each Member State shall designate a single administrative authority 
competent to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to MAD are applied (Directive 
2003/6/EC, 2003, a. 11).  
The MAD creates some tools to protect the market from market abuse. These tools 
include insiders' lists, suspicious transaction reports, the disclosure of managers' share 
transactions, and the obligation of issuers of financial instruments traded on a regulated 
market to make public as soon as possible inside information that they possess, with 
limited possibilities to delay (European Commission, 2011, A). 
Finally, the Member States are given access (through the competent authority) to all 
relevant data for investigation, power to take appropriate administrative measures, and 
the ability to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. 
Consequently the emission credit derivatives traded in regulated markets fall under the 
scope of MAD and are protected from insider dealing and market manipulation. 
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5.3.2 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
Emission allowances fall under the scope of MiFID provided that they are financial 
instruments and “they are traded on a regulated market or an MTF (multilateral trading 
facility), are cleared and settled through recognised clearing houses or are subject to 
regular margin calls” (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, Annex 1 (C10)).  
The vast majority of emission credit derivatives are traded either in regulated markets 
and or in multilateral trading facilities and as a result they fall under the scope of MiFID. 
The European Commission considers the MiFID as a cornerstone of the EU's regulation 
of financial markets. Scope of the Directive is to sets out a comprehensive regulatory 
regime covering investment services and financial markets in Europe. In particular the 
Directive covers regulated markets and MTFs (European Commission, 2007).  
In particular MiFID aims to (LK Shields web page, 2012):  
 broaden the range of regulated investment services and financial services;  
 standardise the procedure for obtaining a "European Passport" and extend its 
scope. In particular firms authorised under MiFID will be able to use their 
MiFID passport to provide services in other EU member states without 
applying for permission to do so from the local regulator;  
 introduce multilateral trading facilities (a platform, other than a regulated 
market which allows trading between market participants) and systematic 
internalisers  (a firm that executes and processes client orders in-house, 
outside a regulated market or an MTF) in order to increase competition. 
 Ensure the market transparency and integrity by providing a higher level of 
protection for investors;  
 impose defined rules with regard to conduct of business, conflict of interest, 
transaction reporting and best execution; and  
 ensure maximum harmonisation of measures and means implemented by 
competent authorities within Member States. 
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All investment firms carrying out investment services concerning emission allowance 
derivatives have to obtain an authorisation under the MiFID and are subject to on-going 
supervision by financial regulators. Also their activity has to conform to a series of 
operational and reporting requirements (European Commission, 2010, p. 8).  
Under the MiFID “investment firm means any legal person whose regular occupation or 
business is the provision of one or more investment services to third parties and/or the 
performance of one or more investment activities on a professional basis;” (Directive 
2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 4(1)).   
Furthermore “investment services and activities means any of the services and 
activities listed in Section A of Annex I relating to any of the instruments listed in 
Section C of Annex I;” (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 4(2)).  
As it has already been mentioned emission credit derivatives are listed in section C of 
Annex I and therefore the MiFID applies to emission credit derivatives. 
MiFID offers some firms exemptions from authorisation. In particular MiFID divide 
firms in investment firms that carry out core services and in investment firms that carry 
out non-core/ancilliary services. 
Investment firms which carry out core services will fall to be regulated under MiFID. 
The core services are listed in section A of Annex I and are:  
 Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial 
instruments. 
  Execution of orders on behalf of clients. 
  Dealing on own account. 
  Portfolio management. 
  Investment advice. 
  Underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments 
on a firm commitment basis. 
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  Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis 
  Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities.  
MiFID authorised firms may carry out non-core/ancilliary services. However firms 
which carry out ancillary services only will not fall to be regulated under MiFID. These 
ancillary services are listed in section B  of Annex I and include: 
 Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of 
clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral 
management; 
  Granting credits or loans to an investor to allow him to carry out a transaction 
in one or more financial instruments, where the firm granting the credit or 
loan is involved in the transaction; 
  Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related 
matters and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of 
undertakings; 
  Foreign exchange services where these are connected to the provision of 
investment services; 
  Investment research and financial analysis or other forms of general 
recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments; 
  Services related to underwriting. 
  Investment services and activities as well as ancillary services of the type 
included under Section A or B of Annex I related to the underlying of the 
derivatives included under Section C – 5, 6, 7 and 10 - where these 
areconnected to the provision of investment or ancillary services. 
Regarding the requirements for authorization under MiFID, the performance of 
investment services or activities as a regular occupation or business on a professional 
basis is subject to prior authorization. Also, Member States shall allow any market 
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operator to operate an MTF, subject to the prior verification of their compliance with the 
provisions set out in the Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 5(1:2)). 
Additionally, each Member State shall require that: a) any investment firm which is a 
legal person have its head office in the same Member State as its registered office, b) any 
investment firm which is not a legal person or any investment firm which is a legal 
person but under its national law has no registered office have its head office in the 
Member State in which it actually carries on its business (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 
5(4)).  
Also the investment firms have to meet some organization and operational criteria. 
MiFID introduces rules regarding conduct of business, conflict of interest, transaction 
reporting, customer classification and best execution. It also sets out new requirements 
regarding pre and post-trade transparency for equity markets and the establishment of a 
new regulatory regime for systematic internalisers. The most significant new measures 
are (LK Shields web page, 2012):  
 Client classification - new harmonised EU framework for classifying clients 
into "three-tier" categories, retail clients, professional clients, and market 
clients.  
 Reporting to clients - an investment firm should provide adequate reports for 
the services provided to a client, making the necessary disclosures with regard 
to costs and investment risk.  
 Safeguarding client assets - adequate arrangements are required to safeguard 
client assets and ownership rights.  
 Best Execution - an investment firm should take reasonable steps when 
executing client orders to ensure the best possible results for clients.  
 Information to clients - information provided to clients must be in a 
comprehensible form, clearly disclosing all the potential investment risk.  
 Execution-only services - this may be provided only on the clients instruction 
with regard to certain types of financial instruments, including securities 
bonds, money market instruments and some equity instruments.  
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 Pre-trade and post-trade transparency - MiFID introduces new requirements 
for shares traded on regulated markets and MTFs. It also requires "systematic 
internalisers" to provide definite bid and offer quotes in liquid shares for 
orders below standard market size.  
 Conflict of interest - Investment firms must take reasonable steps to manage 
conflict of interest between its organisation, tied agents, employees, parents 
companies and subsidiaries etc. They must put in place effective 
organisational and operative arrangements to manage and avoid such 
conflicts.  
 Outsourcing - An investment firm must ensure when relying on third parties 
for the performance of operational functions to take reasonable steps to avoid 
undue additional operational risks. 
Regarding the obligations of Member States, they shall establish a register of all 
investment firms. This register shall be publicly accessible and shall contain information 
on the services and/or activities for which the investment firm is authorised. It shall be 
updated on a regular basis (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 5(3)).  
Each Member State shall also designate the competent authorities which are to carry out 
each of the duties provided for under the different provisions of MiFID. Competent 
authorities shall be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for 
the exercise of their functions. These powers shall be exercised in conformity with 
national law and shall include, at least, the rights to (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 
50(2)):  
 have access to any document in any form whatsoever and to receive a copy of 
it; 
  demand information from any person and if necessary to summon and 
question a person with a view to obtaining information; 
  carry out on-site inspections; 
  require existing telephone and existing data traffic records; 
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  require the cessation of any practice that is contrary to the provisions adopted 
in the implementation of this Directive; 
  request the freezing and/or the sequestration of assets; 
  request temporary prohibition of professional activity; 
  require authorised investment firms and regulated markets' auditors to 
provide information; 
  adopt any type of measure to ensure that investment firms and regulated 
markets continue to comply with legal requirements; 
  require the suspension of trading in a financial instrument; 
  require the removal of a financial instrument from trading, whether on a 
regulated market or under other trading arrangements; 
  refer matters for criminal prosecution; 
  allow auditors or experts to carry out verifications or investigations. 
Furthermore, Member States shall require competent authorities to establish the 
appropriate methods to monitor that investment firms comply with their obligations. 
Also Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities monitor the activities of 
investment firms. 
Finally, the Member States are having the power to take any administrative measure or 
impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions in the cases of 
non compliance under the MiFID (Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, a. 51(1)).  
From the above is clear the investment firms that carry out transactions of emission 
allowances (included in core services) are fall under the scope of the Directive. Thus the 
carbon market is regulated by MiFID and the investment firms are subject to supervision 
by financial regulators. 
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5.4 Changing the rules 
Under the ETS Directive by 31 December 2010 the Commission had the obligation to 
examine whether the market for emissions allowances is sufficiently protected from 
insider dealing or market manipulation and, if appropriate, shall bring forward proposals 
to ensure such protection (see section 4.3).  
In December 2010 the European Commission issued a first assessment regarding the 
levels of protection of the carbon market and in October 2011 the Commission adopted 
a proposal for the review of the financial markets rules.  
The Commission judged that protective measures only against insider dealing and 
market manipulation were not enough, as it has to address additional forms of market 
misconduct, such as money laundering, terrorist financing and other criminal activities 
There were two main reasons behind the Commission’s decision to amend the existing 
financial markets framework. 
The first reason was that transactions for immediate delivery of allowances (spot 
transactions) are currently not subject to equivalent rules with the derivatives 
transactions at the EU level and are not supervised. Consequently the Commission 
decided to propose a suitable regulation that set spot transactions under the financial 
markets legislation (DG Clima of the European Commission web page, 2012, R). 
The second reason was that during the period 2009 – 2010 the European carbon market 
dealt with three incidents that did not constitute market abuse in the sense of the MAD, 
but they affected the smooth operation of the market: 
 There were incidents of “phishing attacks”. In particular fraudsters tried to o 
get unauthorised access to accounts of market participants. 
 Hungary resold in the carbon market emission allowances that had already 
been used for EU ETS compliance. 
 There were cases of Value Added Tax (VAT) fraud. 
As a result the Commission on October 2011 proposed for: 
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1. A Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) aiming to update the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD). 
2. For a Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive (CSMAD). 
3. The review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
4. For a Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). 
However, on July 25, 2012 the European Commission decided to present further 
amendments to the proposed MAR and CSMAD. The Commission’s decision came after 
the Libor scandal in mid-2012.  
In particular, in the recent LIBOR scandal have been raised serious concerns about false 
submissions of banks' estimated interbank lending rates. Any actual or attempted 
manipulation of such key benchmarks can have a serious impact on market confidence, 
and could result in significant losses to consumers and investors, or distort the real 
economy (European Commission, 2012, A).  
A benchmark is any commercial index or published figure calculated by the application 
of a formula to the value of one or more underlying assets or prices, including estimated 
prices, interest rates or other values, or surveys by reference to which the amount 
payable under a financial instrument is determined. Underlying assets or prices 
referenced in benchmarks can include equities (e.g. the FTSE 100 index), bonds (e.g. 
NASDAQ OMX fixed income), interest rates (e.g. LIBOR or EURIBOR), or 
commodities such as agricultural products (e.g. cocoa LIFFE London), metals (e.g. Gold 
COMEX) or oil (e.g. Brent oil ICE). ) (European Commission, 2012, B).  
The Commission decided that its proposals for a MAR and the related proposal for a 
CSMAD did not explicitly cover the direct manipulation of benchmarks. Therefore, in 
order to capture the direct manipulation of benchmarks and in order to ensure that such 
manipulation of benchmarks is a criminal offence, the Commission has proposed to 
amend its proposals for a Regulation and for a Directive (European Commission, 2012, 
B).  
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The additional amendments to the proposed MAR and CSMAD are discussed in detail in 
Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively. 
Furthermore, it has to be clarified that the proposed amended MiFID and the MiFIR are 
having the same goal: the review of the existing MiFID. Thus, within this Chapter the 
proposed amended MiFID and the MiFIR are examined together in Section 5.4.3. 
Currently all the proposals are passing to the European Parliament and the Council 
(Member States) for negotiation and adoption. The Regulations and Directives will apply 
once they will have been adopted.  
  
5.4.1 Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) 
According to European Commission objective of the review of the MAD through MAR 
is to extend the scope of EU rules to financial instruments only traded on new platforms 
and over the counter (OTC), currently not covered by EU legislation, and adapting rules 
to new technology (European Commission, 2011, B).  
For emission credits in particular the MAR introduces a specific definition of inside 
information for emission allowances. Under the existing MAD, the issuer of an emission 
allowance is not typically the person who possesses inside information, the standard 
definition of inside information does not sufficiently ensure disclosure of relevant inside 
information.  The obligation to disclose inside information will be effectively placed on 
companies with large installations regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System, as it 
is they who possess the relevant information (European Commission, 2011, B).  
Another innovation of MAR is that it set under the financial legislation all the range of 
trading venues.  The existing MAD covers only those transactions take place in regulated 
markets. The MAR extends the scope of the market abuse framework to apply to any 
financial instrument admitted to trading on a multilateral trading facility (MTF) or 
organised trading facility (OTF), as well as to any related financial instruments traded 
over the counter (OTC). 
Also the MAR is trying to reinforce regulators' investigative powers. In particular the 
proposal extends suspicious transaction reporting to orders and to OTC transactions. It 
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also introduces the new offence of “attempted market manipulation”, while it grants 
competent authorities access to private documents or premises where there is a 
reasonable suspicion of insider dealing or market manipulation. Moreover it gives the 
regulators the power to obtain existing telephone and data traffic records from telecoms 
operators. It finally requires Member States to provide for the protection of 
whistleblowers and sets common rules where incentives are provided to them for 
reporting information about market abuse (European Commission, 2011, A).  
In addition the proposal strengthens the administrative sanctions that can be imposed for 
market abuse. The current framework provides only for weak sanctions that are lacking a 
deterrent effect. The MAR proposes that fines should not be less than the profit made 
from market abuse where this can be determined, and the maximum fine should not be 
less than two times any such profit. For natural persons, the maximum fine should not be 
less than €5 million, and for legal persons it should not be less than 10% of annual 
turnover, with Member States being free to exceed these limits. In imposing sanctions, 
competent authorities should take account of other aggravating or mitigating factors, 
such as the gravity of the offence, previous offences or a suspect's cooperation with an 
investigation (European Commission, 2011, A).  
Ultimately the proposal tries to reduce the administrative burdens on small and medium-
sized companies (SMEs) issuers. Insiders’ lists under the MAD are imposing 
unnecessary administrative burdens on SME issuers. MAR aims to eliminate these by 
providing that the precise data to be included in such lists should be defined in delegated 
acts and implementing technical standards adopted by the Commission (European 
Commission, 2011, A).  
It has already been pointed out that on June 27, 2012 and after the Libor scandal the 
Commission presented amendments to the proposed MAR in order to include all 
benchmarks in the Regulation, provided that these determine the amount payable under a 
financial instrument (European Commission, 2012, B).  
The amended proposal for a Regulation would prohibit natural or legal persons from 
transmitting false or misleading information, providing false or misleading inputs, or any 
action which manipulated the calculation of a benchmark, including the manipulation of 
benchmarks' methodologies (European Commission, 2012, B). 
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5.4.2 Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive (CSMAD) 
The MAD leaves to Member States to adopt sanctions and decide whether or not to 
impose criminal sanctions. Moreover, the definition of which forms of insider dealing or 
market manipulation constitute criminal offences diverges considerably from Member 
State to Member State. 
According to the Commissions rationale there have to be imposed common minimum 
rules on criminal offences and on criminal sanctions for market abuse. These rules are 
expected to facilitate the cooperation of law enforcement and judicial authorities in the 
Union (European Commission, 2011, A) 
Subject to criminal sanctions are proposed to be the offences of insider dealing and 
market. The proposal also requires Member States to criminalize inciting, aiding and 
abetting insider dealing and market manipulation, as well as attempts at these forms of 
market abuse (European Commission, 2011, A).  
The Member States are required by the proposed Directive to ensure that the criminal 
offences defined in the CSMAD are punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal sanctions. 
After the Libor scandal the Commission presented amendments to the proposed CSMAD 
in order to ensure that manipulation of benchmarks is subject to criminal sanctions. In 
this way the Commission tries to obtain the effective enforcement of EU policy on 
market integrity methodologies (European Commission, 2012, B). 
In particular the amended proposal for a CSMAD extends the scope of the criminal 
offence of market manipulation to cover the direct manipulation of benchmarks, if 
committed intentionally. The amended proposal also requires Member States to 
criminalise inciting, aiding and abetting the manipulation of benchmarks, as well as 
attempts at such manipulation methodologies (European Commission, 2012, B). 
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5.4.3 Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) 
After the shock of the 2008 financial crisis the 20 major economies (G20) decided to 
take action. At the 2009 Pittsburgh summit the G20 agreed that it was of great 
importance to implement more explicit rules on the less regulated markets in an attempt 
to improve their transparency and oversight. 
This agreement had as a result the European Commission to propose the review of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and a Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). Scope of MiFID and MiFIR is to make financial 
markets more efficient, resilient and transparent, and to strengthen the protection of 
investors (European Commission, 2011, C).   
The Commission decided some elements of MiFID to be placed in a directive and others 
in a regulation. According to the European Commission this split reflects the need to 
achieve a uniform set of rules in some areas, while allowing for national specificities in 
others (European Commission, 2011, D).  
In particular MiFIR proposed setting out requirements on a) the disclosure of data on 
trading activity to the public and transaction data to regulators and supervisors; b) the 
mandatory trading of derivatives on organised venues; c) removing barriers between 
trading venues and providers of clearing services to ensure more competition; and d) 
specific supervisory actions regarding financial instruments and positions in derivatives. 
On the other hand MiFID amends existing provisions on authorisation and organisational 
requirements for providers of investment services, and all rules regarding investor 
protection, including for firms located in third countries but actively engaged in EU 
markets. Also included in the directive are the authorisation and organisational rules 
applicable to different types of trading venue, providers of market data and other 
reporting services, as well as the complete powers to be granted by Member States to 
national competent authorities, including the framework of sanctions for breaches of the 
rules. These provisions are best situated in a directive to account for differences in 
national markets and legal structures as well as the profile of local investors (European 
Commission, 2011, D).  
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Trading in allowance derivatives is already covered by MiFID and MAD. However, this 
not the case for EUAs trading in the spot market as the spot transactions are not 
supervised. The proposals bring the spot trading of EUAs under the same framework 
with the EUA derivatives market. 
Therefore MiFID and MAD are expected to provide a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for the trading in carbon market. The inclusion of EUAs under the financial 
markets legislation will introduce greater security for traders of EUAs (European 
Commission, 2011, D).  
The proposals also intend to include more trading venues under the scope of MiFID. The 
existing Directive covers only regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs). The reviewed MiFID is going to cover also the organized trading facilities 
(OTFs) and the crossing networks (systems operated by investment firms which mainly 
internally match client orders). Essentially with this move the Commission tries to 
ensure that all trading venues are under the same framework (European Commission, 
2011, D). 
Additionally the proposals try to facilitate the access of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) to capital markets. In particular provides for the creation of a specific 
quality label for platforms that aim to meet SMEs' needs. 
Furthermore the proposals try to take into account the technological innovations in 
financial markets. In specific they are introducing safeguards for algorithmic and high 
frequency trading activities. These safeguards include the requirement for all algorithmic 
traders to become properly regulated, provide appropriate liquidity and rules to prevent 
them from adding to volatility by moving in and out of markets. Also, the proposals will 
improve conditions for competition in essential post-trade services such as clearing, 
which may otherwise frustrate competition between trading venues(European 
Commission, 2011, D).  
The proposals are also intent to increase the transparency of financial markets. First there 
are introduced requirements to gather all market data in one place in order investors to 
have an overview of all trading activities in the EU. Also by including OTFs it is 
expected that there will be improvement of the transparency of trading activities in 
equity markets, including "dark pools" (trading volumes or liquidity that are not 
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available on public platforms). Finally it is introduced a new trade transparency regime 
for non-equities markets (i.e. bonds, structured finance products and derivatives) 
(European Commission, 2011, D) 
In this context the proposals also aim to amplify the role of regulators and set stricter 
rules in the derivative markets. The regulators in coordination with the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) will have the power even to ban products 
from the market when they judge that the smooth functioning of the market is 
jeopardized, while they will be able to monitor and intervene at any stage in trading 
activity in all commodity derivatives. The proposals also introduce a position reporting 
obligation by category of trader in an attempt to achieve a more comprehensive 
supervision of the derivative markets (European Commission, 2011, D). 
Another provision of the proposals is to strengthen the investor protection. They set rules 
in order to cover more financial products (eg structured deposits), while they improve the 
context of investment advice and portfolio management. They are foreseen that 
independent advisors and portfolio managers should be prohibited from making or 
receiving third-party payments or other monetary gains in order to avoid conflict of 
interest. They also set rules on corporate governance and managers' responsibility 
(European Commission, 2011, D).  
It has also to be pointed out that a number of other EU financial market measures cross-
referring to the MiFID and may also be applicable to carbon markets. These financial 
market measures include Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Settlement Finality 
Directive
 
and the Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories. 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive sets out rules to protect the financial system against 
the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. This framework is based on 
international standards adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (European 
Commission, 2012, C).  
Scope of the Settlement Finality Directive is to reduce the systematic risk associated 
with the insolvency of a participant in payment and securities settlement systems. The 
Directive also applies to collateral security provided in connection with the participation 
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in a system, or operations of the central banks of the Member States in their functions as 
central banks (European Commission, 2012, D).  
Finally, the proposed Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories is introducing a reporting obligation for OTC derivatives, a clearing 
obligation for  qualifying classes OTC derivatives, and measures to reduce counterparty 
credit risk and operational risk for bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives (European 
Commission, 2010, A, p.8).  
 
5.5 The auctioning Regulation 
During the first two trading periods the auctions carried out under the EU ETS have been 
covered by the existing financial markets legal framework as long they meet some 
certain conditions. The transactions felt under the scope of MAD as long as the products 
traded on a regulated market were financial instruments (derivatives). Additionally the 
MiFID covers emission allowances transactions provided that they are financial 
instruments and they are traded on a regulated market or an MTF (multilateral trading 
facility). 
From the above it is clear that spot trading of emission allowances, as in the most cases 
of auctions from 2005 to 2012, is not covered by the existing financial markets 
legislation and is not protected against market abuse. Thus, the Commission decided to 
introduce specific rules regarding the protection of the primary carbon markets which are 
included in the auctioning Regulation No 1031/2010 amended by the Regulation No 
1210/2011. 
In particular the auctioning Regulation defines timing, administration and other aspects 
for the auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances for the third trading period, 
while its amendment covers the early auctions of phase III emission allowances during 
2012. Furthermore, the Regulation establishes the regulatory framework for the auction 
from 2013 onwards and for the early auctions held in 2012. 
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5.5.1 The link with Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive 
Essentially the regulation is broadening the rules of MAD and Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive in the primary carbon market, as it requires auction platforms and the 
participants in the market to follow the same requirements even if their activity involve 
trading of emission allowances that do not considered financial instruments. 
Article 36 of the Regulation clarifies that when the auctioned allowances fall under the 
scope of MAD, this Directive shall apply to the auctioning of those products. In the case 
that the auctioned products are not financial instruments within the meaning of MAD, 
the Regulation provides for the same rules that MAD foresees to be applied. 
In specific the Regulation in Article 37 gives the same definition as MAD regarding 
inside information and market manipulation. At the same time Articles 38 to 41 require 
the prohibition of insider dealing and market manipulation.  
Moreover Article 42 of the Regulation set specific requirements to mitigate the risk of 
market abuse. The auction platform, the auctioneer and the auction monitor shall each 
draw up a list of those persons working for them, under a contract of employment or 
otherwise, who have access to inside information. Also, persons with managerial 
responsibilities within the above mentioned organizations have to notify the regulators 
for the existence of bids that are linked to them. The auction platform shall adopt 
structural provisions aimed at preventing and detecting market manipulation practices, 
while any participant in the market who reasonably suspects that a transaction might 
constitute market abuse shall notify the competent national authority of the Member 
State. 
Finally the Regulation in Article 43 clarifies that the competent national authorities 
under the MAD are responsible for the market oversight and have the power to take the 
necessary enforcement measures provided by MAD. 
Regarding the connection of the Regulation with the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 
Article 55 determines that the competent national authorities under the Directive in 
question shall monitor and take the necessary measures to ensure compliance. Also the 
auction platform has to cooperate fully with the financial intelligence unit (FIU) 
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(established under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive), while each Member state has 
to ensure that the national measures foreseen by Anti-Money Laundering Directive apply 
to the auction platform appointed in its territory. 
 
5.5.2 Additional measures 
The main innovation on behalf of the European Commission, as an additional safeguard 
against market abuse in the primary market its decision for the appointment of an auction 
monitor. According to Article 24 of the Regulation all the Member States s shall appoint 
an auction monitor following a joint procurement procedure with the Commission. 
The joint procurement agreement between the Commission and the (participating) 
Member States for the auction monitor that will survey the auctions conducted on all 
auction platforms has already entered into force. The agreement lays down the rules 
under which the Commission and the Member States will conduct the joint procurement 
procedure. 
The role of the auction monitor is to monitor whether the auctions held are transparent 
and ensure fair and open access, while it will supervise the price formation and technical 
and operational aspects. The auction monitor shall report to the Commission regarding 
the proper implementation of the auctions conducted and it will provide an annual 
consolidated report to the Member States and the Commission that shall comprise all the 
relevant data regarding the primary carbon market behavior (Regulation No 1031/2010, 
2010, a. 25). 
Furthermore the Regulation foresees that auctioneers, auction platforms and the 
competent national authorities shall assist the auction monitor and provide it with any 
information in their possession relating to the auctions. 
Nevertheless the auction monitor is not the only authority responsible to monitor the 
auctions. The European Commission will also have a supervising role as it will be 
responsible on the functioning of all auctions held on all platforms. 
Additionally, according to Article 54 of the Regulation the auction platforms shall 
monitor the relationship with bidders admitted to bid, shall ensure that the documents, 
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data or information it holds on a bidder are kept up-to-date, while it shall keep records 
regarding all the transactions. 
The Regulation set also some additional rules in order to strengthen further the 
regulatory framework. Article 57 gives the auction platform the power to impose a 
maximum bid-size, or any other remedial measures necessary to mitigate an actual or 
potential discernible risk of market  abuse, money laundering, terrorist financing or other 
criminal activity, as well as anti-competitive behavior. These measures may be imposed 
by any auction platform after consulting the Commission and obtaining its opinion 
thereon. 
Finally, Artcle 59 determines the obligations of the eligible bidders and the relationship 
with their clients. It also clarifies the responsibilities of the competent national 
authorities regarding the authorization and monitoring of the eligible bidders and gives 
them the power to enforce compliance. In addition it elucidates the responsibilities of the 
Member States to give their competent national authorities the necessary investigative 
powers and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. 
 
5.6 The energy markets legislation 
As power companies (alongside with the financial intermediates) are the major players in 
the European primary and secondary carbon market, an examination of the market 
oversight has to take into account also the energy market legislation.  
In particular the recent Regulation on Wholesale Energy Markets Integrity and 
Transparency (REMIT) for monitoring the wholesale energy markets has 
interdependences with EU ETS. 
REMIT is Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency. The 
Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 8
th
 December 
2011 and entered into force on 28
th
 December 2011. 
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Scope of the REMIT is to prevent wholesale energy market abuse and market 
manipulation. Therefore the Regulation complements and expands the scope of the 
Market Abuse Directive (MAD) to cover wholesale energy products. 
Article 1 of the Regulation clarifies that when the wholesale energy products are 
financial instruments fall under the scope of MAD. In the case that the wholesale energy 
products are not financial instruments within the meaning of MAD are covered by this 
Regulation.  
Article 2 of REMIT gives the same definition as MAD regarding inside information and 
market manipulation. Also Articles 3 and 5 require the prohibition of insider dealing and 
market manipulation respectively.  
However REMIT introduces explicit prohibitions against insider dealing. In particular 
Article 3 defines that people who possess inside information in relation to a wholesale 
energy product shall be prohibited from:  
a) using that information by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or 
dispose of, for their own account or for the account of a third party, either directly 
or indirectly, wholesale energy products to which that information relates; 
(b) disclosing that information to any other person unless such disclosure is made 
in the normal course of the exercise of their employment, profession or duties; 
(c) recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of inside information, 
to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy products to which that information 
relates. 
The above prohibition according to Article 3 applies to the following persons: bmembers 
of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of an undertaking; b) persons 
with holdings in the capital of an undertaking; c) persons with access to the information 
through the exercise of their employment, profession or duties; d) persons who have 
acquired such information through criminal activity; e) persons who know, or ought to 
know, that it is inside information. 
[190] 
 
Furthermore Article 13 implements prohibitions against market abuse in general. In 
specific each Member State shall ensure that its national regulatory authorities have the 
necessary investigatory and enforcement powers. These investigatory and enforcement 
powers include the right to: 
a) Have access to any relevant document in any form, and to receive a copy of it; 
b) Demand information from any relevant person, including those who are 
successively involved in the transmission of orders or conduct of the 
operations concerned, as well as their principals, and, if necessary, the right to 
summon and hear any such person or principal; 
c) Carry out on-site inspections; 
d) Require existing telephone and existing data traffic records; 
e) Require the cessation of any practice that is contrary to this Regulation or 
delegated acts or implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof; 
f) Request a court to freeze or sequester assets; 
g) Request a court or any competent authority to impose a temporary prohibition 
of professional activity 
Moreover, Article 4 foresees that wholesale energy markets participants are obliged to 
publicly disclose inside information in an effective and timely manner. It also provides 
for some exceptions from the above obligation. 
Regarding the particularities of REMIT, the Regulation defines that trading in wholesale 
energy market is subject to monitoring by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER).  
ACER has the duty to detect and prevent trading based on market abuse and shall at least 
annually submit a report to the Commission on its activities under this Regulation and 
make this report publicly available.  
Also Article 7 clarifies that ACER shall cooperate at regional level with national 
regulatory authorities in carrying out the monitoring of wholesale energy markets. For 
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this purpose national regulatory authorities shall have access to relevant information held 
by ACER, while they may also monitor trading activity in wholesale energy products at 
national level. 
Furthermore ACER has the responsibility to establish mechanisms to share information 
with national regulatory authorities, competent financial authorities of the Member 
States, national competition authorities, European Securities and Market Authority 
(ESMA) and other relevant authorities (Regulation No 1227/2011, 2011, a. 10).  
Another aim of ACER, under Article 16, is to ensure that national regulatory authorities 
carry out their tasks under REMIT in a coordinated and consistent way. So ACER has 
also the role of the supervisor of the national regulatory authorities. On their part the 
national regulatory authorities shall provide all the relevant information to ACER, 
including suspicions for possible market abuse. 
REMIT set also rules for the participants in the wholesale energy market. The 
participants in the market are obliged under the Regulation to provide ACER with a 
record of wholesale energy market transactions, including orders to trade. Also Article 8 
obliges them to provide ACER and national regulatory authorities with information 
related to the capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption or 
transmission of electricity or natural gas or related to the capacity and use of LNG 
facilities, including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities. 
On the other hand ACER is responsible to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
protection of the information received and shall take all necessary measures to prevent 
any misuse of, and unauthorised access to, the information maintained in its systems 
(Regulation No 1227/2011, 2011, a. 12). 
Under Article 9 of REMIT the market participants have also the obligation register with 
the national regulatory authority in the Member State in which they are established or 
resident or, if they are not established or resident in the Union, in a Member State in 
which they are active.  
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Additionally, any participant in the wholesale energy market who reasonably suspects 
that a transaction constitute market abuse shall notify the corresponding national 
regulatory authority. 
Finally regarding the penalties to be imposed under REMIT, Article 18 points out that 
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the 
Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. 
The penalties must be effective, dissuasive and proportionate, reflecting the nature, 
duration and seriousness of the infringement, the damage caused to consumers and the 
potential gains from trading on the basis of inside information and market manipulation. 
 
5.6.1 Interdependences of REMIT with EU ETS  
As it has already been mentioned only the wholesale energy products that are not 
financial instruments are fall under the scope of REMIT. Therefore it is clear that 
emission allowances are not covered by REMIT and they are regulated by the MAD. 
Nevertheless REMIT has some indirect effects on the primary and secondary European 
carbon market as it concerns a market (energy market) with significant linkages to 
carbon trading. 
Introduction of REMIT have a disciplining effect on the overall energy market behavior. 
As energy companies comply with certain rules under REMIT they overall conduct is 
reflected in both the energy and carbon markets. 
In plain words as the transactions between energy companies and European carbon 
markets are supervised by REMIT, there is a greater protection against a possible market 
abuse. 
Another implication of REMIT is that ensures the proper functioning of the wholesale 
energy market and oversees the fluctuations in the price of electricity, trying to secure 
that prices reflect the real expectations of the market.  
Several studies have proved that fluctuations in the price for electricity strongly 
influence also the prices of emissions allowances. Thus by ensuring that the price of 
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electricity is not manipulated REMIT also protect the price of emission allowances in an 
indirect way. 
Ultimately, the transparency achieved by REMIT through the timely and 
appropriate publication of inside information by electricity generators is also significant 
for European carbon markets. As the inside information of the big players in the market 
became public there is almost not room for market abuse in both the energy and the 
carbon market (Emissions-EUETS web page, 2012). 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
The main conclusion deriving from this Chapter is that a constantly evolving carbon 
market needs constantly evolving monitoring rules. A well established legal framework 
secures fair and efficient trading conditions for all market participants, while it protects 
the market from fraudulent acts. 
Within this Chapter is demonstrated that the European Commission and the financial 
market legislation is relevant for the market of emission allowances to the extent that 
transactions in the market involve use of financial instruments. Nevertheless, two 
specific reasons made clear that the market is not sufficiently protected. 
Primarily, some incidents during the period 2009-2010 showed that there are loopholes 
in the current financial market legislation. Furthermore, the spot transactions are 
currently not subject to equivalent rules with the derivatives transactions at the EU level 
and are not supervised.  
Thus, the Commission judged that protective measures only against insider dealing and 
market manipulation were not enough and decided to address additional forms of market 
misconduct, such as money laundering, terrorist financing and other criminal activities. 
The Commission took action and proposed the amendment of the existing market 
legislation. Thus, it can be concluded that the ability of the European Commission to 
embrace the problems and propose solutions is the confirmation that in the EU ETS the 
market rules are evolving accordingly with the market growth. 
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Another conclusion is that the Commission is concentrating on ensuring the integrity of 
the auctions to be held as from the beginning of 2013. In order to achieve this goal the 
Commission decided that Member States shall appoint an auction monitor. This auction 
monitor will monitor whether the auctions held are transparent and ensure fair and open 
access, while it will supervise the price formation and technical and operational aspects. 
The final conclusion deriving from this chapter is that the Regulation on Wholesale 
Energy Markets Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) is not covering the emission 
allowances, but it has some indirect effects on the primary and secondary European 
carbon markets. By ensuring the smooth functioning of the energy market, REMIT is 
also protecting carbon markets against market abuse and price manipulation. 
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Chapter 6: Summing up 
This thesis attempts to draw some conclusions regarding the auctioning and trading of 
emission allowances under the EU ETS by examining the basic elements of these two 
particular functions. The more specific scope of the thesis was on one hand to collect 
information, analyze and assess the auctions held in the different phases of EU ETS from 
2005 onwards as a means of allowance allocation in the primary market and on the other 
hand to review the various emission allowances products traded in the European carbon 
exchanges and the monitoring rules governing the carbon market. 
To the best of my knowledge this study offers for the first time an empirical analysis of 
the design and the results of the implemented emission allowances auctions from certain 
Member States during phase II of the EU ETS. Furthermore, it investigates the rules to 
be governing the auctions during phase III, while it displays the leftovers that the 
European Commission has to deal with.  
Additionally, as far as I know this is the first time that a study is gathering such an 
amount of the various trading analytics of the different emission credit products 
transacted both in the primary and in the secondary market. Moreover, by using 
statistical tools tries to draw conclusions regarding the degree of interdependence 
between the four main products traded in the European carbon exchanges (EUAs, CERs, 
ERUs, and EUAAs) and the price interrelationship of the different contracts (spot, 
futures) offered for each product.  
At the same time, this dissertation performs a thorough investigation of the European 
Commission monitoring rules either already in place or in a proposal status to prohibit 
market abuse, including the recent REMIT regulation for monitoring the wholesale 
energy markets and its potential interdependences with EU ETS. To the best of my 
knowledge this dissertation offers the first assessment regarding the implications of 
REMIT in the carbon markets, while it is the first time that the entire legal framework 
governing the European carbon markets is put together under the same paper. 
This investigation has lead to some basic conclusions.  The primary emission allowances 
market is in full interdependence with the secondary carbon market. All GHG emissions 
trading products as offered in both primary and secondary markets have obtained the 
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characteristics of all the others trading commodities. The transition from phase II to 
phase III of the EU ETS is considered of paramount importance by the European 
Commission.  In an expanding carbon market a constantly evolving legal framework 
ensures the integrity of the market and secures fair and efficient trading conditions. 
These observations lead to an overall conclusion: an efficient, transparent, and 
smooth-functioning market is the result of different factors combined effectively. 
Chapter 2 discussed the influence of the secondary carbon market over the auctions 
and concluded that an efficient secondary market is the key for the success of the 
auctions and hence of the EU ETS. If someone consider the spread between the 
secondary market price and the clearing price as the determinant that defines the 
interdependence between the two markets, the indications are clear in all the auctions 
held both in phases I and II: Clearing prices generally did not deviate from lead markets 
by more than a few percentage points, while the primary market price and the secondary 
market price seem to move in parallel.  
Thus, the level of the secondary market price seems to determine the clearing price of the 
auction. Consequently, it can be concluded that a transparent and smooth-functioning 
secondary market is the key for the success of the auctions and hence of the EU ETS. 
In addition, from the auctions held (especially in phase II as they number was by far 
greater) some conclusions derived regarding the behavior of the market participants and 
the fluctuation of the clearing price. In specific the interested firms in emission credits 
seem to prefer buying allowances via intermediates, the primary market seems to have 
obtained balance as the sellers adopt successfully to price fluctuation, while the demand 
defines the level of the closing prices. 
There are also some additional observations regarding the auctions held into the two 
different trading periods. In phase I the number of auctions was limited by a few 
Member States, the lack of experience of the sellers was obvious, and overallocation of 
allowances led some auctions to failure. The auctions carried out during phase II seem to 
tell a different story compared to what happened in the first trading period. The auctions 
were more often by a lot of Member States and some countries (Germany and UK) 
performed many of them. The Member States had some previous experience, while the 
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price followed a much more normal path. Thus, this series of auctions could be 
considered as successful. 
It is also demonstrated that the type of contract does not affect the auctions performance. 
The German futures auctions have shown that the derivative products’ price behavior 
seems to be in accordance with the spot products price. Therefore, the strategy 
undertaken by Germany regarding the futures auctions can be a leading example 
regarding the products are going to be offered during Phase III auctions.  
It is finally demonstrated that the auction method is considered to be a key element for 
the success of the scheme, while there are presented the arguments of those in favor of 
auctioning and the supporters of the grandfathering solutions and is concluded that 
auctioning of allowances prevails over free allocation. 
Another basic conclusion of this thesis is the importance of the transition from the 
second to the third trading period. Chapter 3 presents the specific decisions of the 
European Commission in order to achieve this goal and the decisions yet to be made by 
January 2013. It is concluded that European Commission has done some very important 
steps in order to achieve its goal but it still has to make some final adjustments. 
It is also discussed the way in which the Commission tries to achieve its target. In 
particular the Commission action is divided in two main streams. The one is the 
accomplishment of auctions from 2013 onwards and the other is the implementation of 
early auctions. The Chapter presents all the decisions made in both streams and displays 
the decisions that have not been made yet. 
Additionally, it is pointed out that early auctions are serving the Commission in an 
additional way. Through the early auctions under the so called NER 300 program the 
Commission intends to fund innovative low-carbon projects within the borders of the 
European Union.  
Moreover, there is an observation regarding their performance of the early auctions 
already held under the NER 300 program. The auctions results are identical with those of 
the auctions carried out during the second trading period of the EU ETS. Someone can 
notice the same behaviors both in terms of market participants and price formation. 
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The third Chapter discusses another main conclusion of this thesis: all GHG emissions 
trading products as offered in primary and mainly in secondary markets are 
transacted as any other commodity. All the markets of commodities across the globe 
have some specific characteristics: There is enough liquidity in the market, all the 
interested parties can participate, there is availability of many different contract types, 
and the price is formatting according to the market participants’ expectations. Especially 
the European secondary market meets all the conditions and it can be concluded that 
carbon emission allowances are traded as any other commodity.  
The European carbon exchanges seem to have obtained the characteristics of the 
exchanges for other types of commodities such as stock exchanges. There is a wide 
variety of contracts based on the four main carbon products they offer (EUAs, CERs, 
ERUs, and EUAAs), the market is open to all interested parties, while the value of the 
European secondary carbon market and the volume of transactions are growing 
exponentially.  
Additionally, there are clear indications that the prices of the contracts of the same 
product with different maturities tend to move in parallel, while the price of the different 
products is following the participants’ expectations. All the statistical tools that have 
been used tend to confirm both arguments.  
Furthermore, it is pointed out that EUAs transactions are dominating the European 
secondary carbon market as their volume and value are about five times greater than 
these of the CERs and ERUs transactions combined. 
Regarding the global primary carbon market it also seems to operate smoothly even 
though its value and volume of transactions are much smaller than these of the secondary 
market. The market has many participants, it is open to everyone interested to perform 
trading, the prices are following the participants’ expectations, while its value is a sign of 
sufficient liquidity.  
In the primary market are traded the three products linked to the Kyoto Protocol: AAUs, 
CERs, and ERUs. Each product has different characteristics and is traded in different 
terms. CERs’ primary market is the largest of all three both in terms of volume and 
value. 
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The facts within this thesis indicate that the European carbon market has faced a notable 
growth since its implementation in 2005. Thus, in a constantly evolving market a 
constantly evolving legal framework is of great importance in order to be ensured a 
smooth-functioning market. Chapter 5 displays the legal framework in place to protect 
European carbon market from fraudulent acts. 
It is concluded that the European Commission and the financial market legislation is 
relevant for the market of emission allowances to the extent that transactions in the 
market involve use of financial instruments. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that the 
carbon market is not sufficiently protected. In particular, there are loopholes in the 
current financial market legislation, the spot transactions are not protected, and the 
protective measures only against insider dealing and market manipulation are not 
enough. 
The European Commission recognizes the fact that the market is not sufficiently 
protected and it has taken action by proposing an amendment of the existing regulation. 
This behavior is a clear indication that in the EU ETS the market rules are evolving 
accordingly with the market growth. 
From this Chapter arises also the conclusion that the European Commission is 
particularly interested on ensuring the integrity of the auctions to be held as from the 
beginning of 2013. In this direction the Commission decided that Member States shall 
appoint an auction monitor, which will have the task to ensure the efficiency of the 
auctions. 
Finally, the REMIT Regulation is not covering the emission allowances, but it has some 
indirect effects on the primary and secondary European carbon markets. Scope of the 
REMIT is to ensure the smooth-functioning of the energy market. However, in this way 
the Regulation is also protecting the carbon markets against market abuse and price 
manipulation. 
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Appendix A 
Mean equality tests and variance equality tests between different pairs of series 
German spot auctions clearing prices and secondary market spot prices 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 48 2.09E-15 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 48.00000 2.09E-15 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 48) 4.36E-30 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 48) 4.36E-30 1.0000 
     
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (24, 24) 1.071461 0.8671 
Siegel-Tukey  0.106723 0.9150 
Bartlett 1 0.027997 0.8671 
Levene (1, 48) 0.023302 0.8793 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 48) 0.002697 0.9588 
     
     German futures auctions clearing prices and secondary market futures prices 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 48 3.93E-16 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 48.00000 3.93E-16 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 48) 1.54E-31 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 48) 1.54E-31 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (24, 24) 1.008748 0.9832 
Siegel-Tukey  0.223143 0.8234 
Bartlett 1 0.000446 0.9832 
Levene (1, 48) 0.001957 0.9649 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 48) 0.000000 1.0000 
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UK auctions clearing prices and secondary market prices 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 56 -2.64E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 56.00000 -2.64E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 56) 6.99E-12 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 56) 6.99E-12 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (28, 28) 1.021406 0.9557 
Siegel-Tukey  0.101090 0.9195 
Bartlett 1 0.003085 0.9557 
Levene (1, 56) 0.000589 0.9807 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 56) 0.003531 0.9528 
     
      
Greek auctions clearing prices and secondary market prices 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 30 -5.85E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 30.00000 -5.85E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 30) 3.42E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 30) 3.42E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (15, 15) 1.149659 0.7906 
Siegel-Tukey  0.358045 0.7203 
Bartlett 1 0.070530 0.7906 
Levene (1, 30) 0.107095 0.7457 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 30) 0.106917 0.7460 
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NER 300 futures early auctions clearing prices and secondary market futures 
prices 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 62 0.018449 0.9853 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 62.00000 0.018449 0.9853 
Anova F-test (1, 62) 0.000340 0.9853 
Welch F-test* (1, 62) 0.000340 0.9853 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
 
      
      Method df Value Probability  
      
      F-test (31, 31) 1.066319 0.8593  
Siegel-Tukey  0.190246 0.8491  
Bartlett 1 0.031442 0.8593  
Levene (1, 62) 0.099864 0.7531  
Brown-Forsythe (1, 62) 0.085287 0.7712  
      
       
Spot EUA and DEC 12 EUA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -9.31E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 -9.31E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 8.66E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 8.66E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.079173 0.6956 
Siegel-Tukey  0.153827 0.8777 
Bartlett 1 0.153090 0.6956 
Levene (1, 212) 0.184941 0.6676 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.139444 0.7092 
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Spot EUA and DEC 13 EUA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -1.41E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 -1.41E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 1.99E-12 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 1.99E-12 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.038881 0.8447 
Siegel-Tukey  0.272399 0.7853 
Bartlett 1 0.038374 0.8447 
Levene (1, 212) 0.074396 0.7853 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.031575 0.8591 
     
     
Spot EUA and DEC 14 EUA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 1.03E-05 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-
test* 212.0000 1.03E-05 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 1.06E-10 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 1.06E-10 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.055739 0.7806 
Siegel-Tukey  0.221906 0.8244 
Bartlett 1 0.077590 0.7806 
Levene (1, 212) 0.128278 0.7206 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.175181 0.6760 
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DEC 12 EUA and DEC 13 EUA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -7.90E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 -7.90E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 6.24E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 6.24E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.038784 0.8451 
Siegel-Tukey  0.273209 0.7847 
Bartlett 1 0.038185 0.8451 
Levene (1, 212) 0.023338 0.8787 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.041316 0.8391 
     
          
 
 
    
DEC 12 EUA and DEC 14 EUA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -1.00E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 -1.00E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 1.00E-12 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 1.00E-12 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.139325 0.5031 
Siegel-Tukey  0.346734 0.7288 
Bartlett 1 0.448424 0.5031 
Levene (1, 212) 0.626866 0.4294 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.661410 0.4170 
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DEC 12 EUA and DEC 12 CER 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 5.148090 0.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 168.9728 5.148090 0.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 26.50283 0.0000 
Welch F-test* 
(1, 
168.973) 26.50283 0.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.264355 0.2289 
Siegel-Tukey  -4.02E-15 1.0000 
Bartlett 1 1.447850 0.2289 
Levene (1, 212) 0.231316 0.6310 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.249159 0.6182 
     
      
DEC 12 EUA and DEC 12 ERU 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 5.148101 0.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 168.9728 5.148101 0.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 26.50295 0.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 168.973) 26.50295 0.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
 
Variance equality test 
 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.211602 0.3246 
Siegel-Tukey  -4.02E-15 1.0000 
Bartlett 1 0.970248 0.3246 
Levene (1, 212) 0.332129 0.5650 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.379933 0.5383 
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DEC 12 CER and DEC 12 ERU 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -8.59E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 -8.59E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 7.37E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 7.37E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.043540 0.8268 
Siegel-Tukey  0.242813 0.8082 
Bartlett 1 0.047903 0.8268 
Levene (1, 212) 0.003854 0.9506 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.006452 0.9361 
     
      
DEC 13 CER and DEC 13 ERU 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 5.16E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 5.16E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 2.66E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 2.66E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.024460 0.9012 
Siegel-Tukey  0.085967 0.9315 
Bartlett 1 0.015403 0.9012 
Levene (1, 212) 0.056184 0.8129 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.064182 0.8002 
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DEC 12 CER and DEC 13 CER 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 4.22E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 4.22E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 1.78E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 1.78E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.032380 0.8700 
Siegel-Tukey  0.761044 0.4466 
Bartlett 1 0.026783 0.8700 
Levene (1, 212) 3.07E-05 0.9956 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 4.91E-05 0.9944 
     
      
DEC 12 ERU and DEC 13 ERU 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 9.52E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 9.52E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 9.07E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 9.07E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances  
 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.051607 0.7961 
Siegel-Tukey  0.644762 0.5191 
Bartlett 1 0.066778 0.7961 
Levene (1, 212) 0.033565 0.8548 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.032858 0.8563 
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SPOT EUA and SPOT EUAA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 138 9.61E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 138.0000 9.61E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 138) 9.24E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 138) 9.24E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability  
      
      F-test (69, 69) 1.022202 0.9276  
Siegel-Tukey  1.261344 0.2072  
Bartlett 1 0.008258 0.9276  
Levene (1, 138) 0.033803 0.8544  
Brown-Forsythe (1, 138) 0.042423 0.8371  
      
      
DEC 12 EUA and DEC 12 EUAA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 2.77E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 212.0000 2.77E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 7.67E-12 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 7.67E-12 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.035737 0.8569 
Siegel-Tukey  0.398550 0.6902 
Bartlett 1 0.032518 0.8569 
Levene (1, 212) 0.104960 0.7463 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.072975 0.7873 
     
      
 
[219] 
 
DEC 12 EUAA and DEC 13 EUAA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 212 -1.56E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 
212.000
0 -1.56E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 212) 2.44E-12 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 212) 2.44E-12 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (106, 106) 1.040235 0.8395 
Siegel-Tukey  0.667190 0.5047 
Bartlett 1 0.041039 0.8395 
Levene (1, 212) 0.037201 0.8472 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 212) 0.056015 0.8131 
     
     
SPOT EUAA and DEC 12 EUAA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 138 -3.82E-06 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 138.0000 -3.82E-06 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 138) 1.46E-11 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 138) 1.46E-11 1.0000 
     
     *Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (69, 69) 1.010448 0.9657 
Siegel-Tukey  0.358439 0.7200 
Bartlett 1 0.001850 0.9657 
Levene (1, 138) 0.002741 0.9583 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 138) 0.010195 0.9197 
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Spot EUAA and DEC 13 EUAA 
Mean equality test (series normalized) 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     t-test 138 9.28E-08 1.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-
test* 138.0000 9.28E-08 1.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 138) 8.62E-15 1.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 138) 8.62E-15 1.0000 
     
          
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
Variance equality test 
     
     Method df Value Probability 
     
     F-test (69, 69) 1.050419 0.8387 
Siegel-Tukey  1.255217 0.2094 
Bartlett 1 0.041434 0.8387 
Levene (1, 138) 0.124359 0.7249 
Brown-Forsythe (1, 138) 0.082348 0.7746 
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Appendix B 
EEX closing prices of various contracts between 30
th
 of April 2012 and 30
th
 of September 
2012 (EEX web page, 2012) 
 
Date 
 
EUA 
Spot 
DEC 
12 
EUA 
DEC 
13 
EUA 
DEC 
14 
EUA 
DEC 
12 
CER 
DEC 
13 
CER 
DEC 
12 
ERU 
DEC 
13 
ERU 
EUAA 
spot 
DEC 
12 
EUAA 
DEC 
13 
EUAA 
30/4/2012 7.33 7.60 8.08 8.66 3.92 4.40 3.58 4.25 - 7.40 8.05 
2/5/2012 7.39 7.23 7.68 8.20 3.70 4.13 3.48 4.04 - 6.71 7.16 
3/5/2012 7.04 7.16 7.61 8.13 3.67 4.08 3.47 3.97 - 6.64 7.20 
4/5/2012 6.90 6.70 7.13 7.58 3.60 3.92 3.44 3.79 - 6.14 6.56 
7/5/2012 6.53 6.73 7.16 7.66 3.55 3.87 3.39 3.74 - 6.17 6.59 
8/5/2012 6.58 6.84 7.26 7.72 3.66 3.95 3.47 3.79 - 6.32 6.75 
9/5/2012 6.78 6.79 7.20 7.63 3.70 3.97 3.50 3.78 - 6.27 6.68 
10/5/2012 6.73 6.75 7.15 7.59 3.66 3.94 3.47 3.75 - 6.41 6.83 
11/5/2012 6.56 6.83 7.22 7.67 3.66 3.94 3.45 3.78 - 6.34 6.84 
14/5/2012 6.54 6.67 7.09 7.50 3.63 3.89 3.46 3.78 - 6.15 6.55 
15/5/2012 6.53 6.56 6.96 7.41 3.67 3.90 3.43 3.74 - 6.04 6.45 
16/5/2012 6.33 6.58 6.95 7.46 3.70 3.98 3.51 3.84 - 6.26 6.67 
18/5/2012 6.33 6.43 6.85 7.30 3.43 3.74 3.20 3.49 - 5.95 6.35 
21/5/2012 6.50 6.70 7.11 7.57 3.55 3.82 3.28 3.49 - 6.24 6.64 
22/5/2012 6.71 7.00 7.42 7.90 3.66 3.98 3.49 3.84 - 6.66 7.09 
23/5/2012 6.64 6.80 7.22 7.71 3.55 3.86 3.34 3.61 - 6.35 6.77 
24/5/2012 6.60 6.89 7.31 7.83 3.60 3.92 3.39 3.75 - 6.58 7.01 
25/5/2012 6.82 6.92 7.36 7.89 3.61 3.91 3.36 3.64 - 6.47 6.92 
29/5/2012 6.67 6.64 7.09 7.62 3.48 3.75 3.23 3.52 - 6.23 6.67 
30/5/2012 6.42 6.50 6.93 7.47 3.38 3.68 3.13 3.44 - 6.06 6.50 
31/5/2012 6.38 6.37 6.81 7.33 3.45 3.73 3.16 3.48 - 5.92 6.36 
1/6/2012 6.14 6.46 6.88 7.38 3.44 3.71 3.16 3.48 - 6.05 6.47 
4/6/2012 6.37 6.50 6.90 7.38 3.43 3.72 3.15 3.49 - 6.09 6.49 
5/6/2012 6.38 6.48 6.90 7.42 3.39 3.67 3.11 3.44 - 6.07 6.49 
6/6/2012 6.39 6.46 6.90 7.41 3.38 3.66 3.15 3.46 - 6.06 6.57 
7/6/2012 6.39 6.54 6.97 7.48 3.36 3.68 3.16 3.48 - 6.14 6.57 
8/6/2012 6.33 6.65 7.06 7.58 3.38 3.72 3.14 3.48 - 6.25 6.66 
11/6/2012 6.62 6.68 7.11 7.63 3.37 3.69 3.06 3.39 - 6.30 6.73 
12/6/2012 6.63 6.73 7.16 7.67 3.32 3.65 3.03 3.36 - 6.33 6.75 
13/6/2012 6.70 6.80 7.20 7.72 3.38 3.70 3.08 3.44 - 6.40 6.83 
14/6/2012 6.65 6.93 7.36 7.86 3.37 3.69 3.10 3.41 - 6.52 6.96 
15/6/2012 6.65 7.32 7.75 8.28 3.54 3.98 3.26 3.58 - 6.94 7.34 
18/6/2012 7.32 7.42 7.83 8.37 3.75 4.08 3.44 3.76 - 7.05 7.47 
19/6/2012 7.50 7.59 8.05 8.56 3.86 4.18 3.55 3.87 - 7.20 7.65 
20/6/2012 7.40 7.51 7.96 8.48 3.81 4.11 3.53 3.84 - 7.12 7.58 
21/6/2012 7.45 7.56 8.01 8.53 3.80 4.11 3.50 3.81 - 7.16 7.62 
22/6/2012 8.06 8.16 8.61 9.20 4.17 4.39 3.84 4.06 - 7.75 8.24 
25/6/2012 7.94 8.06 8.58 9.10 3.97 4.24 3.66 3.93 7.51 7.68 8.18 
26/5/2012 7.96 8.10 8.58 9.14 4.03 4.30 3.69 3.98 7.54 7.72 8.20 
27/6/2012 7.88 7.97 8.45 9.02 3.97 4.27 3.65 3.95 7.47 7.59 8.07 
28/6/2012 7.89 7.98 8.46 9.02 4.02 4.29 3.68 3.97 7.48 7.59 8.07 
29/6/2012 8.19 8.29 8.77 9.34 4.18 4.45 3.82 4.11 7.78 7.90 8.40 
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Date 
 
EUA 
Spot 
DEC 
12 
EUA 
DEC 
13 
EUA 
DEC 
14 
EUA 
DEC 
12 
CER 
DEC 
13 
CER 
DEC 
12 
ERU 
DEC 
13 
ERU 
EUAA 
spot 
DEC 
12 
EUAA 
DEC 
13 
EUAA 
2/7/2012 8.03 8.15 8.64 9.21 4.07 4.34 3.75 4.02 7.59 7.75 8.25 
3/7/2012 8.24 8.34 8.84 9.42 4.15 4.40 3.84 4.09 7.82 7.95 8.45 
4/7/2012 8.22 8.30 8.80 9.38 4.12 4.40 3.85 4.14 7.80 7.92 8.41 
5/7/2012 8.28 8.36 8.86 9.44 4.13 4.39 3.87 4.14 7.84 7.95 8.42 
6/7/2012 7.97 8.07 8.55 9.10 3.91 4.19 3.62 3.89 7.58 7.68 8.16 
9/7/2012 7.92 8.01 8.47 9,01 3.84 4.09 3.52 3.80 7.49 7.66 8.12 
10/7/2012 7.88 7.95 8.44 8.97 3.77 4.02 3.47 3.75 7.43 7.61 8.09 
11/7/2012 7.83 7.91 8.36 8.92 3.62 3.90 3.32 3.60 7.40 7.56 8.04 
12/7/2012 7.61 7.69 8.12 8.65 3.36 3.65 3.05 3.34 7.16 7.34 7.80 
13/7/2012 7.56 7.65 8.11 8.62 3.24 3.54 2.96 3.26 7.16 7.30 7.77 
16/7/2012 7.48 7.57 8.03 8.52 3.17 3.46 2.85 3.15 7.06 7.22 7.68 
17/7/2012 7.63 7.70 8.17 8.68 3.31 3.59 2.98 3.28 7.18 7.35 7.82 
18/7/2012 7.11 7.16 7.60 8.10 3.00 3.29 2.72 3.00 6.66 6.82 7.25 
19/7/2012 6.81 6.87 7.30 7.77 2.98 3.26 2.71 3.01 6.36 6.53 6.95 
20/7/2012 7.03 7.14 7.57 8.06 3.15 3.44 2.84 3.12 6.63 6.79 7.23 
23/7/2012 7.09 7.15 7.59 8.08 3.14 3.43 2.83 3.02 6.63 6.81 7.25 
24/7/2012 7.13 7.20 7.64 8.14 3.17 3.48 2.87 3.17 6.68 6.85 7.29 
25/7/2012 6.79 6.86 7.29 7.77 2.86 3.15 2.56 2.84 6.35 6.50 6.94 
26/7/2012 6.93 6.97 7.42 7.88 2.92 3.24 2.62 2.98 6.51 6.59 7.03 
27/7/2012 6.85 6.93 7.38 7.84 2.89 3.22 2.60 2.95 6.47 6.53 6.97 
30/7/2012 6.54 6.58 7.03 7.47 2.62 2.95 2.35 2.69 6.17 6.24 6.69 
31/7/2012 6.88 6.93 7.38 7.80 2.85 3.17 2.54 2.87 6.48 6.57 7.02 
1/8/2012 6.94 6.98 7.42 7.86 2.87 3.17 2.52 3.01 6.53 6.60 7.04 
2/8/2012 7.03 7.08 7.52 7.97 2.91 3.22 2.62 2.85 6.63 6.70 7.15 
3/8/2012 7.12 7.12 7.53 8.01 2.91 3.22 2.62 2.86 6.67 6.74 7.15 
6/8/2012 7.18 7.20 7.63 8.11 2.97 3.28 2.64 2.94 6.71 6.85 7.30 
7/8/2012 7.28 7.32 7.76 8.25 3.04 3.35 2.72 3.02 6.84 6.97 7.43 
8/8/2012 7.18 7.24 7.67 8.16 2.96 3.25 2.68 3.01 6.74 6.89 7.33 
9/8/2012 7.14 7.15 7.58 8.06 2.93 3.24 2.61 2.94 6.67 6.81 7.23 
10/8/2012 7.18 7.20 7.61 8.13 2.90 3.20 2.60 2.91 6.73 6.86 7.29 
13/8/2012 7.44 7.50 7.93 8.45 3.04 3.34 2.72 3.02 7.02 7.16 7.60 
14/8/2012 7.59 7.65 8.11 8.66 3.04 3.38 2.71 3.04 7.16 7.30 7.76 
15/8/2012 7.45 7.50 7.96 8.49 2.87 3.17 2.55 2.87 7.01 7.15 7.61 
16/8/2012 7.66 7.70 8.16 8.67 2.93 3.25 2.60 2.98 7.28 7.35 7.84 
17/8/2012 7.65 7.71 8.15 8.68 2.92 3.23 2.59 2.89 7.22 7.36 7.81 
20/8/2012 7.60 7.64 8.08 8.62 2.93 3.24 2.60 2.92 7.14 7.29 7.73 
21/8/2012 7.87 7.91 8.36 8.92 2.97 3.29 2.66 2.96 7.45 7.57 8.02 
22/8/2012 7.98 8.03 8.47 9.05 3.02 3.33 2.71 3.01 7.55 7.69 8.13 
23/8/2012 8.11 8.15 8.61 9.19 3.08 3.46 2.83 3.15 7.73 7.80 8.26 
24/8/2012 8.12 8.16 8.61 9.20 3.01 3.40 2.72 3.08 7.70 7.82 8.27 
27/8/2012 8.11 8.16 8.59 9.18 2.97 3.37 2.67 3.01 7.66 7.76 8.22 
28/8/2012 7.91 8.01 8.43 8.99 2.86 3.24 2.58 2.90 7.49 7.63 8.08 
29/8/2012 7.64 7.72 8.12 8.64 2.68 3.02 2.37 2.71 7.19 7.35 7.77 
30/8/2012 7.60 7.67 8.07 8.57 2.62 2.96 2.36 2.72 7.25 7.32 7.72 
31/8/2012 7.92 8.03 8.46 9.00 2.74 3.09 2.48 2.81 7.58 7.66 8.10 
3/9/2012 8.21 8.25 8.67 9.20 2.81 3.16 2.52 2.85 7.78 7.86 8.30 
4/9/2012 8.16 8.19 8.63 9.15 2.72 3.08 2.44 2.77 7.74 7.83 8.26 
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Date 
 
EUA 
Spot 
DEC 
12 
EUA 
DEC 
13 
EUA 
DEC 
14 
EUA 
DEC 
12 
CER 
DEC 
13 
CER 
DEC 
12 
ERU 
DEC 
13 
ERU 
EUAA 
spot 
DEC 
12 
EUAA 
DEC 
13 
EUAA 
5/9/2012 8.21 8.24 8.66 9.15 2.54 2.89 2.24 2.56 7.77 7.86 8.28 
6/9/2012 8.21 8.26 8.67 9.20 2.41 2.75 2.11 2.44 7.83 7.90 8.31 
7/9/2012 8.28 8.36 8.78 9.31 2.40 2.75 2.12 2.44 7.87 7.90 8.33 
10/9/2012 7.85 7.86 8.26 8.78 2.10 2.44 1.84 2.17 7.52 7.52 7.95 
11/9/2012 7.70 7.74 8.13 8.65 2.03 2.36 1.80 2.10 7.33 7.36 7.76 
12/9/2012 7.88 7.96 8.36 8.90 2.12 2.43 1.90 2.19 7.53 7.56 7.99 
13/9/2012 7.74 7.81 8.21 8.76 1.95 2.26 1.70 2.00 7.34 7.43 7.83 
14/9/2012 7.37 7.47 7.84 8.38 1.69 1.97 1.50 1.77 6.98 7.06 7.42 
17/9/2012 7.34 7.39 7.76 8.30 1.55 1.80 1.35 1.59 6.92 7.00 7.35 
18/9/2012 7.41 7.47 7.83 8.38 1.62 1.86 1.44 1.72 7.02 7.09 7.48 
19/9/2012 7.50 7.56 7.94 8.47 1.73 1.96 1.51 1.76 7.11 7.17 7.54 
20/9/2012 7.63 7.67 8.03 8.57 1.84 2.07 1.64 1.87 7.22 7.29 7.67 
21/9/2012 7.39 7.45 7.82 8.35 1.89 2.11 1.71 1.94 6.98 7.04 7.43 
24/9/2012 7.20 7.27 7.63 8.16 1.97 2.16 1.78 2.00 6.80 6.85 7.22 
25/9/2012 7.41 7.46 7.82 8.34 2.05 2.25 1.85 2.10 7.01 7.08 7.43 
26/9/2012 7.58 7.63 7.99 8.49 2.14 2.31 1.94 2.16 7.18 7.25 7.60 
27/9/2012 7.77 7.84 8.21 8.72 2.23 2.37 2.06 2.26 7.40 7.47 7.84 
28/9/2012 7.83 7.94 8.32 8.82 2.19 2.37 2.02 2.26 7.46 7.57 7.95 
 
 
